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ABSTRACT
Relying on new empirical data, derived from a survey, and supplemented by an 
extensive study of available secondary material, this thesis represents the first attempt 
systematically to explore key issues regarding occupational welfare in Russia, with 
special reference to health care.
The thesis is divided into three parts: a discussion of the problematic; an 
investigation of the evolution of policy; and an examination of primary and secondary 
empirical data. The fundamental theoretical problems of occupational welfare are 
approached in the light of research in the West, in the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet 
Russia with emphasis both on divergences and commonalities. It is argued that any 
endeavour to separate Soviet and Western experiences is artificial and ultimately 
unproductive. Rather, the analytical penetration of ideological barriers renders 
possible an examination of their fruitful interaction. On the basis of existing knowledge 
two perspectives of occupational welfare -  social policy and organisation — are 
introduced. An attempt to formulate a general definition of the notion of occupational 
welfare is also made.
The evolution of occupational welfare and in particular its health care component 
are examined in their context, from the Tsarist era, during the Soviet Union and 
through to post-Soviet times, with a concrete aim of elucidating any continuities in 
policy pathways. Contemporary issues are associated with the initial outcomes of 
health reforms in the 1990s that are indispensable for projecting the future prospects 
of occupational welfare.
The empirical component of the thesis reports the results of fieldwork carried out 
in Moscow between 1995 and 1997. The brief was to explore the contemporary status 
of occupational welfare in Russia in the context of changing social policy aims and 
methods evolving in the course of the transformation. The attitudes of senior 
managers of industrial enterprises providing in-kind health services for their employees 
were investigated, as were employers' actual health responsibilities in the light of the 
introduction of compulsory health insurance legislation. It is argued that occupational 
welfare has a distinct sphere of operation and offers potential, not only for the survival 
of the service area but also for its further development in the evolving socio-political 
environment.
The thesis is a first step towards a deeper analysis of occupational welfare in 
Russia: an audit of outstanding issues, although not exhaustive, completes the 
account as an aid to further discussion and research.
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PREFACE
The subject of this thesis is occupational welfare and I have chosen it for 
the two main reasons.
The first one is of the theoretical nature. Occupational welfare whatever it 
is understood is undoubtedly an integral part of economy and hence a social 
policy component. The idea of occupational welfare was initially introduced in 
scientific turnover by Titmuss and until recently has quite undeservingly 
received little attention. That is why it seemed so attractive to me to make an 
inquiry with a view of trying to build a comprehensive conceptual framework 
for the understanding of occupational welfare as an international 
phenomenon and to generate themes and hypothesis to be explored and 
tested through field research.
Occupational welfare is discussed in the context of state social policy, 
equity and equality and employment problems. It inevitably brings us to the 
important role of organisations and industrial enterprises in the first instance 
in the provision of social benefits because the distribution of responsibilities 
between various societal institutions is of the utmost importance.
One of the objectives of the study is to introduce Russia into international 
academic debate on occupational welfare that is now mainly based on the 
experience of the Western states and scarce information about the 
developing countries. It is hoped the Russian (Soviet) model and the related 
issues that are so little known to the world scientific community might be a 
contribution to the general knowledge of occupational welfare which has been 
accumulated elsewhere.
It is also important to define if occupational welfare is a societal 
phenomenon inherent in modern societies regardless of whether they are 
capitalist or socialist. A brief review is made of the stand taken by scholars in 
the West and Russia on the issues, which are likely to form the attitude 
towards occupational welfare. The comparison helps to understand
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differences and similarities between the Western and the Russian (Soviet) 
patterns of occupational welfare and thus to make a conclusion whether they 
can be related to the same phenomenon. If the answer is “yes” then it may 
be suggested that Russia always belonged to the mainstream of the 
development of social welfare systems, and, therefore, has the right to be 
included into the analysis of occupational welfare that is now dominated by 
the Western experiences.
The study of the ways occupational welfare is implemented justifies a 
rather bold attempt to formulate a general definition of the very notion of 
occupational welfare. It is not claimed to be exhaustive but it is believed to be 
instrumental in research and practice.
Special reference is made to health care because of its importance in 
social protection when the access to and the quality of health services are one 
of the main indicators of people’s well being. Moreover, historically welfare 
systems in many countries including Russia were started with the introduction 
of some forms of social protection in health care. The problem is viewed from 
a social and managerial perspective including the role of enterprises, 
definition and organisation.
Nowadays Russia has been going through difficult times of reforms that 
are aimed to create democratic society based on market economy. 
Transformation of the established social and economic order infringes upon 
every aspect of national life including welfare sector, which is closely 
interdependent with people's everyday life. It inevitably necessitates the 
creation and implementation of a new social policy.
In the past are collectivist values and state paternalistic ideology with its 
objectives of the gradual elimination of social inequalities, the constant 
increase in people’s well being and tlhe comprehensive development of 
individual. On the present agenda is development of the system of social 
protection, search for new mechanisms of the settlement of social conflicts 
and reconciliation of interests. A viable social policy adequate to the new 
conditions becomes one of the most important pre-requisites of the success 
of economic and political reforms.
9
The reforms in Russia are structural by nature as they affect the roots of 
the societal system. Political decisions in the social sphere might lead in the 
long run to the formation of a new social model. It is essential in these 
circumstances to define the role of various social institutions in contemporary 
Russian society and the ways social responsibilities are to be distributed 
among them.
Therefore, the fate of the institutions that belonged to the old times 
becomes an issue of an increasing importance. If old institutions are not for 
some reasons compatible with the new social organisation of the Russian 
society and thus should go then the questions arise about what is to come 
instead and what institutions will secure the social rights of the Russian 
people proclaimed in the Fundamental Law of the country. In this context the 
ways to protect people against social risks avoiding any gaps in the social 
protection system are among the most significant problems.
Occupational social services are one of the old institutions of social 
protection of people in employment in Russia. What will happen to them is 
important as they used to be quite widespread in the Soviet Union covering a 
large part of population. Today their role in Russian society is under a severe 
criticism. The main arguments of the opponents stress their inefficiency- 
social services are considered to be a burden for an enterprise and 
incompatible with free market economy. It is alleged that if Russian 
enterprises want to be competitive they should stop providing social services 
for employees. Recipes offered include either closure of social services 
belonging to enterprises or their divestiture to local authorities.
In order to have a full picture of the issue it is necessary to overview 
occupational welfare in Russia, its origins and evolution for at least a century 
and a half. It will enable us to place it within the historical context with a 
purpose of tracing continuity and changes in occupational welfare in various 
historical settings. The three periods of the Russian history are taken: the 
Imperial Russia (1860-1917), the Soviet Union (1917—late 1980s) and the 
post-Soviet Russia (late 1980s~onwards). The study shows that the
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phenomenon of occupational welfare should rather be attributed to the 
Russian society in its historical perspective than just to the Soviet state.
The other purpose of the research is empirical. The overarching aim of 
the empirical study was to give a picture of modern occupational welfare in 
Russia through the study of occupational health care, especially enterprise 
health centres. It was based on the fieldwork carried out during the period of 
1995-1997. The emphasis was laid on exploring the attitude of industrial 
enterprises to health protection of their employees in the context of changing 
relations with the state in this sphere. The situation was investigated in 
interviews with representatives of social policy network in the health sector - 
members of parliament, officials of government bodies and Moscow local 
authorities, staff of health insurance companies, industrial managers. Official 
documents and grey literature were extensively used in the research.
The collection of data on occupational welfare, in general, and health 
care, in particular, is not at present an easy task. Official statistics on the 
subject barely exist and it is difficult to gain the access to information at 
enterprise level because firms may not want to disclose data about their 
private plans. That is why a semi-structured questionnaire was used to find 
out opinions of employers still providing health services to their employees. It 
permitted the identification of issues which employers considered important in 
this matter. The sample comprised fifty industrial establishments in Moscow. 
Two enterprises were researched in more detail and information obtained was 
used to compile two case studies on enterprises, which continue successfully 
to invest in health care protection of their employees. The findings were 
compared with the data of the surveys carried out by the World Bank and 
other international and Russian organisations.
For the reasons mentioned above the findings of the study are limited and 
provisional in many respects. Yet there is ground to hope that despite the 
obvious limitations they can help to encourage the further exploration of such 
complex matter as occupational welfare and to find rational ways of making 
right choices in the solution of occupational welfare issues in Russia.
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PART 1
PROBLEMATIC OF OCCUPATIONAL WELFARE
The study of occupational welfare involves the whole range of theoretical 
issues that have been either not thoroughly researched or simply neglected. It 
is particularly characteristic of Russia where up till now the term "occupational 
welfare" has not even been used. This thesis, therefore, is an attempt to fill this 
gap.
Occupational welfare is a multifaceted phenomenon with properties falling 
into the three main categories:
- conceptual / ideological including equality, equity and employment 
considerations;
- financial / economic including allocation of financial and material 
resources through occupational welfare and tax-related issues;
- organisational / administrative including state regulations concerning the 
right to contract out of compulsory welfare schemes, transferability of rights, 
entitlements requirements; coverage of dependents, etc.
Theoretical analysis is made against the background of Western, Soviet 
and post-Soviet debates. Comparative approach affords the best means 
available to define specific and general features of the phenomenon, 
differences and common grounds of the theory and practice of occupational 
welfare in the West and Russia. In discussion of Russian experiences 
emphasis is laid on the Soviet period with its model of enterprise-based social 
benefits, which substantially differed from what existed in the West. As the 
Russian society has nowadays been undergoing the process of economic and 
social transformation the time has not yet come to make any definite 
conclusions on future changes in the sphere of occupational welfare.
The special attention is paid to the place of organisations/industrial 
enterprises in occupational welfare, to its two perspectives (the organisation
12
perspective and the social policy perspective) and the role of 
employers/management of enterprises.
On the basis of the analysis in this part of the thesis an attempt is made to 
work out a general definition of the very notion of occupational welfare. It is 
clearly understood that the aim is very ambitious because of complexity of the 
subject but it is hoped that readers will be indulgent enough: it will be 
worthwhile even to additionally attract attention to the problem.
Finally, the role of health care in the framework of occupational welfare, 
definitions, principles and organisation of occupational health services, the 
Western and Russian / Soviet experiences in this sphere are dealt with.
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Chapter 1 
On Approaches to the Subject of Occupational Welfare
Chapter 1 is focused on the issues that are fundamental for occupational 
welfare -  equality/equity, employment, state social policy and enterprise-based 
social benefits, economic efficiency, non-statutory occupational provisions, 
enterprise social assets. They are expounded in a form of the debates carried 
out by scholars in the West, the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia. This 
method has afforded a good opportunity of drawing a comparison of different, 
sometimes contradictory view on occupational welfare, to define divergences 
and common grounds in understanding the phenomenon.
1. The Western Debates on Occupational Welfare.
Occupational welfare and equality / equity.
The problem of equality/equity in relation to occupational welfare is usually 
approached from the concept of citizenship and social rights. Whether 
occupational welfare can be considered equitable is much debated issue and 
there is no consensus about it.
The researchers in the field often question the social nature of occupational 
benefits on the grounds that they serve interests of particular groups of workers 
rather than the entire society. While state schemes are available to all people 
who meet certain national requirements organisations/enterprises provide 
social benefits only to their employees. Unlike state welfare provisions 
occupational arrangements have always been designed
"not to cater for those whose welfare needs are greatest but for those who 
are perceived to be most valuable for the company's purposes" (Russell, 1991: 
98).
Occupational welfare, as Mishra (1981) pointed out, might not be 
developed where it was most needed. He suggested that occupational welfare
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could not be considered only as a functional equivalent of social services. He 
pointed out that the crucial difference between these two was that occupational 
welfare created inequalities between different groups of workers as a part of a 
reward structure of an enterprise whereas social welfare discriminated, too, but 
according to different, income criteria. He compared social and occupational 
welfare discrimination lines as quantitative (class) versus qualitative (caste).
Titmuss (1974) commented that inequality arose from such determinants 
as occupational and income achievements. Should people have any privileges 
because they were members of such corporate social structures as 
enterprises? He mentioned that occupational welfare could very likely 
undermine the unified system of social policy, as in practice it could be used
"to divide loyalties, to nourish privilege and to narrow social conscience". 
(Titmuss, 1974: 53)
Titmuss called occupational provisions "concealed multipliers of 
occupational success". Besides, it is often stressed that, first, occupational 
benefits increase dependence of employees on their enterprises in solving 
social welfare problems, and, second, if employees are excluded from 
mainstream social programmes social solidarity in society is weakened.
The major criticism of occupational welfare comes from the fact that it is very 
likely to be a source of inequality. Green and colleagues (1986) believed that 
occupational inequalities could substantially strengthen overall inequality in 
society. Titmuss noted that all three divisions of welfare (social, fiscal and 
occupational) should be taken into account when the effects of occupational 
welfare on equality in the welfare state were appraised.
But, in my view, what is missing in these debates is the subject of what the 
notion of equality means and whether its achievement is, in fact, the aim of the 
welfare state. Conflicting views on the problem are very well illustrated by Le 
Grand versus Powell discussion.
Le Grand in his influential “Strategy of Equality” (1982) distinguished five 
types of equality: equality of public expenditure, equality of final income, 
equality of use, equality of cost, equality of outcome. Proceeding from the
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premise that the objective of the welfare state was to promote equality he came 
to the conclusion that
"the strategy of equality through public provision has failed" (Le Grand, 
1982: 151).
Powell (1995), on the contrary, argued that, first, equality should not be 
defined in distribution terms only and, second, reaching equality might not be 
an objective of the welfare state. He stated that in fact the aim of the welfare 
state was to secure a minimum standard of living.
But occupational welfare is left out of this debate, which is mainly 
concerned with public spending. It definitely fails to secure equality of use and 
access because it is inseparably linked to an employee's position in an 
enterprise. It may even be argued that in this case a double inequality shows up 
as employees not only have jobs but also receive additional social benefits out 
of them.
Occupational welfare and especially its voluntary arrangements might not 
be concerned with the problem of equality and justice in society. That is 
expected to be solved by the state, which is supposed to look after the fairness 
of treatment of different groups of population. As a part of reward structure 
occupational welfare does not have the aim to maintain equality even at a 
particular enterprise to say nothing about a trade or an industry. Green and 
colleagues (1986) pointed at the unequal treatment of the working people 
(manual and non-manual/managerial, part-time/full time, etc.) under 
occupational schemes. Higher paid workers, as a rule, manage to get more 
remuneration in benefits as they are more aware of their advantages as well as 
have a greater ability to negotiate.
In this connection Saunders (1990) noted that it should be accepted that 
the modern society is unequal. It was important to decide whether inequalities 
were just or unjust. If a certain degree of inequality was inevitable then the 
problem was to agree how fair were inequalities generated by occupational 
welfare.
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Rawls’ logic as applied to the analysis of occupational welfare leads to his 
second principle of justice that reads as follows:
" Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both 
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open to all". (Rawls, 1972: 60).
The point (b) pertains to occupational welfare, as inequalities it might 
generate appear in the matters incident to or arising out of employment. In the 
sense of Rawls' comment that inequality in distribution of wealth and income 
should be consistent with equal citizenship and equal opportunity it might be 
argued that occupational welfare in the Western societies can be considered as 
a fair enough system because:
• everyone has a right to choose an occupation;
• occupational plans, as a rule, cover all categories of employees, 
including managerial staff;
• those plans supplement state social programmes when the state fails to 
secure equality in society.
Dutch researchers (Brouwer and Hermans, 1999) resorted to Rawls’ theory 
of justice to prove that special private clinics for employees financed by 
employers could be introduced as functioning on a just and equitable basis. 
Such clinics should afford a possibility for employees to avoid being on long 
waiting lists for medical treatment. The opposition to this idea came from the 
government and majority of public organisations. The Dutch government ruled 
against such plans on the ground they discriminate against non-employees.
Equity is also a matter of a great concern. For example, Evans (1994) 
pointed out that occupational provisions contributed to the unfairness of the tax 
system. They breached horizontal equity as an individual having the same 
income as another one might pay less in taxes if he or she had a higher ratio of 
occupational benefits. On the other hand, they were prone to violate vertical 
equity because higher earners were more likely to get more income in the form 
of occupational benefits.
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Occupational welfare and employment.
Occupational welfare is often treated from the point of view of the right to 
work. But connection between them is not at all straightforward. Social rights, in 
fact, have little relevance to understanding occupational welfare, especially as a 
non-statutory category (Mishra, 1981). On the other hand, occupational benefits 
have presently become to a certain extent institutionalised by legislation or 
through collective bargaining. They are often regarded as a basic entitlement or 
condition of employment and can be treated as rights at work (Green and 
colleagues, 1986), often taken for granted, thus reflecting the changing 
perceptions about social security. Employment tends to be accepted as a 
criterion of distribution of social benefits. Many scholars note that social policy 
issues discussed, for example, at the European Union (the EU) level are 
evidently dominated by employment considerations. The theoretical 
background for it is a gradual shift from broad social citizenship understanding 
of equality to equality of opportunity and overcoming social exclusion or, 
briefly, from welfare to workfare (Lister, 1998).
Another widely discussed problem is the influence of occupational benefits 
on flexibility of labour and creation of new employment (Hart, 1988). The recent 
evident increase in interest in occupational welfare is caused by the rising costs 
of employees’ benefits that are borne by business and the effect they have on 
competitiveness. The creation of the single market in Europe leads to the lifting 
of all barriers to free movement of workers that puts pressure on the member 
countries to harmonise industrial relations and social welfare arrangements. It 
is worth mentioning that both policy makers and researchers in Europe seem to 
be more preoccupied with pension issues while, for example, in the USA 
discussions chiefly concentrate around health care plans.
Mitchel and Rojot (1993) argued that employees’ benefits were usually 
viewed as addition to labour costs. Thus, it was considered that firms with 
higher ratio of these benefits were less competitive. They noted that such an 
approach distorted public policy as benefits affected compensation mix rather 
than level of labour costs.
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Occupational welfare and state social policy
Expectations society might have in relation to occupational welfare and how 
it perceives social responsibilities of business is another important issue. In this 
context discussions evolve around relations between occupational welfare and 
the state or, to be more precise, the welfare state.
Bryson (1992) pointed out that most writers on the welfare states were 
silent on the role occupational welfare played in the welfare state models. 
Rose’s statement (1981) that such an omission serves social and political 
purposes aiming to hide advantages received by already better-off people has 
some rationale but seems too political. Such a neglect of occupational welfare 
in the welfare states typologies may be also explained by other reasons.
Occupational welfare is presumed to be an integral part of social policy but 
welfare state models are usually based on the explicit role of the state whereas 
in regulation of occupational welfare the role of state is often implicit. Therefore, 
occupational welfare is not considered as a mainstream.
Mishra (1981) who argued that occupational welfare consisted merely of 
voluntary provisions definitely included it into a non-statutory sector. Analysing 
two models of the capitalist welfare state, residual and institutional, he 
suggested that in the welfare mix underdevelopment of statutory services led 
to the flourishing of non-statutory sector (the residual model) and, on the 
contrary, well-developed statutory services made the role of non statutory 
agencies secondary (the institutional model). The argument is actually based 
on the premise that each of these two sectors is an alternative category of 
welfare and society expects to have a certain level of welfare at any particular 
moment. In case this level is not secured by the state private sector should 
come out to fill the vacuum and vice versa.
The models constructed by other authors (Titmuss, 1974; Esping- 
Andersen, 1990) dealt with the interplay between the state and market or the 
state and private sector, without defining what they, in fact, included into 
"market forces". Esping-Andersen (1990), discussing the private/public mix in 
pension regimes suggested a rather complicated classification of occupational
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pensions plans. He took explicit government regulations to be the main criterion 
fortheir attribution as public or private.
In general, the role of occupational welfare in implementing social policy is 
underestimated or even completely neglected in the analysis of the welfare 
stcte (Gough, 1979). It is a one-side-effect of broadening the notion of the 
welfare state. Today social welfare is viewed in terms of welfare mix understood 
as the combination of efforts of state institutions and non-governmental 
agencies. Rein and Wadensjo stressed that
"the firm-state interaction is probably the overriding factor in creating a 
change in the welfare mix" (Rein and Wadensjo, 1997:4).
They also noted that exclusion of occupational welfare from the total 
welfare spending distorts understanding of the real scope of welfare states in 
different countries.
But even when occupational welfare becomes the subject of discourse it is 
often seen as something adjacent to the state welfare (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1.
Occupational welfare in relation to the state welfare programmes
Brown and Small Esping- Andersen Rein
supplementing complementing reinforcing
substituting zero-sum relationships antagonistic
Source: Brown, J., and Small, S., 1985 ; Rein M. and Rainwater L.,1986; Esping-
Andersen, G.,1996.
The classifications are based on the view that the state is a prime actor in 
the welfare state. It is the organiser of provision of public services and the 
creator of incentive structure for the development of occupational as well as 
private sectors in welfare (Rein and Wadensjo, 1997).
The dilemma is rather simple: occupational welfare is provided either in 
addition to state arrangements thus covering only a limited proportion of 
workforce or instead/ in absence of state programmes. Therefore, in the first
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case occupational welfare is weak and in the second it largely depends on 
changes in state arrangements.
In my opinion, such classifications are not productive as in many instances 
it is very difficult -- if possible at all -  to judge whether occupational welfare has 
supplementary or parallel functions.
In order to determine relations between occupational welfare and state 
welfare it is suggested that the ratio of compulsory and voluntary contributions 
of employers not only to occupational welfare plans but also to public 
programmes in general should be taken as a criterion (Tachibanaki, 1987). 
These relations can be referred to as "substituting" when, for example, 
voluntary occupational welfare provisions are more substantial than statutory 
ones and the ratio of voluntary to statutory occupational welfare is high.
Brown and Small (1985) suggested that the state and occupational 
provisions were closely interrelated. Green and colleagues (1986) referred to 
relations between the state and employers in social welfare provision as "a 
partnership". Mishra (1981) also called an enterprise a leading partner of the 
state in the business of welfare. But only in a particular context it is possible to 
trace whether a limited scope of public provision stimulated employers to act or 
the state came in because of the lack or insufficiency of occupational 
arrangements.
Before the World War II such phenomenon as "welfare capitalism" 
appeared in the USA. It was a policy of corporations that apart from trying to 
weaken the influence of trade unions and to secure workers’ allegiance was 
aimed to prevent the growth of state welfare provisions. In this way corporations 
sought to ensure their independence from the state and more effective 
distribution of welfare targeting it to their own employees. Thus, welfare incident 
to employment was viewed in the USA as an alternative to state welfare 
arrangements.
The development of occupational welfare inevitably stimulates changes in 
aims and methods of the state social policy and visa versa. The evolution of the 
sick pay in the UK that originated as a voluntary employer's subsidised benefit 
and then was made compulsory in 1986 is a good example of such a process.
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The availability of state provisions gives occupational sector more flexibility 
both in principal and in technical and administration matters. Though the types 
of benefits deemed important by an employer may not be the same workers 
would prefer. Supporters of private plans often argue that flexibility of 
occupational arrangements which can be more clearly cut to meet individual 
needs is their major advantage. Non-statutory forms of welfare are more 
developed in countries with low state social expenditure. The experience of the 
USA shows that absence or insufficient level of protection offered by public 
schemes encouraged provision of occupational benefits. In its turn the spread 
of occupational plans could be a prerequisite for the state to curb social welfare 
spending, to withdraw from welfare provision or at least to change its priorities.
Anyway, in the analysis of occupational welfare the methods of 
implementation of social policy reflected in the public/private mix should be 
taken into consideration. It is important to know, for example, whether 
occupational welfare is provided exclusively on a voluntary basis. It means the 
lack of enforcement of the state regulations directly imposing welfare provision 
on enterprises rather than their absence, which would be just impossible to 
imagine nowadays.
Quite a number of writers stressed the role of government as an employer 
because in many countries first social security plans covered solely state 
employees. They can be considered as occupational leading in practice to the 
creation of private market. Esping-Andersen (1990) noted that the state in its 
role as an employer often pioneered the idea of occupational welfare evidently 
overlapping state welfare.
The state promotion of occupational welfare can take different forms. 
Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguished direct (through taxation) and indirect 
(meagre state benefits, strict eligibility criteria, etc.) methods. One of the most 
effective levers of the state influence on occupational welfare is legislation, 
which according to Esping-Andersen's division is a direct measure. Rein and 
Rainwater (1986) argued that there were three ways by which the state could 
intervene with occupational welfare: mandating, stimulating and subsidising.
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It is very important that a careful analysis is made why the state chooses 
one of the above-mentioned options and what consequences it might have. All 
researchers in the field mention that taxation policy is the principal reason for 
both employers and employees in favour of introduction of occupational plans. 
Preferential tax regime of occupational welfare allows comparing it with fiscal 
welfare, the main difference between them being that the former is directly 
incident to employment (Bryson, 1992). Tax concessions can be regarded as 
one of the incentives that accelerated the development of occupational welfare 
(Green and colleagues, 1986).
Apart of creating unfavourable attitude to occupational benefits of those 
groups of population, which do not receive them, such practices lead to the 
narrowing of tax base. In this case, as Titmuss (1974) noted, the price of 
occupational welfare is shared by the entire society.
Finally, it should be always kept in mind that occupational welfare is 
inseparable from political implications. Green and colleagues (1986) wrote that 
in the cases of pensions and NHS there was little pressure in Britain for the 
improvement of state provisions because those in power could expect better 
occupational arrangements for themselves.
Occupational welfare and non-statutory provisions
Western scholars' point of view on relation of occupational welfare to non- 
statutory provisions and agencies deserves to be mentioned. The latter usually 
include charity, mutual aid and individual initiative. Mishra (1981) stated that 
development of occupational welfare alongside the expansion of social services 
implied among other things a change in the private welfare mix reflected in the 
growth of a share of occupational welfare in relation to other non-statutory 
welfare provisions. Stevens (1986) gave an excellent account of how employer 
sponsored benefits in the USA proved to be more successful in providing 
protection against social risks than other non-statutory provision. The reasons 
were mainly economic: mutual aid societies and charities failed to cope with 
growing financial demands.
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Occupational welfare is greatly influenced by trade unions. Stevens (1986) 
mentioned that employee benefits as a reward for work were used in the 
struggle for control over a workplace. It might be suggested that in the long run 
bolh employers and trade unions used occupational welfare provisions as a 
means to counter the actions of each other to secure the loyalty of workers.
The experience of the UK and the USA proves that the role of trade unions 
in provision of occupational welfare may vary depending on political and 
economic situation. In the USA they are active partners in negotiating 
occupational schemes and thus initiating welfare provisions. On the contrary, 
until recently British occupational programmes were started by management, 
probably because trade unions had more possibilities to lobby introduction of 
state welfare provisions through their alliance with the Labour Party.
2. The Soviet Debates on Occupational Welfare
The peculiarity of the subject to be discussed further is that Soviet scholars 
did not use the term "occupational welfare" at all. It does not mean that 
theDretical problems flowing from this notion were not explored. It was made by 
the study of the role of enterprise-based services in social policy, equality and 
equity, social funds of enterprises as a part of public consumption funds. It is 
worth noting that Soviet researchers agreed that practice of occupational 
welfare in the Soviet Union was well ahead of its theoretical conceptualisation. 
As a result many relevant problems failed to have been properly studied. 
(flerrnpb (Degtyar), 1987).
Occupational welfare and equality/equity.1
The problem of social equality in the Soviet society was understood in 
terms of social status rather than in purely distributional terms. All individuals 
were regarded equals as members of society. It was presumed that they all 
worked if they were able to and satisfied their needs even in case they could 
not work; actively participated in public life; possessed equal civil rights and
1 Though in the Soviet Union debates on social equality and equity were carried out in the framework set 
by official ideology it does not mean, however, that the problem should not be dealt with.
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bore equal responsibilities. The ultimate principle of justice of communist 
society was expressed in the maxim "to everyone- according to his needs, from 
everyone -- according to his abilities".
Nevertheless it was acknowledged that social equality could not be fully 
achieved in socialist society as it was a lower stage of communism. Some 
inequalities were explained by the specific historical background (Engels (1961) 
noted that the perception of justice itself was a product of historical 
development) and by the lack of resources society had to satisfy all needs of all 
people. Differences between social groups were expressed, for example, in 
income status dependent of distribution according to work. The importance of 
material stimuli was admitted, especially in 1970s-1980s when the rate of 
growth of the national economy decreased (MuKynbCKMM (Mikul'sky and 
colleagues), 1987).
Equity was a major concern of Soviet scholars mainly because of 
economic/ property considerations. Since the means of production were in 
public ownership all people were equal in relation to it. They were considered to 
be co-owners of enterprises and possessors of equal rights to outcomes of their 
activities. In this context occupational welfare was incremental as it was 
available only to those in employment and sometimes their dependants. 
However, as it existed side by side with the state system of social protection 
that covered all social risks and all citizens, the employed could get social 
services through two systems, namely, the state and enterprise, often 
duplicating each other. To solve the arising principal ideological problem of 
finding arguments to justify such a situation the idea of a preferential treatment 
of workers was put forward. As the social and economic status of any stratum 
of population was measured by its contribution to development of economic 
basis of the new society those people who contributed more to welfare of 
society were to be rewarded more. Industrial workers came the first on the list 
as the main productive force. It was considered to be just especially because 
workers’ input to the growth of the national economy would in the end enable all 
citizens to benefit through public ownership of the means of production.
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Occupational welfare and employment
Soviet researchers were aware of the problems-embedded into the system 
of benefits and services incident to employment, which undermined application 
of the principle of equality in welfare system. Among them were the following.
First, occupational provisions implied discriminatory distribution of goods 
and benefits: large and rich enterprises were able to provide more for their 
employees than the smaller ones. It resulted in great diversity of provision of 
social services.
Second, when social benefits and entitlements were linked to peoples' 
employment the quitting by a worker of his/her job meant loss of access to 
them. Due to shortage of many consumer goods and services a lot of what 
people needed could not be freely purchased or acquired in other places than 
enterprises.
Third, elite groups, first of all governmental and Communist party officials 
were granted privileges inaccessible to general public, such as special shops 
and hospitals, country houses (dachas), chauffeured cars, etc. Their legitimacy 
was questionable from the point of view of the egalitarian concept of social 
justice proclaimed at that time.
Employment figured prominently in debate on socialist social justice that 
implied:
• equal position in relation to means of production;
• securing employment for every economically active person;
• remuneration in accordance with labour input.
It was admitted that an enterprise being an integral unit of the national 
economy and society had a certain degree of autonomy and thus its own 
interests, which might differ from those of society at large (riono30B (Polozov), 
1978). An increasing independence of enterprises in provision of social benefits 
could lead to serious distortions in correlation of public and enterprise interests. 
In order to counteract the tendency and reconcile those interests it was 
suggested that the role of local authorities in coordination of social welfare 
activities on their territory had to be augmented.
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Enterprise-based social benefits and state social policy
The provision of enterprise-based social benefits was always considered in 
the Soviet Union to be a part of social policy. This assumption was not subject 
to criticism and discussion around it was limited to the problems of how 
enterprises had to provide social services in kind for their workers through 
social funds and social assets.
Social welfare activities of Soviet enterprises were aimed at the adjustment 
of global social policy goals to specific circumstances and at their use in the 
framework of the mainstream welfare system as a channel of provision of 
supplementary social welfare benefits for the employed.
The place of Soviet enterprises in economy and society determined in its 
turn the role of enterprise-based social services in social policy. As all 
enterprises were publicly owned these services were not exactly "employer- 
provided", in fact they were "state provided" via employer as some employment 
was considered to have strategic importance for the development of the 
national economy. The industrialisation policy proclaimed at the 14th 
Communist Party Congress in 1925 required a high concentration of all 
resources including human. It changed the face of industry and led to 
unprecedented increase in the number of enterprises, all state-owned, and 
industrial workers.
The fact that in the mainstream Soviet research enterprise social funds 
were included into the notion of the public consumption funds (obtchestvenniye 
fondi potrebleniya) is an important evidence of enterprise-based social welfare 
being a part of social policy.
The aggregate means allocated by socialist society for consumption by 
population were divided -  as suggested by Marx (Mapicc, 1961) -  into:
• wages/salaries;
• public consumption funds (PCF) consisting of centralised funds 
accumulated in the state budget via taxation system and 
decentralised funds formed in enterprises.
Centralised public consumption funds were set up to promote equality 
between members of society by enabling them to fully realise their potential
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ablities as inequalities arising from distribution according to labour input rather 
than needs, differences in family status and personal abilities could not be 
eliminated through personal income. Through public consumption funds those 
needs were satisfied that were considered important from the point of view of 
society. They were excluded from individual choice based to a large extent on 
indvidual income. These funds covered services that were regarded as 
fundamental for the whole society as distinct from purely individual needs 
dependent on income and choice of an individual.
It was argued that combination of goods and services distributed 
indvidually according to labour input (wages/salaries) and collective provision 
of services to all people regardless of their income status through public 
consumption funds by health care system, educational, cultural, recreation and 
sport institutions, construction of housing, etc., as well as cash payments to 
support the disabled, the elderly and children (pensions, stipends, family 
benefits) was the most effective and efficient way to meet needs of all members 
of society (MuKynbCKHii (Mikukl’sky, 1976).
Social funds created at enterprises out of their means on the basis of 
performance indicators formed the decentralised part of the public consumption 
funds. Their aim was to meet social needs of the employed and to 
counterweight the negative effect of distribution according to labour input on 
workers.2 The decentralised public consumption funds were viewed as a junior 
partner of the centralised ones, a temporary measure on the road to the 
communist system of distribution of social welfare according to people's needs. 
It was argued that those funds helped to create material incentives for the 
employed.
Soviet scholars distinguished a few specific features of the decentralised 
public consumption funds:
• the range of needs covered was limited in comparison with that of the 
centralised ones;
2 Social funds of enterprises also included expenditures on their social infrastructure that was not 
financed from PCF.
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• the size of social funds differed depending on revenues of a particular 
enterprise;
•  the importance of the funds flew from the shortage of consumer goods 
and services and it would decrease with the development of local social 
services (AHTOceHKOB (Antosenkov), 1987).
In general the Soviet debate disclosed a positive attitude towards welfare 
provisions in enterprises on the following grounds. First, they were to improve 
living standards of workers and to satisfy their growing social needs. It was 
argued that at enterprise level resources could be used more effectively 
because the needs of each individual were easier to be taken into account thus 
giving additional opportunity to contribute to people's well being. This aspect 
was especially emphasised in 1970s-1980s when the lack of resources for 
social needs, underdevelopment of social infrastructure and shortages of 
consumer goods became evident.
Second, occupational provisions were believed to be important for 
stabilising labour force and fostering attachment of the employed to their 
enterprises.
Third, enterprise social services were to play the economic-stimulating role. 
In order to raise efficiency of the national economy material incentives for 
workers had to be reinforced. Apart from wages and salaries social benefits 
were intended to stimulate better work and it was for this purpose that social 
funds of an enterprise were formed on the basis of its performance indicators. 
That is why some authors argued that those funds acquired economic rather 
than social meaning.
During the first decades of the Soviet power when the welfare system was 
being set up the prevalence of economic function of enterprise social services 
over the social one did not bother Soviet scholars too much. But with the 
maturity of the system and changes in social policy priorities they were 
definitely faced with the dilemma of what function -  social-needs or economic- 
achievement -  was predominant. One of the approaches suggested that as 
enterprise based social services originated as the decentralised part of the 
public consumption funds they were first of all to meet social needs of
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employees and had to be gradually transferred to local authorities to provide 
services to the entire population (PoroBMH (Rogovin), 1984; AHTOceHKOB 
(Antosenkov), 1987). On the contrary, noting that amount of social funds had to 
be determined by the outcomes of enterprise activities Zagorul'kin and 
Kolesnikov (3aropynbKMH u KonecHMKOB, 1983) implicitly acknowledged that 
economic-stimulating function was more important than that of meeting social 
needs of the employed.
This contradiction could not go unnoticed. By the 1980s some Soviet 
researchers came to admit that these functions were inseparable and flew out 
of the nature of enterprise social services. For example, Degtyar (flermpb, 
1984) argued that it was necessary to find a proper balance between their 
social and economic rationale. She even suggested that in order to solve the 
problem it could be productive to consider enterprise social funds as a distinct 
phenomenon with its special tasks and priorities prone to changes from time to 
rather than just a part of the public consumption funds.
Another important issue that drew Soviet scholars' attention was the 
optimal scale of social funds of enterprises. Quite a number of studies dealt 
with criteria of selection of a performance indicator to which their formation 
should be linked.
The late Soviet debate on occupational welfare is well summarised in the 
following passage:
"..The enterprise resources supplement the means allocated from state 
budget, the latter forming the resource basis for fulfilment of social guarantees. 
Under the present circumstances in the course of the improvement of 
management mechanisms the role of social funds of enterprises in satisfying 
certain social needs of employees has been increasing. They reinforce material 
incentives. At the same time the growing importance of social funds leads to 
the strengthening of unevenness in the distribution of public consumption funds 
among different groups of population with substantial variations between 
employees of various industries and enterprises. These disparities... do not 
always reflect the difference in their labour input. Therefore, in future it would 
be necessary to take more drastic measures to eliminate those disparities ... 
which arise from a different size of social funds at particular enterprises." 
(MuKynbCKMM (Mikul’sky), 1983: 27-28.).
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3. The Post- Soviet Debates on Occupational Welfare.
Occupational welfare and economic efficiency
One of the major issues at stake is correlation between social plans and 
economic status of an enterprise. Some authors suggest that social plans 
contribute to deterioration in enterprise financial status and enterprises owning 
social assets are at a disadvantage (Boycko and Shleifer, 1994). The logic is 
rather simple: less social spending -- more money left for other purposes, 
including expansion of production.
Enterprise-based social provisions are often treated negatively as the 
expression of paternalistic intentions of employers. Those ones who try to 
maintain social infrastructure are accused of behaving as kings of small states 
with everything at hand and a possibility to exercise considerable power. This 
point of view negative as far as social responsibilities of enterprises were 
concerned was expressed in the survey of the Expert Institute of the Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.
The survey was carried out in 1992 to study factors that affected behaviour 
of enterprises in the new environment. It contends that there is the reverse 
relationship between financial status of an enterprise and its social 
expenditures. Indicators of enterprises with developed social infrastructure are 
usually worse than those of enterprises, which choose to invest in production. 
Therefore, enterprises that experience financial difficulties endeavour to cut 
social expenditures first.
Russian enterprises seek for profit many of them trying to withdraw their 
position as mini-states (Preker, 1994). The main reason is that
"extensive provisioning of social services ... diverts enterprises from their 
core activities" (Freinkman, L. and Starodubrovskaya, L.,1996: 4).
It prevents them from being competitive and slows down the process of 
restructuring, including privatisation. It is even argued that enterprise social 
obligations may reduce interest of potential foreign investors (Rein and 
colleagues, 1997). Kosmarsky and colleagues (KocMapcKMii, 1996) note that in
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many cases social expenditures are the only ones that an enterprise can 
control and thus economise on.
Under the pretext that social expenses are not productive the necessity to 
incude social responsibilities in the list of enterprise functions is neglected. 
Whereas a lot has been said about how much social benefits cost nothing is 
mentioned about positive effects of such spending, for example, on workers’ 
health and recreation, etc. Is it all about financial matters only or there is a 
place for changing attitudes?
Occupational welfare and enterprise social assets
During the Soviet period a vast material infrastructure was built up by 
thousands of enterprises. It consisted of dwelling houses, health and sport 
facilities, kindergartens, children's camps, etc, which came under the notion of 
social assets and were aimed to satisfy vital social needs of members of 
society.
In the post-Soviet Russia in atmosphere of general enthusiasm around the 
concepts of complete restructuring of economy and inefficiency of enterprise 
social programmes the problems of social assets have moved to the forefront 
with no unanimity among scholars on the subject.
Jackman (1995(b)) analysing economic efficiency of enterprise social 
assets questions a widely held view that provision of social services is 
inefficient for enterprises. He argues that some social services may be as 
efficiently provided by large enterprises as by government and form a part of 
local systems of social facilities in co-operation with local authorities. The 
withering away of enterprise-based social services is a result of the natural 
process of changing employment structure from larger to more decentralised 
production units and there is no point in doing something about social assets 
before the restructuring of employment is achieved.
Some writers think that in principle the participation of enterprises in social 
protection via social assets is not a bad thing at all though it requires substantial 
financial resources. In the face of crisis many enterprises have to cancel their 
social programmes but when they will have money they are not only likely but
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should start them again (PoAMOHOBa (Rodionova), 1993). Teplikhin and 
colleagues (1995) argue that social assets do not greatly affect the financial 
status of an enterprise.
Some experts think that maintenance of social infrastructure, especially if it 
is crucial for community, can increase the power of an enterprise, even an 
unprofitable one, to negotiate subsidies with the federal government or local 
administration and survive in economically groundless situation (OECD, 1995).
At the same time Leksin and Shvetzov (JleKCMH m HlBeuoB, 1998) suggest 
that keeping social assets can be economically rational only if they:
• are profitable;
• contribute to better motivation of personnel under the conditions of 
tax and other indulgences.
They have come to the conclusion that in the current situation in Russia 
privatised enterprises have no economic incentives to maintain social assets: 
higher wages are more important than social benefits; these assets are used 
not only by workers but local population as well while to run them enterprises 
incurs costs both direct ( energy, repairs, etc.) and indirect ( employment of 
managerial staff).
If the final verdict is that social expenditures run against enterprise nature 
the further logical step would be to cancel social programmes and to divest of 
social assets. There are various views on the ways it can be implemented.
The OECD survey (1996) suggests that the decision on the use of social 
facilities, including such options as keeping, selling, closing down, donating, 
should be left to an enterprise itself which is fully consistent with the principles 
of free market.
Tratch and colleagues (1996) argue that in transitional economies the so- 
called institutional approach to social assets as a form of enterprise social 
spending should be used. While in most studies social spending is looked at as 
a variable dependent of such characteristics of an enterprise as its size, 
industry, composition of workforce, etc., the state-enterprise interaction, 
especially in the field of regulating property ownership, is more important. In this
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case the divestiture of social assets should to a large extent depend on 
government regulations of the two major issues, namely
"whom the property can be transferred and whether a transfer allows any 
change of use" (Schaffer, 1995(b): 261).
Lippold (1996) notes that as the state and enterprise are interconnected in 
social welfare the former should regulate the process of divestiture. He comes 
to broader understanding of enterprise-based social services suggesting that 
policy towards them should be formulated in the framework of overall social 
policy goals.
If it is recognised that occupational provisions developed as a substitute of 
state arrangements (KocMapcKMM (Kosmarsky and colleagues, 1996) then they 
should be cancelled only when either the state or market can offer more that is 
not the case in today's Russia because:
• there is an obvious decline in the state social services. Local 
authorities are often short of funds to maintain social assets to say 
nothing about acquiring any new ones. In practice the transfer of 
social facilities of enterprises to local authorities is likely to end in 
closing them down that would weaken social protection of population;
• many people cannot afford to buy social services in market as the 
purchasing power of population falls down.
4. Comparison of Western and Russian/Soviet Approaches to 
Occupational Welfare.
The Soviet period has been chosen for comparison with the Western 
practices quite intentionally. It fully corresponds with the objective of this thesis 
to give a comprehensive description of occupational welfare taken in different 
societal environment.
For a long time drastic differences in ideology did not permit Western and 
Soviet researchers to approach the matters pertaining to occupational welfare 
in a similar way. Soviet scholars proceeding from the Marxist theory were
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always critical about social policy and concept of the welfare state in the West.3 
Their Western counterparts representing the non-Marxist traditions spoke in a 
critical tone evaluating Soviet social policy. Both sides tried to stress those 
features of each other’s systems they thought of as negative and different from 
their theory and practice.
Reluctance of Western employers to provide social assistance to their 
employees and class conflict as a driving force of the development of 
occupational welfare were favourite issues in the Soviet discussion on 
occupational welfare in the West.
Western studies on the Soviet social policy failed to give a profound 
analysis of the channels of delivering welfare services in the Soviet Union other 
than the state.4 It was assumed that through public ownership of the means of 
production, centralised government financing of welfare programmes and 
political dictatorship the Soviet state controlled and regulated every aspect of 
society's life and thus was fully responsible for the provision of social welfare. 
Mishra (1981), one of the first Western scholars who covered Soviet experience 
in his analysis of welfare state, described socialist welfare system as the 
structural model of the welfare state.
The problems related to occupational welfare in the Soviet Union were 
viewed through the state welfare programmes or industrial relations leaving out 
a broader outlook on an enterprise as a social rather than technical and 
economic unit. For example, the mechanism of setting up social funds at Soviet 
enterprises vitally important for development of occupational welfare was 
discussed only as a part of either planning process or managerial instruments 
(Bornstein (ed.), 1981; Feiwel, 1972; Hardt and McMillan (ed.), 1988; 
Commander and Jackman,1993).
Divergences
3 The Soviet perspective is very well explored by Zinin and Kashchenko (3h h h h  h  KameHKO, 1986).
4 McAuley (1979) suggested that only resources to be used collectively as social consumption funds 
should be considered as a component of the Soviet welfare state. Being rather critical about welfare 
policies in the Soviet society, he regarded the Soviet welfare state as the authorities’ second main set of 
instruments of influencing income distribution and argued that there was no clear evidence whatsoever for 
claims that socialist society was inherently more equal than capitalist.
35
The most important divergences in theoretical approaches to occupational 
welfare in the West and in the Soviet Union are as follows.
a) In the West the problem has always been to find ways to incorporate an 
enterprise into social policy and to adjust occupational welfare to the needs of 
society; in the Soviet Union researchers tried to justify the necessity of 
enterprise-based social benefits as a channel of distribution of social welfare 
ether than the state. A positive stand towards occupational welfare adopted in 
the Soviet literature — its necessity was recognised and its social policy role 
had never been questioned — inevitably led to theoretic discussion being 
Imited to finding ways to organise it in a more effective and efficient way.
b) While in the West discussion on equality/equity issues in connection with 
cccupational welfare has been carried out in the framework of concept of 
atizenship and democratic polity, in the Soviet Union it was provoked by 
economic-public- ownership- of- the means- of- production considerations.
c) Clarke (1993(a)) pointed out that the main difference between the 
Western and socialist countries was that in the latter working status influenced 
the workers' social identity in a much more fundamental way.
Common grounds
Nevertheless, there are noteworthy common grounds in the Western and 
Russian/Soviet Union theoretical approaches to occupational welfare.
a) Even a brief account of explorations in Soviet social sciences which are 
unfortunately underestimated in the West reveals the following paradox: in spite 
of different ideologies issues that drew attention of the Soviet researchers were 
to a large extent the same their Western counterparts were interested in. 
Discussion on occupational welfare was dominated by the two main themes: 
equality/ equity considerations and interaction between the state and 
occupational welfare.
b) The industrialisation postulate contends that at the stage of 
industrialisation and urbanisation all advanced countries faced similar social 
problems leading to a need for social welfare though, of course, historical 
backgrounds inevitably influenced processes of setting the scope of social
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rights and social protection of people (Madison, 1968; Rimlinger, 1971). It is 
relevant to both the West and the Soviet Union.
c) As some Western researchers noted the drive for industrialisation and 
full employment in the Soviet Union since the early 1930s as well as efforts to 
practically implement the basic principles of the socialist distribution "to 
eveyone according to his work" and " those who do not work do not ea t" led 
to social welfare system including occupational welfare becoming largely work- 
relcted and connected to labour market that made it somewhat reminiscent of 
the Western system. In the course of formation of the Soviet welfare state 
emphasis shifted from providing social security to increasing economic 
productivity (Schwarz, 1953; McAuley, 1979). The term "social or socialised 
wage" was often used to show that social services provided through public 
consumption funds were aimed at rising the efficiency of the labour market. The 
stress was laid on necessity to improve human factor of production and 
encourage labour incentives (Hubbard,1942; Osborn,1970). Distribution of 
sodal benefits was largely based on employment criteria (enterprise-based 
benefits in kind, pensions and sickness pay in accordance with the lengths of 
woik in organisation, eligibility criteria for a number of benefits). Occupational 
wel:are was first of all aimed to cut labour turnover, to create workers' 
dependence on an enterprise and to establish a new form of social control and 
labour discipline (Rimlinger, 1971; Clarke and colleagues, 1993). Dixon and 
Makarov (1992) even suggested that socialist welfare system was in fact based 
on ihe principles of occupational rewards and residual welfare. Manning, on his 
part, argued that
"...Soviet welfare was, in Titmuss's terms, largely reminiscent of 
occupational welfare..." (Manning, 1992: 43)
Conclusions
My main conclusion from what has been set forth before is that 
occupational welfare is a widely spread phenomenon, a means of providing a 
specific kind of social protection to those in employment, a significant form of 
social welfare. The time has come to make a try at working out the integrative
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theory of occupational welfare that would absorb the most promising ideas and 
positive experience.
Transformation of the Russian society has naturally brought changes in 
debate on the role of an enterprise in social protection of the working people. It 
is now greatly influenced by approaches towards theory and practice of 
occupational welfare dominating the Western discussions that are prominently 
reflected in the works of Russian scholars.
The emphasis is mainly laid on the necessity for Russian enterprises to 
restructure their activities. The need to increase production output and improve 
financial status of enterprises as well as to encourage individual social 
responsibility are advanced to prove that there is no place for occupational 
social plans. The conception is set forth in the papers prepared under the 
auspices of such international organisations as the World Bank, EBRD, OECD 
and is evidently prompted by the ideas of market-oriented transformation of the 
Russian society. It practically neglects the fact that the bulk of enterprises' 
social expenditures in Russia fallson the statutory social security contributions to 
various social funds which problems are discussed in terms of taxation policy 
only.
The analysis of debates on occupational welfare shows that the problems 
discussed in the West, on one hand, and in the USSR, on the other, have much 
common ground. Besides, there is a diversity of opinions among the Western 
scholars as well.
The present dominant ideological stand on this division of welfare in the 
post-Soviet Russia is its rejection as the Soviet type institution incompatible 
with market economy. It may be such an attitude that has led to some serious 
flaws in the discussion.
It does not touch upon, for example, correlation of social benefits and 
wages/salaries. In the Soviet Union low wages were compensated by stable low 
prices, full employment, growth of social services provided through the public 
consumption funds. Nowadays this system ceased to work while the majority of 
population cannot afford to buy social services outside the state or enterprise
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schemes because wages/salaries are still too low amounting to only 15 per cent 
of production costs.
Little attention is paid to significance of enterprise social programmes, their 
place in social policy during the transition period and necessity to develop new 
model of occupational welfare. No methodology of organising and managing 
specific occupational plans in order to reach both social and economic 
objectives is suggested.
The social image of Russian industry and business is presented in liberal 
terms of development o f" a free enterprise" as one of the primary guaranties of 
continuation of democratic reforms in Russia but, regretfully, not much is said 
about the role of enterprises in social protection of employees taken in a 
broader framework as an integral part of social policy.
The key issue after all is what will happen to occupational provisions. The 
importance of the enterprise-based social services should not be measured 
exclusively in terms of financial burden on an enterprise. What also matters is 
their contribution to production process and availability of social services 
especially housing, kindergartens and health facilities outside an enterprise via 
market or the state system.
Weakness of state social welfare at the federal and local levels coupled 
with widespread poverty adds to significance of occupational welfare. Workers 
at enterprises that provide social benefits are in a relatively better position as 
they can rely on their enterprises in meeting some of their social needs. In this 
way employers help the employed to survive the crisis. Paradoxically, this fact 
is definitely more appreciated by foreign rather than Russian observers (Le 
Cacheux, 1996).
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Chapter 2
Two Perspectives and General Definition of Occupational
Welfare
The main objectives of this chapter are to analyse the two perspectives of 
occupational welfare -- social policy and organisational -  which are proposed 
by the author to be introduced in this study and to try to substantiate a 
possibility of working out general definition of the phenomenon. Forms and 
methods of provision of occupational welfare are outlined as well.
1. The Two Perspectives of Occupational Welfare.
In the process of research two facets of occupational welfare clearly 
transpired. One is displayed in matters concerning contribution of occupational 
welfare to social policy and, thus, may be called the social policy perspective.
Occupational welfare also means services and benefits incident to or arising 
out of employment or, otherwise, supplied through organisations of various 
kinds including industrial enterprises. Issues of their environment (society, the 
state, etc.), structure, and management are sufficiently covered in literature but 
there is one function which has not yet been properly studied, that of securing 
social welfare of their members. It becomes essential to try to fill in this gap by 
exploring the organisation perspective of occupational welfare, the more so that 
nowadays the role of different institutions in social policy and the structure of 
welfare mix are under thorough scrutiny.
Table 2.1 provides a guideline for further discussion on the two 
perspectives.
Table 2.1
Occupational welfare perspectives
internal dimension 
oraanisation perspective
external dimension 
social policv perspective
whv oraanisation is for or aaainst? whv society is for or aaainst?
Source: compiled by the author.
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The social policy perspective
This thesis is based on the postulate that from the point of view of society 
occupational provisions are an integral part of the unitary system of social 
policy, concerned with the promotion of well being of all members of the 
modern society ( the social policy perspective).
Most popular conceptual question posed is whether occupational benefits 
are a private or public endeavour or they are about providing private solutions 
for public problems (see, for example, Shalev, 1996). But it is a wrong question 
to ask: a problem becomes public if its existence is acknowledged by society 
and measures are undertaken to settle it in the interests of society. In this 
context any form of its solution will certainly get public approval that makes the 
problem public. To put it another way private provision will not be "private" in 
the sense the word is used in dictionary or every day’s life. In our case, it only 
underlines the importance of the social policy perspective.
The nature and extent of an enterprise involvement in social welfare is 
controversial subject with contradictory ideas set forth in debates. Today there 
is no consensus as to what social responsibilities of an enterprise should 
consist of. Moreover, Friedman (1962), for example, argued that an enterprise 
fully fulfilled its social obligations by maximising profit, securing employment 
and paying fair wages. Thus, social benefits should be regarded as 
inappropriate and even harmful for successful economic performance of an 
enterprise which reflects quite a popular view that social expenses are non­
productive and mainly philanthropic.
Titmuss (1974) was the first to contribute to the understanding of 
occupational provisions as a "division of welfare" and to explore them as a 
welfare phenomenon. He argued that all collective interventions to meet certain 
needs of an individual or/and to serve the wider interests of society might be 
broadly grouped into three major categories of welfare: social welfare, fiscal 
welfare and occupational welfare. He also claimed that such a division was 
based more on an organisational division of method rather than fundamental 
differences in functions or aims. The unity of welfare channels was stressed 
because in the long run they all served the same goal.
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The social policy perspective is indispensable in solving the problem crucial 
to the theory of occupational welfare because it gives an answer to the question 
why organisations should be involved in provision of social services at all.
It can only be regretted that, as careful searching shows, occupational 
welfare does not explicitly feature in the works of representatives of the 
scientific management and the human relations schools. Taylor (1911), for 
example, is interested in wages as an important economic stimulus for workers 
and in fair remuneration as a motivation factor that has nothing to do with 
occupational welfare. The human relations school concentrates on social 
aspects, first of all, on employees' participation in social relations. Occupational 
welfare is viewed from the standpoint that it might be easier for an enterprise to 
use social welfare plans to stimulate employees rather than to change social 
relations inside, for example, by extending employees' influence over the 
decision-making process that requires much more organisational and 
psychological efforts than granting social welfare benefits. Occupational 
benefits are also seen as merely one of the instruments of managerial strategy 
ensuring loyalty of employees and helping to increase productivity alongside 
with regulation of general level of wages, opportunities for promotion, training 
and development.
The importance of the idea of corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
however attractive the notion may seem, is insignificant for the purpose of 
conceptualising occupational welfare, especially in the following aspects. First, 
under “social responsibility” non-material things such as, for instance, equal 
opportunities or treatment of foreign labour are very often understood. Second, 
it is likely to be the reaction of pragmatic employers urging corporations to 
introduce welfare arrangements voluntarily before the state will step in with 
compulsory regulations. Third, it is evidently about social responsibilities of an 
enterprise to the wider community and necessity to cross over the boundaries 
of an enterprise because if an enterprise provides social services exclusively for 
its employees it is exposed to the accusation of being self-contained by 
ignoring the interests of local community (Brown, 1961).
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The role of organisations in social welfare is explored in this paper in the 
industrial enterprise aspect because of the centrality of production process in 
the modern industrialised society to say nothing of the fact that the problem 
itself cropped up in connection with industrial undertakings.
Mishra (1981) analysing the origins of occupational provisions in the terms 
of socio-technocratic demands of industrialisation and capitalism suggested two 
main reasons for the provisions to emerge:
► the growing importance of labour as human factor of production;
► the nature of work in industrial establishments where labour force is
concentrated in large-scale enterprises organised on bureaucratic lines.
As the system of measures to promote people's well being occupational 
provisions may be considered as social services, or "occupational social 
services" (Titmuss, 1974). Their emergence alongside social and fiscal welfare 
is the evidence of increasing diversity and interdependency in modern social 
policy
Employees form a special category of population as they are not only 
members of society but of particular organisations as well. That is why they 
take a specific position in relation to social protection the burden of which, 
according to Rein and Rainwater (1986), could be distributed between three 
principal sectors: enterprise, the state, and mutual aid and private charity, each 
expected to play its part in securing employees' well-being.
Most people in developed countries are recruited into the labour force and it 
is quite logical to suggest that financial and administrative resources of 
enterprises should be used to provide social protection for employees and 
possibly their dependents on permanent and stable basis. Titmuss (1974) 
looked at occupational welfare as a means of collective intervention more 
efficient than individual efforts. Economically welfare provisions in industrial 
establishments which can mobilise resources and finance large schemes based 
on economy of scale differ favourably from such forms of welfare protection as 
self-help or mutual assistance emerging as alternatives to competitive ideology.
Titmuss stressed that workers may need welfare provisions not as 
increments to their standard of living but as
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"practical compensation for dis-services, for social costs and social 
insecurities which are the product of rapidly changing, industrial-urban society" 
(Titmuss, 1968:133).
It is recognised that complicated social relationships have led to the 
emergence of social risks beyond control of an individual for which he/she 
cannot be held responsible on individual basis. In the existing economic and 
social situation certain redistribution of resources in society is needed if it wants 
to secure a decent standard of living for its members. The problem is how such 
redistribution could be made especially when the role of the state in securing 
social welfare in market economy has become the subject of scrutiny and 
criticism and provision of some social services by voluntary and private 
agencies has increased. In their midst an enterprise appears to be able to bear 
social responsibilities in society not only economically and technologically but 
as socially independent unit.5
The emergence of occupational welfare means that relations between 
employers and employees become more social than individual, thus reflecting 
social recognition of needs and dependencies in an enterprise. In the socio­
individual equation of risk sharing a significant role in meeting basic social 
needs of employees is played by employer. Kerr notes, that
"in the logic of industrialisation, the responsibility for guaranteeing the 
minimum welfare and security of industrial man rests in large measure upon his 
managers and his government" (Kerr, 1973:180).
It is the social policy perspective that helps to explain why organisations 
provide social benefits at all. Occupational welfare is undoubtedly stimulated by 
social policy considerations expressing intentions of society: occupational 
programmes appear to be an integral part of the unitary system of social 
welfare rather than merely organisation "business". They are carried out
5 As debate on social role of organisations is usually carried out in the framework of their social 
responsibilities it is necessary to remember the distinction between such terms as "social" and "social 
welfare".
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because they are important from the point of view of social policy, which 
sanctions occupational arrangements.
The development of occupational welfare like any other institution of 
contemporary society depends to a considerable extent on the state as the 
overseer of social policy in society. Interaction between the state, society and 
organisations, in particular, in the provision of social welfare for the working 
people assumes ever-greater importance because it is necessary to distribute 
welfare in society in a way that preserves both social justice and economic 
efficiency.
The organisation perspective
The attitude of industry towards occupational welfare, its willingness and 
capacity to accept welfare obligations (the organisation perspective) greatly 
vary depending on particular enterprise and industry. It results from the fact that 
there is no consensus among employers on the scope social responsibilities of 
business.
Some employers tend to rely on the state that plays the leading role in 
social welfare and are reluctant to provide occupational benefits considering 
them as interfering with market efficiency and weakening competitiveness and 
financial status of an enterprise. Besides the provision of "remuneration 
package" instead of simply paying wages/salaries puts additional administrative 
burden on employers. Even if they accepted certain welfare responsibilities for 
their employees, they would hardly agree to extend them to dependents and 
retired as well as to cover some risks. Wilson (1979) posed a question whether 
employers were likely to reap any net benefits out of the provision of social 
services to their employees.
There is not enough evidence, both empirical and conceptual, to prove 
whether occupational welfare is the moral commitment of a good employer, the 
reminiscent of the poor relief aimed at a more effective way to target resources 
to the working ( means deserving) poor, or the recreation-of-human-capital part 
of economic efficiency. It may also be considered as expression of social 
responsibilities of entrepreneurs to their employees and society at large or a
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part of their obligations to the state. In the latter case occupational welfare 
becomes a branch of the state welfare provision when employers hardly have 
any choice to provide welfare services to their employees or not.
Mann (1989) grouped factors potentially significant for the main 
stakeholders in occupational welfare. He explored motives of different social 
actors and the ways they influenced provision of social services. The state was 
introduced not simply as an actor with its own ideology but as the one who 
influenced decisions of other actors, including employers. The management- 
related issues comprised: management philosophies, including paternalism; 
management industrial relations strategy, for example, harmonisation; 
preservation of company image to the public; management response to labour 
market pressures by attracting and retaining labour.
In his classification of enterprise motives Domanski mentioned economic -  
to "enhance economic performance", social — "to stabilise social order" and 
ideological -- "pursuit of moral imperatives" (Domanski, 1997: 65)
Both classifications are actually much alike and summarise ideas expressed 
elsewhere. Correlations between occupational welfare and paternalism should 
be especially mentioned.
Domanski (1997) dwelt at length on the subject. His interpretation of the 
phenomenon was somewhat controversial mixing causes and consequences. 
He looked at all enterprise social provisions as paternalistic. Such a loose use 
of this term is characteristic of a number of writers.
Mann (1989) made a distinction between paternalism as a managerial belief 
and as a managerial strategy used by management to secure workers loyalty 
until it brought any evident results. Joseph (1992) stressed that the notion of 
paternalism could be evaluated both positively and negatively. It may be 
beneficial to employees but, on the other hand, justify their dependency on and 
submissions to employers.
I argue that what is important in defining paternalism are motives. Drawing 
parallel between father-child relations and occupational welfare only those 
provisions may be considered paternalistic which are made by an employer 
with the sole intention to do good for his employees and with no gain for him
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envisaged. Paternalism should be cleared from other reasons for employer to 
provide social benefits: if it is done to maintain social order at an enterprise, to 
attract labour force, to stimulate higher productivity, etc. the prime motive is 
employer interests rather than welfare of employees.
I suggest that organisation interests to provide occupational welfare should 
be divided into "pragmatic-profit" and "social-paternalistic" as presented in 
Table 2.2
Table 2.2
Organisation interests in occupational welfare
Pragmatic- Profit Social- Paternalistic
production employers' 
economic 
gains
employers' employees' 
social welfare 
gains
Source: compiled by the author.
The pragmatic-profit approach implies manipulating employees in one way 
or the other. The aim is to bring tangible results to an enterprise, first of all, 
such as, for example, improvement in performance indicators or product 
quality, customer services, etc. This is in conformity with the mainstream of the 
management science today that recognises the importance of human relations 
at work. It is generally assumed that social benefits in-cash or in-kind contribute 
to motivating, attracting and retaining employees and provision of welfare 
services helps to increase productivity not handicapped by employees’ personal 
problems.6
6 There is no convincing proof of a direct link between occupational benefits and productivity, though 
there is some evidence for a link between dissatisfaction, absenteesm and labour turnover.
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Whatever changes in industrial structure and labour market happen the 
maintenance of efficient work force remains the key imperative. Occupational 
welfare is believed to be an instrument of building up internal labour market to 
attract and retain labour force as well as investment in human capital, first of all 
in employers' interests (Green and colleagues, 1986). Mishra (1981) looked at 
occupational benefits as a share of managerial rewards favoured by tax 
exemptions, a form of income maintenance for highly paid employees to 
counter progressive taxation. Occupational schemes are often operated as a 
part of management process when they are shaped in accordance with 
profitability criterion. The social-paternalistic approach has two dimensions, 
namely social and welfare. The first one includes maintenance of social order 
by securing social peace in an enterprise and
"a will to instil acceptance of the social hegemony of the employer" 
(Domanski,1997:65).
Occupational welfare, thus, is aimed to strengthen attachment of workers to 
the employing enterprise. Good industrial relationships at this level help to 
cultivate community spirit and foster human relations.
The welfare dimension is aimed at improving living standards of employees 
and increasing their consumption of social services, especially when 
contributing to social welfare of employees is not unduly costly to the enterprise 
(Zoeteweij, 1986).
In many cases it is difficult to draw a distinct line between the pragmatic- 
profit and social-paternalistic factors which are by no means mutually exclusive. 
Decisions to provide occupational welfare can be prompted by considerations 
of both profit and employers' social responsibility towards employees.
The attitude of employees towards occupational benefits is on the whole 
positive. Resulting in the increase of their well-being they may be attractive for 
employees for a number of reasons including taxation. Occupational benefits 
are usually taxable at a lower value and, thus, employees are to pay less in 
taxes than on equivalent sum in salaries/wages. Real earnings may be also 
increased by overcoming salaries/wages structures that can be regulated by
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law. Besides, it is the matter of status and prestige, convenience and comfort, 
protection against social risks that counts.
To sum up, the major contradiction and ambiguity of occupational welfare 
inherent in its nature lie in the fact that the internal and external perspectives 
are not mutually exclusive (see Table 2.1). Moreover, they are inseparable and 
influence each other with occupational welfare finding itself at their intersection. 
Interests of organisations and society can overlap as the aim of the former 
pursued by providing social welfare benefits coincides with that of the latter to 
secure social protection for its members. Interaction of these counterparts in 
social welfare is actually one of the driving forces in the development of 
occupational welfare.
Dualism of occupational welfare was stressed by Stevens (1986) who 
considered it as a hybrid social institution. She pointed out that employees’ 
benefits were a half way between reward for work as alternative to wages and 
public sector programmes and a right; a compromise between human needs 
and citizenship rights, on one hand, and market efficiency considerations, on 
the other.
2. Forms of Provision of Occupationai Welfare
The specific forms of the provision of occupational benefits to employees 
are outlined further on. In doing so it is necessary to have the following in mind.
First, employees may share cost of occupational welfare contributing to 
occupational plans. In this case the latter are employer-subsidised but not 
employer-financed.
Second, occupational provisions other than social security may not be taken 
into account when calculating both employers' and employees' contributions to 
compulsory social security schemes.
Third, there is distinction between costs of occupational social services to 
employers and benefits to employees, the former being easier to assess.
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Occupational welfare as provision of social benefits other than salaries
/wages
There are different viewpoints on economic nature of occupational welfare 
though consensus exists among scholars that procuring social benefits other 
than salaries and wages is one of its most significant features. Some 
researchers (Zoeteweij, 1986) believe that occupational benefits substitute a 
part of salaries/wages while others view them as a supplement to a regular pay. 
Here many substantive questions in analysis of occupational welfare arise. If 
occupational benefits form a part of salaries/wages then why do employers and 
employees opt for social benefits instead of monetary payments? Can this fact 
be explained only by tax advantages? If occupational benefits are 
supplementary, then why do employers spend additional money on their 
employees? Is this a reflection of managerial policies or broad understanding 
by business of its social role?
Unfortunately, no solid evidence has been found to give convincing replies 
to these questions. However, one thing is indisputable: there are two separate 
parts of employees' compensation mix: wage/salary system and benefits.
The voluntary or statutory provision of occupational benefits
The voluntary or statutory nature of occupational welfare is a very important 
issue. In this respect occupational programmes can be:
• employer-initiated as voluntary commitment;
• employee-negotiated, as a rule through collective bargaining;
• statutory introduced by the state.
Voluntary character of occupational welfare flows out of the fact that in 
principle employers are free to decide what to do or not to do. Some of them 
see no obligation to provide employees with anything else than fair wages. The 
others may consider that they just cannot afford social benefits or find it more 
efficient to allocate additional resources to increase wages. They may carry out 
occupational programmes and be entitled to opt out of the state social 
schemes. But in reality such an ideal situation does not exist because there are 
three actors in the field of occupational welfare: employers, employees and the
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state. Occupational provisions can be made compulsory through collective 
bargaining or as a clause of contract between employer and employee. Trade 
unions play important part in regulating labour relations.
As far as the state is concerned it either sets rules for occupational 
schemes, usually protecting employees' interests, or makes explicit the 
necessity of introduction of such schemes. For example, employers' 
contributions under social security and superannuation plans may be reckoned 
as their statutory social obligations. Some occupational welfare arrangements 
may not be imposed by statute but nevertheless overseen by the state.
There is no consensus as to whether voluntary and compulsory provisions 
should both be included into occupational welfare. Mishra (1981) insisted on its 
voluntary nature arguing that state interference would change its 
independence. Bryson (1992), on the contrary, described occupational welfare 
in the framework of the welfare state. Titmuss (1974) viewed occupational 
welfare as an intervention undertaken, first, collectively and, second, in the 
interests of the wider society thus looking at it as a part of not only the welfare 
state but of the state welfare. In the author's opinion, implementation of 
occupational welfare provisions makes it explicit that they should include both 
voluntary and statutory ones.
Types of occupational benefits
As there are a great variety of occupational benefits it is of a paramount 
importance for theory of occupational welfare to find out whether they are 
occupational and what criteria are used at that. Endeavours to get an answer 
have not been entirely satisfying. Titmuss who pioneered research on 
occupational welfare did not expand his ideas in detail. His well known 
definition is a descriptive one offering a more or less full list of what he thought 
had to be included into occupational welfare, namely:
"pensions for employees and dependants; child allowances; death benefits; 
health and welfare services; personal expenses on travelling, dress and 
entertainment; meal vouchers; cars and season tickets; accommodation; 
holiday expenses; children school fees; sickness benefits; medical expenses;
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education and training grants; cheap meals; unemployment benefit; medical 
bills and an incalculable variety of benefits in kind ranging from obvious forms 
of realisable goods to the most intangible forms of amenity" (Titmuss, 1974: 
51).
Unfortunately, Titmuss did not explain what criterion he used to include one 
social benefit or another into his notion of occupational welfare. Practice and 
research have convincingly proved that benefits other than mentioned in the 
Titmuss's list may be attributed to occupational welfare. Rein noted that
" "Occupational welfare " is perhaps a more informative description, 
implying as it does that benefits depend on the job one holds within a firm" 
(Rein in Shalev (ed.), 1996:29).
There are some social advantages that people get only through 
employment. Bryson, for example, included into occupational welfare " those 
benefits that accrue to wage and salary earners over and above their pay...." 
(Bryson, 1992:131) having in view profit sharing as a way to increase 
employees' welfare. Barr, in turn, argued that
"in addition to wage income firms (individually or on an industry-wide basis, 
voluntary or under legal compulsions) provide occupational welfare in the face 
of sickness, injury or retirement." ( Barr, 1993:6).
Many suggestions on occupational welfare elements have one trait in 
common -- they are usually made from the organisation perspective definitely 
ignoring the social policy perspective, whereas all benefits meeting the 
requirements of both perspectives should be taken into account
A difficult problem to solve is whether social insurance contributions paid by 
employers should be treated as occupational welfare. They are mentioned in 
Titmuss’s definition as well as in the findings by Reid and Robertson (1986) but, 
on the contrary, are not discussed in the study of Green and colleagues (1986). 
Tachibanaki (1987) considered them as the sub-category of the non-obligatory 
non-wage labour costs. It is also argued that as statutory social insurance 
levies are compulsory and universally charged they do not belong to 
occupational welfare. I believe that employers' social insurance contributions
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have to be ascribed to occupational welfare because they are definitely a 
matter incident to employment, separated from salary/wage system and 
important for both organisation and society as a form of financing social 
services.
Methods of provision of occupational benefits
Occupational welfare encompasses both in-kind and cash benefits. They 
differ from each other by methods of:
• financing;
• provision;
• administration.
Occupational benefits may be financed directly or indirectly. The ones that 
provide employees with goods and services in-kind or with money (vouchers, 
etc.) that is spent in the market are directly financed by enterprises while the 
others are financed indirectly.
Methods of provision and administration of occupational plans are very 
diverse. Benefits provided in-kind are usually administered by an enterprise. 
Voluntary insurance schemes are often administered by an enterprise but 
services they offer are provided via insurance company thus provision being 
separated from administration. In the case of social security contributions an 
enterprise either may not perform administrative functions or do it if benefits are 
statutory regulated.
Tachibanaki (1987) drew a distinction between welfare contributions paid by 
enterprises to either government or non-governmental institutions. From the 
point of view of control and spending he divided occupational benefits into:
• social security type, as made statutory by the state (France, 
Germany);
• operating through market, for example, private insurance (the 
USA, Japan);
• more or less equal combination of both (the UK, Canada).
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3. Towards General Definition of Occupational Welfare
Occupational welfare is a complex and controversial phenomenon. 
Contention around it begins with the lack of universally accepted understanding 
among researchers as to what this notion really means that leads to the 
absence of a clear-cut framework for analysis. In such a situation the working 
out of general definition, which can be used in comparative study, is badly 
needed. It should in concise form express the very essence of the phenomenon 
and characterise it as precisely and exhaustively as possible.
There are several reasons why occupational welfare as a system of social 
benefits has not yet been satisfactorily defined. The following three are the 
most frequently suggested. First, when the welfare state models are 
constructed the state is always placed in the centre. Much less attention is paid 
to other sources of welfare despite the fact that there is an increasing 
comprehension that the notion of the welfare state incorporates not only the 
state welfare provisions but a public/private mix. Second, scarcity of statistical 
coverage of occupational plans, especially non-statutory, is another factor that 
obviously hampers the extension of knowledge about occupational welfare. It is 
difficult to elucidate financial and other aspects of organisation-based social 
programmes as organisations may not want to disclose them. Brown and Small 
(1985) noted that identifying who actually paid for occupational welfare was 
really a "frustrating task". Esping- Andersen (1996) went so far as to suggest 
that due to the lack of information it was too early to make generalisations 
about occupational welfare. Third, a great diversity of occupational welfare 
provisions in different countries makes it hard to bring many ways this 
phenomenon displays itself to some general definition.
But, comparison between the Western and Soviet experiences which 
belong to principally different societies and ideologies testifies to the fact that 
similarities in occupational provisions are much greater than divergences and, 
therefore, can be brought to one definition.
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Divergences
The major difference between Western and Soviet practice lies in the way 
enterprise is incorporated into society and the ways the state intervenes in its 
life. These differences explain the variations in forms and methods of provision 
of occupational welfare, namely the voluntary/compulsory and cash/in-kind 
benefits.
a). Soviet enterprises, as a rule, granted social benefits in-kind via 
enterprise-based social assets which were called "sotzial'naya sphera 
predpriyaty' (social sphere of enterprises) whereas their Western counterparts 
purchased social benefits outside using, in particular, insurance mechanisms 
which were not developed in the Soviet Union.
b). There were differences in methods the state used to intervene in the life 
of enterprises and in correlation of voluntary and compulsory procurement of 
occupational welfare provisions. The Soviet state had much more authority to 
impose social welfare obligations upon enterprises and, therefore, most of them 
were mandatory. For example, the size of social funds, namely the amount of 
resources to be spent on enterprise-based social benefits was regulated by 
statute. On the contrary, statutory social security was more substantial in the 
West.7
Similarities
Closer look at occupational welfare in the Soviet Union reveals that it has 
much in common with the Western practice.
a) Occupational welfare was:
► an integral part of the unitary system of social policy in the country ( the 
social policy perspective);
► incident to or arising out of work/employment (the organisation 
perspective);
► covering benefits other than wages and salaries;
7 The structure of taxation system in the West and Soviet Union was different. In the West share of 
corporate taxation reaches about 10 per cent of total tax revenues as average with income tax amounting 
to nearly 30 per cent. In the Soviet Union taxes paid by enterprises were equivalent to 90 per cent of the 
state revenues while income tax was only 8 per cent
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► financed and provided by employers.
b) Though Soviet enterprises belonged to the state they were nevertheless 
organisationally independent entities with their own balance sheet. They paid 
taxes, had rights to use and manage the assets assigned to them, dispose of 
their own financial resources which were separated from those used by the 
state via budget system. In that way the state left some of them with enterprises 
instead of distributing through the centralised channels.8 Soviet enterprises 
enjoyed a considerable discretion in choosing concrete methods of provision of 
occupational services.9 Therefore, they had a certain degree of autonomy from 
the state that make them resemble their Western counterparts.
c). Schaffer (1995(b)) argued that cost of social benefits provided by 
Russian enterprises as their contribution to social welfare was comparable with 
social expenditures of Western industrial undertakings. More or less reliable 
data relevant to the subject come from the labour costs statistics enabling to 
draw a general conclusion as to non-wage spending which usually includes 
occupational benefits. For example, Table A.1 in the Appendix A show non­
wage labour costs in manufacturing in the seventeen developed countries in 
1995. They make a sizeable share of the total labour costs averaging 39.2 
percent (ranging from 50.3 per cent for Italy to 27.5 per cent for Australia). The 
structure of labour costs of Russian enterprises (see Table A.2 in Appendix A) 
is quite similar. Indeed, occupational provisions are rather popular in most 
developed countries.
The comparison of occupational welfare in the West and in the Soviet 
Union reveals a lot of similarities in the scope of financing and the range of 
benefits provided under the two systems -  capitalist and socialist — which at 
the first glance seem to be so different. Soviet enterprises were separated from 
the state in operational terms, thus being a special channel of distribution of 
social benefits.
8 It is often argued that taxes paid by Soviet enterprises were a mere reallocation of the state resources 
rather than real taxes.
9 Zaslavskaya and Rivkina (3acjiaBCKaa h PbiBKHHa, 1989) consider the possession of social infrastructure 
as one of the integral characteristics of organisation in the Soviet Union together with a certain degree of 
autonomy, availability of fixed and current assets and proper staffing.
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The most significant similarity in the Western and Russian patterns of 
occupational welfare is that it is a part of social policy. Soviet enterprises were 
heavily involved in occupational provisions in-kind, but the same were available 
to workers in the Western countries, too. Occupational welfare in the USSR 
was heavily regulated by the state, but it was one of the many ways the state 
intervened into the life of society, in general, and an enterprise, in particular, 
which also happened in the Western countries. Therefore, the importance of 
Soviet/Russian experience for understanding occupational welfare is that it 
stresses the social policy perspective that is not so apparent when Western 
theory and practice are discussed.
Towards general definition
Analysis of occupational welfare theory and practice in Russia as related to 
the West undoubtedly enriches the understanding of this phenomenon and 
enables to lay foundation for its general definition.
It is to be remembered that there are already a few denotations of social 
benefits which employees get through employment: occupational benefits, 
employee benefits, corporate welfare and fringe benefits as most popular (for 
example, Brown and Small (1985), saw no difference between such things as 
occupational welfare and fringe benefits). The term "occupational welfare", 
offered by Titmuss, is, to my mind, the best one as it covers issues ignored by 
other terms. First, it most appropriately reflects integrity of and correlation 
between work/employment and welfare in terms of semantics, and, second, it 
underlines some features of these benefits, which, in Titmuss's opinion, allows 
incorporating the phenomenon in mainstream research on social policy and 
social welfare.
The word "occupational" means "incident to or arising out of employment" 
and thus indicates that welfare benefits in question are inseparably linked to 
employment. The other word in the denotation -  "welfare" -- presupposes 
provision for the purpose of improving the well-being of the working people of a 
variety of benefits in-cash and in-kind ranging, as Titmuss puts it,
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" from obvious forms of realisable goods to the most intangible forms of 
amenity" (Titmuss, 1974: 51 ).
I suggest that taking into account practical experience and body of 
knowledge amassed in the course of intensive study of occupational welfare 
and its properties by quite a number of scholars all over the world the general 
definition of occupational welfare might be construed as follows:
Occupational welfare as an integral part of comprehensive social policy is 
provision of social services and benefits other than salaries and wages, incident 
to or arising out of employment, in various forms, voluntary or statutory, offered 
through employer in compliance with the interests of an individual, organisation, 
the state and society.
The definition is by no means claimed to be exhaustive but it is seen as 
laying ground for a further discussion on definition of occupational welfare. It is 
deemed to be instrumental to analysis of similarities and differences in 
occupational welfare in various countries that is particularly important for 
today's Russia with a view of globalisation of all processes in the world and 
movement of Russian society towards mainstream of history. Occupational 
welfare, however insignificantly the phenomenon might seem against such 
backgrounds, has its own role to play in these developments.
Conclusions
Occupational welfare is a means, organisational and financial, of providing 
a specific kind of social protection to a very numerous part of population, 
namely those in employment, and, therefore, can be considered as a significant 
form of social welfare. Its importance stems from the fact that it is a function of 
organisations of various kinds, which play an important role in contemporary 
society.
The assumption that occupational welfare has been developing in two main 
perspectives -  social policy and organisation -  opens up new possibilities of
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deeper understanding of its gist and properties. Naturally, it does not mean that 
other trends should not exist and be explored.
Occupational welfare lies at the crossroad of interests of society and 
organisation. In this context I believe that the social policy perspective is 
indispensable for placing occupational welfare in the framework of general 
social policy that regretfully is often neglected. The Soviet experience may 
essentially contribute to remedying the situation.
Variety of forms, types and methods of occupational welfare provisions in 
different countries springs up from national traditions and political, economic 
and social peculiarities. The task is to discern similarities in diversity that is 
made in the thesis by citing theories and experiences of the West and the 
Soviet Russia, which were antipodes in ideology and practice.
Relating Russian theoretical treatment and practice of occupational welfare 
to what exists in the developed countries shows that it is a societal institution 
compatible with different modes of society organisation. Therefore, 
occupational welfare in Soviet Russia can be considered as one of its models 
rather then a unique product of the Soviet state.
The proposed definition of occupational welfare flowing from this premise is 
hoped to be a workable concept that can be applied in research. It is on no 
account supposed to be made mandatory either on international or national 
levels.
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Chapter 3
Occupational Welfare and Organisation: Conceptual
Framework
Chapter 3 further develops a conceptual framework for understanding 
occupational welfare, emphasising interdependence between its social policy 
and organisation dimensions. It is discussed in terms of theories of 
organisations and management. The choice is prompted by the fact that there 
is not much research available on the nature of Russian to say nothing about 
Soviet organisations in general, and industrial enterprises, in particular. 
Therefore, it is useful for the purpose of developing the theory of occupational 
welfare to summarise Western approaches to organisations, their relationships 
with the state and society and the way the latter influences processes inside 
organisations, to organisation as a system of social relations with the view of 
applying them to the Russian case.
The place of industrial managers who are members of organisation and 
society at large and, thus, important players in occupational welfare, is 
examined in the context of the West, the Soviet period and contemporary 
Russia. Their increasing powers in enterprise and social and economic life of 
society justify the focus of the fieldwork on senior managers of Russian 
industrial enterprises.
1. Theories of Organisations and Their Environment
Theories of organisations: main approaches
Organisation naturally attracts much attention and is studied from different 
standpoints. There are quite a number of theories explaining its nature and role 
in modern society. According to Brown (1992), for example, the main themes in 
understanding industrial organisations fall into four groups:
• system thinking conceptualises organisations as open socio-technical 
systems consisting of four main elements -- formal structure, informal 
structure, occupational structure and tradition;
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• contingency theory explains organisational structure and functioning 
as contingent upon environment within which organisations operate;
• social action approach argues that structure of an organisation is the 
consequence of the patterns of action of social actors who pursue 
certain goals albeit within constraints set by the actions of others.
• labour process theories view organisations as control structures and 
focus on the ways managers /employers use to control their 
employees.10
The state and society as part of organisation environment
Taking organisations as a starting point the state and society at large are 
discussed as a part of the organisation's environment, however, the latter might 
be conceptualised differently. Functionalism, for example, suggests that all 
social institutions are interdependent and always tend to equilibrium and 
stability. According to the conflict theories social structures consist of unequally 
advantageous groups, whose interests are in conflict and organisations are 
crystallisations of the class society, involved in a struggle over contradictory 
interests.
In spite of divergences there are some basic ideas accepted by the majority 
of researchers.
First, mainstream today recognises the importance of environment for 
organisations, which cannot be understood if taken in isolation from their 
environment. The main elements of organisation's external environment are the 
state and society.
10 In Russia words “manager” and “employer” are often used interchangebly, meaning somebody whose 
position in an enterprise empowers him/her to take or ultimately influence decisions to give work to other 
persons. But strictly speaking, the term “employer” is a broader one and can mean owners, owners who 
manage and managers.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to estimate the number of people in each category. According to 
official Russian statistics, people working in the national economy are “those on a contract” and “those 
not on a contract”. Owners evidently come under the second heading and are mentioned separately as 
private entrepreneurs who have their own business and can hire other people. Among employed on a 
contract there are managers who sign labour contract themselves but being in charge of running enterprise 
can decide on giving work to another person. The category owners/managers takes on people in 
intermediate position and they are likely to be counted as owners first.
61
Second, organisations interact with environment which means that various 
external factors influence processes inside organisations, although such 
theories, as population ecology, suggest that this is a one-way process, when 
an organisation adapts to a changing environment acquiring shape which suits 
its domain best. Others look at organisations as active force, which not only 
reacts to changes taking place outside but also actively influences them. The 
labour process theory locates organisations within the overall conception of the 
structure and dynamics of the capitalist society.
Contingency theory emphasises the following aspects of environment. First, 
there is a range of external factors, which influence the organisation, and, 
second, different departments in an organisation can operate in different 
environments. Therefore, on one hand, organisations interact with their 
environments and, on the other hand, environment is a source of change: in 
order to survive organisations have to change.
Resource dependence theory suggests that organisations depend on the 
support of resource-supplying constituencies necessary for their survival, 
including the state, management and employees. As a result, they should first 
of all satisfy the interests of such constituencies to secure their support, for its 
withdrawals threaten the survival of organisation. Watson notes that such 
analysis
" successfully relates the micro or small scale processes of organisational 
functioning to the macro or political-economic dimension of societal processes" 
(Watson, 1987: 204)
Third, comparative studies of organisations reveal the importance of 
differences in culture within and between societies. They are important factors 
in explaining disparity in organisational behaviour between countries.
The argument that significant differences in organisations across the world 
can be attributed to culture representing a key factor in organisational 
behaviour is, perhaps, prevalent today (Hofstede, 1980). However, one should 
be wary of overstating such a view, since some academics come to a 
somewhat different conclusion pointing at the convergence of organisational
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culture. For example, Hickson and colleagues (1979) suggest that there is a 
relationship between factors such as size and technology and structure that 
transcends culture. Bureaucracy is the same in all societies and bureaucratic 
structures are likely to emerge in particular sectors of the economy. On a more 
general level, many commentators have followed Kerr and colleagues (1973) in 
suggesting that industrial and post-industrial societies would, in any case, 
become more alike as they develop in the future.
Different approaches to analysis of relations between organisations and their 
environment are useful for conceptualising interdependence of the two 
perspectives of occupational welfare but with certain limitations. Firstly, the 
theories discussed above fail to specifically take into account the welfare state 
as a part of organisation environment. The latter is usually discussed from the 
point of view of an enterprise producing goods or services. However, in modern 
society the environment may influence processes within organisations in many 
other ways including the welfare state as a set of institutional arrangements and 
ideology. Secondly, interaction of the state and enterprise in social welfare is 
often put in the framework of social legitimacy of an enterprise, which implies 
that enterprises should be responsive to social criticism. If they fail to do so 
their legitimacy becomes problematic. Therefore, the question is how to 
incorporate an organisation into the broader democratic social and political 
environment.
Industrial enterprises are usually viewed as one of the types of organisations 
operating in industry (Brown, 1992). Therefore, a general theory of 
organisations is applied to them as well. The next step would be to define 
whether or not enterprises in capitalist and former socialist countries might be 
analysed in terms of the mainstream theories of organisations.
The contradiction that follows was well reflected by Morgan who argues that
" the fundamentally different relationships between state, economy and civil 
society make for a very different pattern of organisation" ( Morgan, 1990:198).
At the same time he notes that there are forces that operate across state 
and societal boundaries.
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The theories of organisations mentioned above have been developed in the 
West and definitely informed by the Western practices reflecting the problems 
of organisations in the capitalist society. The theory of a socialist enterprise is 
not well developed as it used to be seen as an extension of the state. 
Domanski (1997) suggested that socialist enterprises performed a gate-keeping 
function. It can be argued that there were certain limitations in explicit 
application of Western approaches to the Soviet organisations, for example, 
difference in environment and the ways it influenced Soviet organisations (see 
Morgan, 1990, for a more detailed account). However, because organisations 
as a special phenomenon have similar features some basic concepts are 
relevant to their analysis, regardless of the type of society they operate in.
Today there is a growing body of literature on Russian post-socialist 
enterprises, making attempts to define their behaviour in a new transition 
environment. The command system in its Soviet form is destroyed but the 
existing environment is not a market because of the lack of competition and the 
underdevelopment of market infrastructure. The major change in the 
environment is the loosening of state control and regulation, which gives 
Russian enterprises more independence and flexibility, but at the same time 
imposes more responsibilities and risk taking. The most important characteristic 
of the environment in which Russian enterprises perform is uncertainty and, 
hence, their main objective today is to survive. They have to develop new 
patterns of behaviour in order to stay alive in the changing world.
Two comments seem appropriate in this situation. First, it is not always clear 
what authors dwelling on the problem of survival of Russian enterprises do 
actually understand by it. Survival can mean either adaptation to the changing 
environment or preservation of some characteristics enterprises consider 
important. This, in fact, implies different behaviour on the part of an enterprise. 
Second, many researchers agree that the state is the major source of 
uncertainty for Russian enterprises: despite new trends in relations between 
enterprises and the state the latter still remains their main partner.
Research on Russian industrial enterprises shows that the weight of factors 
that are beyond direct control of an enterprise is quite significant. The two of
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them are usually mentioned as influencing most the life of Russian enterprises: 
enterprise status at the beginning of reforms/restructuring ( equipment, product 
mix, etc.,) and macroeconomic policy of the state. In short, the concept of 
survival implies that at present short term objectives are more important for 
Russian enterprises, which find it difficult to develop a long-term strategy, as 
everyday fight to stay alive hampers their strategic vision.
Organisations as social relations
The mainstream theory today conceptualise organisations as system of 
social relations:
"social relationship which is either closed or limits the admission of 
outsiders will be called organisation (Verband) when its regulations are 
enforced by specific individuals: a chief, and, possibly, an administrative staff 
which normally also has representative powers" (Weber, 1978:48).
According to Stinchcombe (1965), organisation is a system of stable social 
relations, consciously aimed at attaining certain aims and objectives. It is 
generally acknowledged that organisational goals are continuously negotiated 
in the interactions between its members. Organisational outcomes are 
produced by the actions of individuals and groups within organisations. 
Therefore, analysis of formal and informal relations in organisation is 
significant.
Social relations have two major dimensions: power and conflict. Power 
involves the ability of particular groups to impose their definition of the situation 
and solution of it on other groups within the organisation. In discussion of power 
and conflict the important role is allocated to a notion of interest as each group 
within an organisation tries to promote its interests and seeks to reach its aims.
Perception of organisations as a system of social relations is valuable for 
understanding change. Functionalism and conflict theories despite their 
differences state that social structures determine the world. The change occurs 
because of the dynamics of the system. Functionalism, for example, views 
social change as evolutionary and adaptive when the system accommodates to 
new circumstances and, therefore, can hardly explain rapid changes. The
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action approach suggesting that the power structure in an enterprise can be 
redefined admits the possibility of social change rather than systemic 
adjustments.
Silverman stressed that
" the action approach does not in itself provide a theory of organisations. It 
is instead best understood as a method of analysing social relations within 
organisations" (Silverman,1970: 51 ).
Action-based theory puts an emphasis on perceptions and actions of 
individuals and their groups, the goals people choose to pursue and the ways 
they use to reach these goals. Any explanation of human action has to take into 
account the meaning which individuals involved assign to their actions. Social 
reality does not just happen, it has to be made to happen.
For Weber (1978) it is important to understand attitudes that inform actions 
of various groups and individuals in organisations. It is often argued that there 
is no direct link between attitudes and behaviour as people fail to act as they 
believe they should because of constraints imposed on them. The action 
approach maintains that the notion of choice means that actions are not totally 
inhibited by environmental demands or structures but depend on objectives and 
values of the actors concerned. Social structures are the outcomes of such 
actions though existing social structures set certain restraints. Therefore, in 
order to understand why people make choices they do it is important to 
understand their attitudes that determine behaviour and serve as instruments of 
continuity and change in social life.
2. Managers, as Members of Organization, in Society and Enterprise: 
Western and Russian Focus
Managers in modern society: Western approaches
In the Western research the role of managers in organisations and society 
is typically evaluated from the viewpoints of "social group" and "political 
actors". They do feature in the analysis of social stratification as a definitive 
social group, though different explanations of their position on the social ladder 
of society have been given. This means that, first, managers should share
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certain common characteristics, and, second, they should demonstrate some 
common trends in attitudes, beliefs, etc., determined by their specific position in 
society.
The criteria used to define a social group can be broadly classified as 
economic (position as regards to the means of production and level of income) 
and social ( social status and prestige, educational level, etc.).
a) Many authors of different schools tend to approach managers in terms of 
ownership and control. Managers are related to such classes as owners, on 
one hand, and workers, on the other hand. They are on a payroll but differ from 
workers in many other respects. As Saunders (1990) notes, managers may 
employ people, issue commands to workers and make decisions on the ways 
enterprises are run without owning the capital. They are well remunerated and 
enjoy quite high social prestige.
In this regard, Saunders (1990) mentions that the Marxist analysis based 
on the two-class division of society fails to incorporate managers. Marxism 
contends that managers express the interests of capitalists. But the socio- 
occupational approach seems to be more fruitful in defining the position of 
managers. Occupational position is often taken into account when constructing 
social strata regardless of the fact whether it is an outcome of other social 
relations or self-important. For example, Scase (1992) argues that class 
relations connected with the mode of production determine occupational 
structure of society. According to Bell (1973), occupations are relatively stable 
work activities determined by the objective requirements of organisation of the 
work systems and exist independently of other social relations at work.
In this context position in the labour market is more important than the 
relationship to property. Scase recognises that
"occupational order is a core dimension of any system of social 
stratification" (Scase, 1992:37).
Watson (1987) explicitly links class position to a position in the division of 
labour in society with implications it has for access to those experiences, goods 
and services that are scarce and valued in that society.
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Goldthorpe's classification (1980) includes managers into the so-called 
service class on the basis of their work situation (the degree of authority they 
enjoy at work) and their sharing similar life chances and economic interests. 
This service class exercises power on behalf of the corporate authority but, at 
the same time, is employed selling its services in the market. But "service 
class" differs from the working class by having a relative security, prospects for 
material and status advancement and a certain professional code. Goldthorpe 
makes an important conclusion that this class is growing and acquires more 
social and political importance in society.
But the theory of social stratification defines not only special groups in the 
society but also their relations to other groups. Davis and Moore (1945) explain 
the functional importance of different positions based on two criteria: 
uniqueness (can not be easily substituted by other positions) and number of 
subordinate positions. In this context managers definitely occupy a high 
position in the social order of society.
The ideas of professionalism and managerial discretion have emerged with 
separation between ownership and control: managers run an enterprise but do 
not own it. Nowadays this distinction is gradually eroding because managers 
often become owners at the same time holding shares of their enterprises.
The managerial thesis is widely used in the Western theory. The 
managerial revolution is consistent with the trends of industrialisation in the 
developed countries. Berle and Means (1947) and Burnham (1945) argued that 
ownership had become dispersed among shareholders and control over large 
corporations had fallen into hands of professional managers. Baran and 
Sweezy (1968) suggested that as managers were among big shareholders 
there was no divorce between ownership and management. However, this does 
not change the essence of the idea: managers are not neutral, they are in many 
cases interested in the performance of their enterprises.
The development of management as occupation caused the growth of a 
distinct stratum in enterprises. But claims that management is a profession has 
serious implication for managers as professional ethics emphasise first of all 
the responsibilities occupations have towards society.
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b). The important role that management plays within organisations is 
stressed by the theories of management and organisational behaviour that 
assume that management co-ordinate, direct and guide the efforts of the 
members of organisation towards the achievement of organisational goals.
Management is a group in organisation that usually articulate organisational 
goals. It is seen as a dominant coalition whose members have the power to 
decide how organisation operates (Child, 1969). The idea of managers 
balancing the interests of all groups concerned with an organisation seems to 
be attractive to explain their role in organisation. On one hand, managers have 
a stake in an enterprise, on the other hand, they have to take into account the 
interests of other stakeholders ( shareholders, employees, customers, public at 
large) in order to secure a successful performance of an enterprise. The 
important function of managers is mediation between environment and 
organisation, inside and outside, trying to reach an acceptable compromise 
between internal and external interests.
Managers attempt to integrate all other elements of organisation - people, 
structure, and goals. The success of business is dependent on the knowledge 
and skills of managers (Drucker, 1979; Mullins, 1993).
The discussion on rational/irrational basis of decision-making has explicit 
consequences for managers. In the first case the capacity of managers to make 
rational decisions based on evaluation of various opportunities is praised. In the 
second one it is insisted that managers can hardly be expected to make 
rational decisions as they face a number of constraints, including the power of 
other groups within the organisation. But the formal / informal dichotomy is 
more important for the understanding of the position of managers in 
organisation. The formal relations in organisations have been recently 
underestimated, while the democratic nature tend to be overestimated. The 
importance of formal decisions proceeds from the fact that the system of 
remuneration is directly linked to the fulfilment of formal decisions. It is 
managers who take the formal decisions whatever the influence of other 
internal or external factors. If a certain degree of irrationality in a decision
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making process is allowed than the importance of perceptions and attitudes of 
managers becomes evident.
Bearle and Means (1947) found out that managers had considerable 
discretion and, as a result, contributed to the broadening of corporate 
objectives. Due to separation of ownership and control the influence of owners 
can be weakened and managers may pursue objectives other than profit- 
maximisation including social goals. Managers can also follow strategies that 
first of all benefit them rather than the owners. Though reservations are 
expressed especially about the extent of managers' discretion the managerialist 
thesis still enjoys popularity.
Changes in industrial organisation in Germany, France and Britain, which 
occurred during the last twenty years and national variations within the general 
tendencies, enable Lane to conclude that the role of managers has increased 
and to suggest that
"trade unions have lost their influence both at the level of collective 
bargaining and in national politics" (Lane,1989:120).
The power in industrial relations has shifted in favour of management 
though it is still unclear how it would affect national politics.
High technology production systems make management dependent on 
"responsible worker initiative and involvement" (Lane, 1989:143). As a result 
managers have to offer employees opportunities for participation, good 
employment conditions and career opportunities.
c) The incorporation of managers into middle class (Scase, 1992; Giddens, 
1973) has important implications for the analysis of their role in contemporary 
society. The theory of social stratification not only explains the existence of 
different social groups but also addresses the issue of social stability. The latter 
is dependent on the size of the middle class: strong middle class helps to 
preserve stability in society. Incorporating managers into middle class implies 
that they are satisfied with their position in society, exercise a certain power and 
authority and, therefore, might be interested in preserving the status quo. 
Goldthorpe (1980) notes that though managers as the service class do not
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necessarily have a preference for capitalism, they will support it as long as it 
enables them to maintain their position.
d) In the political arena managers are discussed as an interest group, which 
is fundamental to the democratic political process. As they form a distinct group 
it is suggested that managers must share common interests that they may try to 
promote via professional organisations, or other bodies, which may have similar 
concerns. As the role of interest groups depends to a large extent on the 
functions their members perform in the social division of labour, such 
associations may exercise a considerable power derived from their members’ 
important position in the system of production.
Soviet managers: Western and Soviet Approaches
Defining position of Soviet managers in society Western scholars tend to 
consider them as a distinct social group. They were especially interested in the 
role managers had played during the two periods of the Soviet history, namely 
industrialisation and emergence of the so-called "red directors" and the 1965 
reforms. These were the periods of serious changes in the "khosiastvenny 
mechanism", the way the Soviet economy in general and enterprises in 
particular were managed.
Western scholars adhered to sometimes apparently contradictory 
approaches to evaluating the role of Soviet managers. On one hand, Azrael 
(1966) and Bienstock and colleagues (1944) depicted them as obedient cogs in 
the totalitarian machine. On the other hand, Granick came to the conclusion 
that
" from the point of view of practical independence in making concrete 
decisions, the Soviet director may be conceived of as an entrepreneur" 
(Granick, 1974:285).
In his influential study he demonstrated that Soviet directors had 
considerable power and a large measure of autonomy. The necessity to 
implement guidelines of the Communist Party was the only serious restriction of 
their activities. Granick argued that, as the Soviet factory was the only stable
71
element in the often-reorganised industry, it amassed considerable decision­
making power and enterprise directors enjoyed substantial autonomy.
Granick (1972) suggested that Soviet managers above all pursued the 
interests of their own enterprise. One of the reasons was a special bonus 
system dependent on fulfilment of certain performance indicators. It 
encouraged:
• attainment of short-term objectives;
• priority to problems of a unit for which a manager was responsible;
• negotiations with the state authorities for better terms and more 
subsidies.
Therefore, the necessity to reconcile interest of an enterprise, on one hand, 
and the national economy and society as a whole, on the other hand, was one 
of the most serious problems of the Soviet industrial management. This 
corresponds with the findings of some Russian researchers who point out that 
external pressures are important to understand the development of Soviet 
enterprises (Ilyin, 1996).
Analysing Soviet politics Western researchers often refer to industrial 
managers as an interest group stressing their important role as a source of 
influence on the state (Scilling and Griffits, 1971). Though in the totalitarian 
systems interest groups are prohibited or non-existent it does not prevent 
certain interests from exerting influence. It should be remembered that Soviet 
managers were members of the Communist party and were dominated by it. 
The party organisations penetrated all levels of society, each enterprise having 
a party committee. It was hardly possible to articulate autonomous interests, 
but the important position of managers in the production process enabled them 
to express interests in issues directly related to production process.
However, reservations must be made on application of interest group 
approach to Soviet managers. They were not organised politically and did not 
participate in political life as an independent force. Therefore, it would be more 
precise to refer to Soviet managers as an opinion group.
Soviet theory is almost silent on managers. In the Soviet Union the two- 
classes division of society based on access to the means of production was
72
recognised to include the working class and the peasantry as basic groupings 
plus intelligenzia as a social stratum. Nevertheless, as the public ownership of 
the means of production eliminated exploitation, unequal relations to the means 
of production led to the differentiation of the conditions of people' s life. 
Especially in the late Soviet studies discussion definitely shifted to the analysis 
of socio-occupational division. Conditions and character of work (complexity, 
qualifications, autonomy, etc.) were the main criteria used to define a social 
stratum. But, in those studies, it is not always possible to distinguish managers 
who are often included into the so-called "specialists" (PoroBMH (Rogovin), 
1984). One of the reasons is that the formation of a classless society and the 
elimination of the differences in the style of life of people belonging to different 
groups was one of the main objectives of the Soviet social policy.
Late Soviet research prioritised the study of specific interests of various 
social strata. Such interests were considered non antagonistic in socialist as 
opposed to capitalist society. But, in general, it was acknowledged that group 
interests were aimed at maintaining the position of the group in the social 
structure of society. Different groups had different stakes in reforms of 
management of the national economy undertaken in the Soviet Union. For 
example, Zaslavskaya and Rivkina (3acnaBCKan n PbiBKUHa, 1989) came to the 
conclusion that decentralisation of economy was likely to benefit enterprise 
managers who could be considered as reform supporters.
Russian managers today: increasing powers
In the USSR managers used to be state employees. Their status was 
characterised by a high educational level; stable long-term tenure in office and 
a system of special bonuses. Party membership was desirable for promotion. 
Industrial management career could be a step to higher governmental and 
party posts with more privileges to come.
Now old enterprises became more independent from the state, a lot of 
enterprises were privatised and turned into joint stock companies as well as 
new private establishments emerged. The role of managers has been
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fundamentally changing, they can and, in fact, some of them do own shares in 
their enterprises ensuing an interest in their success as owners.
Russian and foreign experts on the subject point out that management has 
considerable influence and power within Russian enterprises and have 
strengthened control over them in the course of privatisation (World Bank, 1996; 
Dolgopyatova, 1995). Empirical evidence shows that top management has very 
strong control over enterprises. For example, in order to find out the correlation 
between ownership and control the World Bank survey (1994) examined the 
influence of different groups within enterprises in the decision making process. 
It revealed that managers played the most important part in passing decisions 
on various issues; including hiring and firing of workers and provision of social 
benefits. In the light of other research, Rose's statement (1994) that, in shaping 
enterprise social plans supply side factors, including management attitudes, are 
more important than demand side — workers' preferences — is justified.
This strong belief in the power of managers results in the fact that 
behaviour of Russian enterprises is usually studied through managers. Most 
studies of occupational welfare in Russia are based on interviews with senior 
managers and focus on the range and volume of services provided, sometimes 
on their dynamics.
It should be noted that two other players in the field -- workers and trade 
unions were excluded from my analysis on the following grounds.
The role of workers in decision-making in enterprise is inconsiderable. Long 
delays in payment of wages are an indirect evidence of their weak position and 
inability to control the situation. There are data to suggest that, even if workers 
own a major package of shares, they have little influence over decision making 
(World Bank,1996; Blasi and Shleifer,1995).
Absence of powerful workers' organisations is one of the reasons for their 
poor participation in the life of enterprises. At present trade unions in Russia do 
not play any significant role and their influence on political and economic issues 
appears to be weak. Trade unionism in the Western sense has never been 
strong in Russia. It did not have a chance to develop in Imperial Russia as 
trade unions were made legal only ten years prior to the 1917 October
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Revolution. In the Soviet Union trade unions were very closely affiliated with 
management of enterprises; in fact, a trade union leader was a member of 
management team. Both managers and workers were members of the same 
trade union. Nowadays when relations between capital and labour are changing 
this is not any more appropriate. Old trade unions have a dubious reputation 
among workers and are not taken seriously. Newly emerging ones are not 
strong at the moment and still have to establish themselves as independent 
bodies really concerned with the interests of their members and this, of course, 
will take some time.
But at present there is an evident lack of theoretical backing for the 
understanding of the role of Russian managers. Sociological studies typically 
focus on entrepreneurship as a distinctive phenomenon of the social life of 
modern Russia. A number of studies have been conducted recently to draw a 
social portrait of new entrepreneurs in Russia. Much less attention is paid to 
industrial managers whose position in society has been definitely changing. In 
order to fill in this gap it is necessary to discuss the relevant theories developed 
in the West and in the Soviet Union/Russia as a starting point of elaborating 
theoretically sound approaches to Russian managers.
Conclusions
As occupational welfare is incident to or arising out of employment and, 
thus, supplied through organisations of various kinds, including industrial 
establishments, exploration of organisations in a greater depth and setting a 
conceptual framework for issues related, in particular, to the place industrial 
managers occupy as members of organisation and society at large, are more 
than appropriate for the purposes of the present study.
The contents of this chapter indicates that:
• interaction of organisations and their environment is a natural 
precondition of their existence. The state and society are the major 
components of organisations’ environment that influence their 
operations, occupational welfare among them, in many ways offering 
opportunities and shaping constraints;
75
• there is a consensus in the research that managers, being members of 
organisations, at the same time constitute a special social and political 
group in society with certain distinctive social characteristics that might 
pursue its own interests;
• managers play an important role in Russian organisations and have a 
great potential to shape their life. The available data indicate that in the 
course of transformation the powers of Russian managers have 
increased.
• as values of a market economy and democracy are now accepted in 
Russia the academic discussions of the Western scholars on 
organisations and managers will have more relevance to their Russian 
counterparts that, unfortunately, are still not well researched though the 
number of relevant studies is growing. But it should be remembered that 
in the absence of real market environment Russian enterprises might still 
retain some characteristics of Soviet ones.
All this leads to conclude that Russian managers are important players in 
the field of occupational welfare, who are likely to shape its organisation 
perspective influenced by their attitudes and perceptions.
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Chapter 4
Health Care as Component of Occupational Welfare
Health care has been taken as a specific subject of the thesis because of 
its importance among many problems of occupational welfare. The choice was 
also prompted by the fact that health care is typically overlooked in the debates 
on the problem because of the difficulty to locate it as one of the elements of 
occupational welfare, especially in the absence of its general definition. 
Besides, my intention was to enlarge the discussion by introducing valuable 
experience of Soviet enterprises employees' health protection.
This chapter is dedicated to such principal matters pertaining to its research 
as the two perspectives of occupational welfare in health care, relation to 
pension/taxation issues, occupational disease versus general illness; 
definitions, principles and organisation of occupational health care and 
occupational health services.
1. Problems Pertaining to the Study of Health Care as Component of 
Occupational Welfare.
The two occupational welfare perspectives and health care
Philosophy of workers' health protection ensues from social / quality of life 
and economic / productivity considerations and aims at maximising health gains 
for society and organisations. It justifies the necessity of application of the 
social policy perspective and the organisation perspective to occupational 
health care.
Society is concerned about public health as an important ingredient of living 
standards. Right to health care was one of the first social rights granted by the 
modern states and social security systems in many Western countries began 
with workmen's compensation and health insurance. Health policy is also 
closely related to economic policy: healthy population is crucially important for 
economic development. Therefore, health is of everybody’s concern (See 
Figure 1 in Appendix A).
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Picking out the employed as special health protection target group is 
stipulated by the following reasons. First, they represent a large section of 
population and, second, they are all subjected to the same aftermath of working 
environment, physical, chemical, biological, psychosocial and ergonomic which 
can be damaging to workers' health, not mentioning accidents at work. That is 
why workers must be classed as a group having specific needs in health 
protection determined by the risk of suffering occupational diseases and the 
necessity to eliminate bad influence of working conditions on health status in 
general.
Nowadays issues of workers’ health and occupational health services 
(OHS) have been permanently on the political agenda of international 
community, for example the European Union (the EU). As early as in 1962 a 
special committee on industrial health and safety was established as a branch 
of the GDV (Directorate General Five). Since the late 1980 the EU activities in 
this field have intensified resulting in adopting the programme of action on 
safety, hygiene and health at work in 1988. The next year the EU Council took 
the decision on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the 
safety and health of workers at work. It is important to note, that the EU 
decisions on health and safety at work are adopted by the qualified majority 
rather than by reaching consensus as it is the case in the most other issues.
If the organisation perspective of occupational health care is discussed, 
employers look for healthy workforce because, first of all, ill health is costly for 
many reasons. If workers are sick or die prematurely it has a direct impact on 
the costs of hiring and training new workers, sick leave, terminal benefits, etc. 
Better health means reduction of absenteeism from work and increase in 
productivity and profits. According to the World Bank estimates, from 10 to 20 
per cent of the GDP are lost every year due to bad health status of the 
employed (WHO, 1995).
This argument is well illustrated by the diagram that demonstrates the 
relationships between the healthy working environment, the health of the 
workers and the productivity and profitability of enterprises (Fig. 1, Appendix A).
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But not only economic factors are important. Protection of the working 
people health is discussed today in the framework of the sustainable 
development. Needs of the present generation should be met in such a way 
that it does not damage people's health and environment, destroy resource 
base for human development and leave a chance to the future generations to 
satisfy their needs. Human beings with their right to healthy and productive life 
in harmony with nature are in the centre of this strategy. Occupational health is 
one of the basic elements in social and health dimensions of the principle of the 
sustainable development (WHO, 1995).
Health care and pensions / taxation issues of occupational welfare
In the West the problem of occupational welfare has been definitely 
dominated by pension issues. Esping-Andersen (1996) quite explicitly 
connected the development of occupational welfare with the establishment of 
pension rights. The recent works edited by Shalev (1996) and Rein (1997) 
focused on occupational pensions.
On the contrary, in the Soviet Union pensions had never been included into 
an enterprise domain. To be precise, enterprises had no right to provide 
pensions in addition to the state system. The state health and pension systems 
developed alongside: for example, there were no occupational pensions but 
enterprise health services in-kind did exist. Pensions were funded from the 
state budget while health care was an important element of occupational 
welfare. For Soviet enterprises health care for employees was always more 
important than pensions. The tradition has deep historical roots because 
employer provided health services were established in Russian industrial 
enterprises as early as the late nineteenth century while no pensions was paid 
at all.
Social funds in Soviet enterprises were never looked upon as financial 
assets that is usually the case for pension arrangements in the West. 
Occupational pension funds there can accumulate considerable sums of money 
and are often regarded as a means of personal savings and capital formation. 
Nowadays the state tries to involve enterprises more explicitly in solving
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pension problems by incorporating occupational pensions as a second 
(together with the state and personal) tier in pension systems being created in 
many Western countries. Occupational pensions plans are intended to create 
additional financial resources for economy and show the way to lifetime 
redistribution of income.
It is also worth to mention that pension plans are perhaps the only 
occupational welfare arrangement on which enough statistical data is available 
that, of course, makes a task of the research much easier.
The principal difference between health plans and pension schemes is that 
health protection generally implies not only compensation for the loss of income 
but also provision of health services in-kind. Payment of benefits and provision 
of health services may either go together or be organisationally and financially 
separated. Occupational health plans, as a rule, cover only employees, 
sometimes their dependents, whereas occupational pensions are paid to 
people no more in employment.
There is one more issue that deserves to be mentioned in connection with 
organisation of occupational health care. Tax treatment is assumed to be one 
of the most effective instruments of affecting the development of occupational 
welfare. Comparison of taxation of occupational pension and health schemes in 
the OECD countries brings out a noteworthy pattern. While occupational health 
insurance plans are taxed in most countries (9 out of 13) occupational 
pensions, on the contrary, are levied in a few ones (4  out of 13) (OECD, 1988). 
According to Mitchel and Rojot (1993) it demonstrated that the state policy was 
aimed either to discourage occupational health plans or to promote first of all 
occupational pension schemes.
Occupational disease versus general illness
People’s health is affected by quite a number of social and economic 
factors among which conditions and contents of work being most important. As 
working environment can cause illness and injuries employers must bear 
certain responsibilities for their employees' health. Whatever differences exist in
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understanding of their scope and the ways they are to be fulfilled the working 
people should be protected against three types of health threats:
• injuries at work;
• occupational diseases;
• general illness.
The major question is whether employers should be held responsible only 
in the first two instances when influence of employment conditions can be 
easily traced or in case of general illness as well. The relative importance of the 
burden of injuries at work, occupational diseases and general illnesses should 
always be kept in mind. Officially recorded morbidity patterns show that in 
contemporary society the burden of general illnesses is heavier than that of 
injuries at work and occupational diseases caused directly by employment 
environment.
The principal distinction between an occupational disease and a general 
illness is that the former is definitely produced by working conditions while the 
latter is not related to the job, at least directly. But in practice it is difficult to find 
out whether a disease or an illness arose out of or in the course of employment. 
The matter is that many diseases result from both occupational and non- 
occupational causes and a number of work-related diseases tend to manifest 
themselves long after the period of a worker’s exposure to the influence of 
health damaging working conditions has terminated.
If it is admitted that there is no difference in treatment of occupational 
disease and general illness then they can be easily integrated in and covered 
by one programme. But it is often argued that injuries at work and occupational 
diseases require specialised medical care as well as rehabilitation provided 
through appropriate programmes by specially trained personnel. In any case, 
integrated and separate health schemes have their advantages and 
disadvantages, the major trend, however, being promotion of the former.
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Role of enterprises in protection of the working people's health: principal
approaches
The close link between health status of the employed and working 
conditions, that worries society and enterprises, implies employers' involvement 
in promotion of health of population through provision of care for workers. It 
could not but affect organisation of health care systems.
The role of employers in provision of health care for workers can be 
discussed from the following viewpoints:
• employers' contributions to the national health systems;
• occupational health and occupational health services.
If the latter are typically included into occupational welfare, the former are 
usually not considered as its element. Such an omission renders it important to 
discuss employers' part in the provision of health care in society in more detail. 
It is typically exercised:
in case of financing -  via general taxation, social or private insurance 
contributions or lump sum payments;
in case of management and control -- via state-administered, self-managed 
or privately-run plans.
In the latest analysis of health care systems the emphasis is placed on 
purchaser / provider relationships. For example, in the OECD report (1994) they 
are classified according to sources of financing and methods of paying 
providers while role of enterprise in health care is practically ignored. Roemer's 
study is among the few that discussing methods of health care financing 
explicitly introduce industry, or
"the provision of services at the expense of an enterprise, supported by its 
earnings” (Roemer, 1976 :15)
Maydell (1993) argued that every specific form of organisation of health 
care, first, was designed to achieve certain objectives, second, needed to fit 
into the social and political system that exists in a country. It is with this 
understanding that experiences of some countries are briefly surveyed below.
In the UK employers contribute to the National Health Service (NHS) 
through general taxation thus having minimum influence on the way it operates.
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Provision of medical treatment is separated from payment of sick benefits by 
employers as the statutory sick pay. In order that employees can avoid waiting 
lists, enjoy more comfort and privacy, gain direct access to consultants 
occupational health care is provided via voluntary health insurance plans. Hogg 
Robinson Healthcare (Fletcher, 1997) estimated that employers privately 
insured about 1.8 million people in the UK.
Another way for employers to fulfil their obligations is health insurance, 
either voluntary or compulsory. In Germany, for example, they make 
contributions to compulsory health insurance administered by sickness funds. 
Main features of the German system are as follows:
~  rates of contributions vary because sickness funds not only collect 
money but also fix rates that are on average about 13 per cent of payroll 
equally divided between employer and employees;
— both parties exercise considerable influence on administration of 
sickness funds ensuing from the principle of self-management carried out by 
employees and employers associations;
-  sickness funds are engaged in payment of benefits and provision of 
health services.
Voluntary occupational health insurance in Europe, as a rule, is employer 
managed and limited in scope because nation-wide health care programmes 
exist in many countries. It is introduced to supplement mainstream health care 
when compulsory health coverage is deemed to be inadequate or it is 
necessary to defray the full cost of treatment. In this case the above-mentioned 
type of insurance allows having a greater choice of doctors or health services, 
better accommodation at hospitals, saving of time, etc. That is why it might be 
attractive even if there is compulsory insurance system in a country.
But voluntary health insurance may be the mainstream as it is, for example, 
the case of the USA. It is provided by employers, both employers and 
employees usually contribute to health insurance, be it voluntary or statutory, 
employers' share being mostly the same or larger than that of employees. 
There is no single nationwide system of health protection of population: two
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governmental social security programmes, Medicare and Medicaid, cover only 
the elderly and the poor.
In the West insurance is the most widespread mechanism of provision of 
health services for workers. Its crucial problem today is raising costs of medical 
treatment. Limiting the scope of services covered or increasing contributions, 
including co-payments by the insured, can deal it with. However, either of 
solutions is unlikely to gain public support.
In these circumstances the role of an enterprise as responsible agent has 
been growing. One of the advantages is that organisation usually has greater 
bargaining power in negotiating with providers of health care than individual 
employees. Occupational health insurance arranged as group insurance 
programme guarantee better treatment for employees than in case of 
purchasing individual private health insurance. Good management of a health 
plan helps to find a way to reconcile higher costs of treatment and augmented 
expectations.
Taking into account the mentioned above and using the definition of 
occupational welfare, developed by the author, it is argued that employers 
participation in the national health schemes should be regarded as a 
component of occupational welfare in its part clearly linked to employment, first 
of all social and private insurance, organised on employment basis.
2. Definitions, Principles and Organisation of Occupational Health 
Care
Definitions of occupational health and occupational health services (OHS)
Occupational health care dated back to the nineteenth century emerging 
as an answer to challenges of the new industrial society. But initial attempts to 
develop its conceptual foundation were undertaken at international level by the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) and International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
only after the Second World War.
The WHO Constitution stipulates prevention of accidental injuries and the 
promotion of improvement of working conditions as functions of WHO. It has 
had a specific programme of occupational health since 1950 and carried it out
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in close coordination and collaboration with ILO. The Alma-Ata declaration 
(WHO, 1978) emphasised the necessity to organise primary health care 
services both preventive and curative as close as possible to where people 
lived and worked giving priority to the needy including the working people at 
high risk. The Health for All provided for improvement of health of the 
employed. International organisations, such as WHO and ILO, national 
authorities and professional bodies have been engaged in working out 
definitions of occupational health and occupational health services (OHS).
Occupational health as defined in the Global Strategy for Occupational 
Health for All is a multidisciplinary activity aiming at:
protection and promotion of the health of workers by preventing and 
controlling occupational diseases and accidents and by eliminating 
occupational factors and conditions hazardous to health and safety at work;
development and promotion of health and safe work, work environment and 
work organisation;
enhancement of physical, mental and social well-being of workers and 
support for the development and maintenance of their working capacity, as well 
as professional and social development at work;
enablement of workers to conduct socially and economically productive 
lives and to contribute positively to the sustainable development (WHO, 1995).
Therefore, three main aims of health protection of the working population 
include maintenance and strengthening of the health of workers and their ability 
to work; improvement of working conditions and safety at work; development of 
structures and cultures of every organisation in order to create a positive social 
climate, to secure increase in its effectiveness.
The Global Strategy for Occupational Health for All provides for the 
importance of OHS that are placed the fourth among the ten priorities set up by 
the WHO. Occupational health service was first understood as
"...a service established in or near a place of employment for the purposes
of:
a) protecting the workers against any health hazard that may arise out of 
their work or the conditions in which it is carried on;
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b) contributing towards the workers' physical and mental adjustment, in 
particular by the adaptation of the work to the workers and their assignment to 
jobs for which they are suited; and
c) contributing to the establishment and maintenance of the highest 
possible degree of physical and mental well-being of the workers." (ILO,1959).
It was envisaged that if due to geographical or other reasons organisation 
of OHS in an enterprise was impossible then a contract with a local general 
practitioner (GP) or health service should be made on provision of the first aid 
in case of emergency, carrying out of medical screening, if required by the 
national legislation, hygiene control.
In 1985 the new ILO Convention modified the definition of OHS which now
"means services entrusted with essentially preventive functions and 
responsible for advising the employer, the workers and their representatives in 
the undertaking on
-  the requirements for establishing and maintaining a safe and healthy 
working environment that will facilitate optimal physical and mental health in 
relation to work;
-  the adaptation of work to capacities of workers in the light of their state of 
physical and mental health. "(ILO, 1985).11
Principles of functioning of OHS
The main principles, which underlie the idea of OHS, are as follows,
a) Working conditions influence people's health, therefore:
• diseases caused by the working conditions should be diagnosed, 
treated and compensated;
• it is a responsibility of employers to secure health and safety at work;
• employees should not bear any costs for organisation of OHS or pay 
for the services they provide.
11 Since 1950 ILO and WHO have had a common definition of OHS. It was adopted by the joint ILO/ 
WHO Committee on Occupational Health at its first session in 1950 and revised at its 12th session in 
1985.
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b) OHS should be developed to cover all workers in all sectors of the 
economy and in all enterprises as well as the self-employed. Special attention 
should be paid to agricultural and migrant workers, employed in small 
enterprises and in the informal sector and the self-employed.
c) Modern OHS in practice integrating the efforts of diverse professionals 
disclose a comprehensive multidisciplinary approach securing workers’ health 
by both influencing environment at work and workers themselves. That is why 
they are referred to as services aimed to protect health rather than just to 
provide medical treatment.
The medical approach dominated health care systems until recently. 
Situation has been changing under the influence of such factors as 
technological progress; new values (priority for primary care, workers' rights); 
stress on prevention (interdisciplinary character, safeguarding general health 
status of workers).
Prevention and health promotion are recognised as the most important 
functions of OHS. Cases of medical treatment of general illness are solved 
depending on circumstances. However, as protection of workers’ health is 
understood comprehensively it must inevitably include specific measures to 
prevent occupational diseases as well as to establish some kind of control over 
workers' health status. It should be taken into account that it is difficult to 
separate occupational disease from general illness as in many cases it is hard 
to establish a link between working conditions and occurrence of illness. 
Therefore, though ILO accentuates OHS orientation towards prevention, the 
fatter at the same time recommends that provision of general primary care, now 
an important trend in development of health care, should become one of OHS 
responsibilities. Thus, the fact that OHS have a potential to strengthen primary 
care leads to the growing attention to their activities.
Organisation of occupational health services
According to international standards OHS should develop on the following 
patterns:
• coverage of all workers by occupational health programmes;
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• special emphasis on small enterprises and the self-employed, including 
agricultural workers;
• provision of primary care services where necessary;
• national health programmes aid in gradual development of OHS for all 
workers starting from those at the highest risk.
Organisation of OHS depends on the requirements of national legislation, 
health care system and traditions of a country. They can be established:
• in compliance with the legislation in force;
• in accordance with collective agreements or other agreements between 
employers and workers;
• in any other form as approved by the relevant authorities after 
consultations with employers and workers' organisations.
The ILO Convention (1985) stipulates that one of the major organisational 
features of OHS should be their easy accessibility to workers and therefore 
they must be provided within or near the place of employment. It specifies that 
services can be provided:
• by the undertaking or group of undertakings;
• public authorities;
• social security institutions;
• other bodies authorised by the competent authorities;
• combination of any of the above.
Researchers have elaborated on the spheres in which OHS work. For 
example, Rantanen (1989) enumerated the following functions:
> surveillance of the work environment;
> initiatives and advise on the control of hazards at work;
> surveillance of the health of employees;
> follow-up of the health of vulnerable groups;
> adaptation of work and the work environment to the worker;
> organisation of the first aid and emergency response;
> health education and health promotion;
> collection of information on workers' health;
> provision of curative services for occupational diseases;
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> provision of general health care services.
Roemer (1976), in his turn, noted that OHS greatly varied and though they 
could be found in all countries they were nowhere the predominant method of 
provision of health care.
The scope of OHS activities, for example, in some European countries 
differs consisting of:
• prevention, visits to working places, provision of the first aid and medical 
screening (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands);
• prevention and provision of some medical treatment (Austria, Finland, 
Italy, Sweden);
• prevention plus provision of full medical treatment (Iceland).
The size of enterprises is such an important factor of OHS provision that it 
is mandatory in some countries, for instance, OHS should be set up in 
enterprises employing more than 50 people in Belgium, over 100 people in 
Spain. However, as a rule, they are established in large enterprises.
Another matter of concern is the coverage of employees. OHS are opened 
either in enterprises where it is really necessary (Denmark, Sweden) or cover 
all workers (Belgium, France). First OHS were established in industrial 
enterprises only but later they spread to other organisations. In the majority of 
countries employers bear costs of OHS though in the rest they are financed by 
the state or via health insurance. If importance of economic incentives for 
employers are acknowledged they can get subsidies from the state to cover the 
costs incurred as in some Scandinavian states.
But despite all the efforts to develop OHS there still is a gap between the 
requirements of WHO and ILO and reality. According to available estimates 
only 20-50 per cent of workers in Europe have access to OHS that fully comply 
with WHO/ILO rules. It largely depends on:
first, the ways OHS are related to health care systems. In the West the 
latter varies from the National Health Service in the UK to the employment- 
based health insurance in the USA. Though Global Strategy for Occupational 
Health for All underlines the increasing role of health care systems in the 
development of OHS the latter are usually separated from the mainstream. In
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health care systems emphasis is made on cure while OHS are intended to deal 
with prevention of health hazards although in some countries they may also 
diagnose and treat occupational diseases. The lack of coordination between 
the two systems often does not permit them to cooperate effectively;
second, interdepartmental relations. Traditionally labour ministries 
supervise issues of protection of health of the working people. But as OHS 
contribute to solving both health and labour problems, communication and 
coordination between health and labour authorities as well as other agencies 
concerned is required.12
Enterprise-based health services in the Soviet Union as a model of OHS
Enterprise health services in the Soviet Union are regarded by WHO 
(Rantanen, 1989) as a model of OHS. It had two distinct features:
• OHS were an integral part of the national health system and therefore 
they are often referred to as a national health service model;
• provision of primary and even secondary care was an important function 
of OHS.
OHS as a division of occupational welfare played much more substantial 
part in the Soviet Russia than in the Western countries. The belonging to the 
national health service and necessity to provide special medical treatment to 
employees influenced their development.
The principles laid down at the inception of the Soviet health care were:
• absence of financial barriers in access to medical services;
• universal coverage of the entire population;
• provision of full range of medical services;
• equal access to medical services of all people;
• integration of health services that ensured continuity in medical 
treatment including prevention and rehabilitation as well as the system of 
sanitary and epidemiological services;
12 In many countries responsibilities for protection of workers’ health originally vested in 
ministries of labour are gradually transferred to ministries of health (see Roemer, 1976, for 
details).
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• high quality medical education and, as a result, high standards of 
professional skills of medical personnel.
The national health service was founded on the integrity of the system -- 
one aim, one method, one approach to problems, one plan exclusively in the 
hands of health authorities.
The Soviet state was proclaimed to be the state of the working people 
which aspiration was to express and defend their interests. Health care system 
had first of all to maintain health status of the working people and their ability to 
work (Kapn6cKMM (Karibsky), 1927). The class-industrial organisation of health 
services became one of the fundamental principles of the Soviet medicine.13
Workers were regarded a special category of patients because:
a) influence of employment environment on the health status of the working 
people was deemed important. Morbidity was to a great degree caused by 
working conditions and it was essential for medical personnel to have special 
training, skills and experience to diagnose and treat various occupational 
diseases;
b) accidents at work occurred quite often that required the first aid to be 
quickly provided;
c) such dangerous and infectious diseases as tuberculosis and sexually 
transmitted diseases were widespread among industrial workers;
d) treatment of workers had to result in as full as possible restoration of 
their ability to work rather than just curing of illness (JlyKOMCKMM (Lukomsky), 
1924; UJTeMH6epr (Steinberg), 1926).
The purpose of the OHS was to overcome individualised approach that 
dominated mainstream health care systems in other countries and was 
intended to cure a particular illness of a particular person irrespective of 
conditions that caused it. Health services in enterprises, on the contrary, 
treated an employee as a part of particular environment rather than simply 
cured illness.
13 On organisation of the Soviet health care system, often referred to as Semashko model, see: 
Marree, J. and P. Groenewegen (1994).
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Occupational health services were predestined to eliminate the negative 
affect of working conditions on workers health. It was acknowledged that
"though there are special occupational diseases, unfavourable industrial 
factors influence the general health status and contribute to the development of 
other, non-occupational diseases" (OpuAn^Hfl (Fridlyand), 1966: 45).
Health centres in enterprises became the main type of occupational health 
services in the Soviet Union. They were supervised by the state and financed 
jointly by the state and enterprises. In this way the significance of special 
treatment of workers, first of all in high-risk industries, was emphasised. 
Enterprise was taken as the nucleus of society through which preventive and 
curative health services could be promoted and health gains maximised for the 
purpose of advancing productivity and improving the health of population. Cost 
of illness made itself feel stronger in the Soviet Russia because of the direct 
link between operational costs of an enterprise and economic gains of society, 
enhancement of the national economy and an individual well-being.
It was recognised that if an occupational disease aggravated any other 
disease without explicit occupational causes, then the loss of ability to work was 
considered occupational. Health centres were not only engaged in preventive 
work in order to promote labour productivity, prolong time of employment, 
reduce absenteeism and offer the first aid in case of emergencies but in 
providing primary and sometimes even secondary care thus enabling 
employees to enjoy preferential access to health care facilities for treatment of 
general illness.
WHO admitted that such a model was effective in combining protective and 
broad curative services and secured comprehensive health treatment for 
workers but at the same time expressed concern that in this framework 
preventive function of OHS might be underestimated.
Conclusions
Occupational health care is one of the cornerstones in the structure of 
occupational welfare. It is intended and provided to protect the workers against
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any health hazard at work and to contribute to the establishment and 
maintenance of the highest possible degree of physical and mental well-being 
of the workers.
International institutions such as WHO and ILO lay down principles of 
occupational health care but their enforcement is the prerogative of national 
legislation rooted in conditions, traditions and customs of a country.
The success or failure of occupational health services is determined by 
political, socio-economic and organisational factors and interrelations of the 
numerous stakeholders involved -  the state, industries, local communities, 
voluntary agencies, etc. Positive experiences of other countries irrespective of 
their ideology and regime may also prove useful.
For instance, international community admits that occupational health care 
in the Soviet Union can be a benchmark in some areas because as 
organisational model it
"effectively combines occupational with general health services, constituting 
a comprehensive workers' health service" (Rantanen,1989:28 ).
The Global Strategy on Occupational Health for All sets the objective to 
further develop high quality and effective occupational health care to cover all 
employees regardless of industry, organisation or occupation (WHO, 1995). As 
far as contemporary changing Russia is concerned it is still faced with two 
issues: whether this division of occupational welfare will survive and what place, 
in this case, occupational health care could have in a new society with the 
Soviet experience duly heeded.
93
PART 2
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF OCCUPATIONAL WELFARE IN 
RUSSIA: A CASE OF HEALTH CARE
This part of the thesis is intended to provide a historical overview of 
occupational welfare in Russia. Its objectives are to trace the origins and 
evolution of occupational welfare, identify factors that influenced its structure 
and functions with an emphasis on state regulations and show its role in the 
welfare system at different stages of development. The overview is focused on 
health care as an important component of occupational welfare: health 
services in industrial enterprises appeared to be one of the first provisions in 
that field.
Each chapter is accordingly divided into two parts: in the first one general 
issues of occupational welfare in the context of the state social policy are 
analysed (social policy perspective) whereas the second section is devoted to 
finding out how those issues featured in provision of health care for people in 
employment (organisation perspective).
To better understand the principal characteristics of occupational welfare 
the following historical societal settings with essentially different ideology and 
societal organisation are taken for analysis:
- The late Imperial Russia from 1860s onwards when industrialisation led to 
adoption of first measures aimed to establish a system of social protection of 
the working people;
- The Soviet Union of 1917 to late 1980s when a unique model of social 
policy and occupational welfare was created on the principles of socialist 
ideology and planned economy;
- The post-Soviet Russia since 1991 when Russia had to modify its welfare 
system in the course of social transformation of society.
The study of occupational welfare in the Imperial and Soviet Russia is a 
challenge in its way because I have not succeeded in discovering special 
research on the topic. Works on Imperial Russia's social history are dedicated 
to industrialisation, development of the working class, trade unionism and
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introduction of social insurance. Social policy and social welfare in the Soviet 
Union are well studied but, unfortunately, little information is available on 
occupational welfare either in Russian or in English.
Chapter 5 
Occupational Welfare in the Imperial Russia: Factory Medicine 
and Compulsory Health Insurance
Chapter 5 renders a brief account of social settings in which workers' 
welfare (in fact, the embryo of occupational welfare in its present meaning) 
and factory medicine came into being in Russia. Analysis is also focused on 
the Tsarist government and employers' attitudes to occupational welfare as a 
component of national system of social protection and on factory legislation 
especially in its part regulating factory medicine and compulsory health 
insurance.
1. Social Policy and Occupational Welfare: General Issues.
Social policy and welfare of workers
The emergence of occupational welfare can be dated from the late Imperial 
Russia and considered as a principal factor of formation of social policy in the 
country.
Flora and Heidenheimer (1981) argued that for the development of the 
welfare states in the West two processes were of a major importance: the rise 
of capitalism, the emergence of national states and their transformation into 
mass democracies. This assertion can be attributed to Russia because only 
after the modernisation of the Russian Empire was started in the early 1860s 
by Alexander II the establishment of social protection system was put on the 
agenda.
The abolition of serfdom and the introduction of local self-government 
through elected bodies — zemstvos — had very important implications for the 
further social and economic development of the country. The subsequent
rapid development of industry led to disrupture of traditional social 
relationships and, consequently, changes in the social structure of the Russian 
society.
The welfare of peasants who at that time constituted the majority of 
population primarily depended upon possession of land. It was assumed that 
having land a peasant would be able to secure the well being of his family. 
Therefore, the problem of land ownership dominated all other issues of social 
welfare (Pinker, 1981). The state social responsibilities towards peasants were 
vested into local authorities {zemstvos), which were supposed to organise 
social services for rural population including provision of public health and 
education.
The break-up of the old social structure and the emergence of new social 
classes inherent to industrial society -- industrialists and workers -- called for a 
necessity to formulate their social rights and responsibilities as well as to 
define social welfare functions of the state. Therefore, three main things 
should be taken into account in the analysis of occupational welfare before the 
1917 October Revolution: the place occupied by industrial workers on social 
ladder; capitalist employers' attitude to their social responsibilities for workers 
and the Tsarist government position towards "division of welfare"1 There is a
1 It would be appropriate to make brief remarks on the social policy role of the Russian Orthodox 
Church that was the most powerful religious body in the country. It was incoherent and the attitude of the 
church to the labour problem was passive. On the eve of the twentieth century there was neither 
Orthodox conception nor any important movement of social Christianity in Russia (Florovsky, 1974). 
The official role of the Russian Church was in fact limited to moral backing of government activities. It 
ensued from the position of the Russian Church which in the course of the historical development of the 
Russian state became what many observers described as "a department of the state" heavily regulated 
and controlled by the state. But of course there was a difference between the attitudes of various layers 
of the clergy. Pointing out to the lack of the comprehensive social concept does not mean ignoring the 
role the church traditionally played in social protection of the weak. It was always engaged in charity 
concentrated around local churches and monasteries and thus depended to a large extent on parish 
laymen rather than on general nationwide strategy.
The Russian Church failed to develop definite stand on such new phenomena as formation of new social 
strata, relations between capital and labour, social welfare of workers, etc., because it was not prepared 
to recognize the necessity of social change inevitable under new social and economic conditions. No 
innovation in pastoral work or doctrine followed.
As to the Catholic Church it promoted the subsidiarity principle implying that intervention of a higher 
unit of society was justified only in case the lower levels capacity to meet the needs of the destitute had 
been exhausted. In Russia "sobomost" ("sobor" is a gathering of people to discuss public matters) as the 
community idea meant an individual action coupled with collective responsibility. In relation to social
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substantial body of evidence for suggesting that Baldwin's argument (1990) 
that by the end of the nineteenth century the urban working class in the 
European countries could not secure its welfare independently is true for 
Russia.
First, workers lived in poverty and their economic status was not sufficient 
to maintain their own welfare to say nothing about providing for a family in 
urban area.
Second, being a newly born class industrial workers had not yet taken a 
definite position in the social structure of the Russian society and their 
citizenship status was not clearly defined. Industrial workers formed a "hybrid 
class" (Strauss, 1941; McDaniel, 1988) as they were recruited mainly from 
peasants and still continued to maintain close ties with their villages while 
working at factories. As a rule they formally belonged to rural communities: 
only after the Stolypin's reforms in 1906 identity cards were issued to legalise 
a possibility for peasants to live outside their villages. Strong rural connections 
were the principal difference between Russian and West European workers 
(Pipes, 1990).2 Coming from villages where the life style was quite different 
they often found it difficult to adjust to new environment and factory discipline.
Third, workers were helpless in defending welfare interests having no 
channels to express their views and to bring their problems to the political 
agenda as well as no possibility to promote self-help organisations. There 
were no formal communication links between factory owners and workers. 
Walkin (1963) stressed that the Russian Empire was a "state without society". 
Until the beginning of the twentieth century when the first elements of 
constitutional regime were introduced Russia was the classical absolutist 
monarchy.3
welfare it implied close solidarity of the Orthodox Christian community (pravoslavnye ) in securing the 
well-being of its members.
-  Only about one half of workers in Russia was engaged in industrial establishments. The other half was 
employed in the so called kustarnaya promishlennost (small, often family size, craftsman units).
3 After the 1905 Revolution the Tsarist state was forced to declare political reforms in the October 
Manifesto (1905) and the Fundamentals of Law (1906). The post of the Prime Minister was established 
in 1905; the first legislative body - Duma - was elected and trade unions and economic strikes were 
made legal in 1906. Legal political parties and voluntary organisations started to emerge, too.
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But with the development of industry workers grew in numbers and 
gradually revealed distinct characteristics as a social group. Since strikes were 
usually treated by authorities as political or even criminal events (the breach of 
public order) the open expression of social and economic grievances made 
workers the most troublesome class in society. Unlike other groups of 
population workers turned out to be capable of becoming organised in order to 
further their demands for better living conditions. In a situation of workers’ 
unrest provision for their welfare was the way the state embarked on in its 
attempts to prevent dissemination of the socialist ideas among workers.
The concept of citizenship and rights prominently figures in the Western 
research on historical development of the welfare states. Madison (1968) 
argued that in general welfare policies in the Imperial Russia were more of a 
charitable nature and the approach to social welfare was mainly assistencial. 
Necessity to establish contractual relations to oblige society to assist the 
needy on the basis of eligibility requirements was almost ignored in Russia as 
well as the right of an individual to any form of public assistance.4
In general, the state paternalistic attitude to workers ensued from an 
assumption that they were unable to manage their own problems successfully 
and, therefore, needed somebody to look after them. Such a philosophy, in 
fact, reflected the feudal tradition when the lord of the estate had a 
responsibility for the welfare of his subordinates that was very strong in Russia 
with its long history of serfdom. There was also a conviction in paternalistic 
duty of employers to take care for welfare of their employees (noblesse 
oblige). The state conception of employer's social responsibility required social 
services for workers to be provided by employers rather than central or local 
authorities. It was based on a rather negative attitude of the tsarist state 
towards capitalism as social organisation of labour. Its officials often stressed 
that employers should first and foremost be held responsible for workers'
4 T he  Soviet interpretation o f the history o f  the Russian Em pire is evidently dominated by the labour 
question approach with an emphasis laid on industrial workers' poor liv ing conditions and inability o f  the 
Tsarist government to solve the problem o f workers' welfare. Recent Russian studies reveal an increased 
interest in the role o f  local authorities in social developm ent and the process o f  enactment o f  social 
insurance (Kynpn*?HOBa (Kupriyanova). 1996: CrenaHOB (Stepanov), 1997).
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poverty. Employers' preoccupation with their own profits and neglect of 
workers' interests were considered the main reasons for strikes disturbing 
social tranquillity.
Government and employers' attitudes to occupational welfare
It should be taken into account that there had never been consensus on 
welfare policies in the Tsarist government. On the contrary, the state 
departments authorised to deal with social matters had different approaches to 
the labour problem that often caused tensions between them. A considerable 
influence on the policy making process in that area was exerted by the police 
(Ministry of Internal Affairs) which main concern was to prevent labour unrest. 
Senior officials at the Ministry in question understood that the revolutionary 
movement could not be fought by repression alone. Acknowledging the 
necessity to improve social welfare of workers, they were prepared to infringe 
upon interests of industrialists in order to preserve peace in society.5
The two other ministries concerned (Ministry of Finance and, after 1905, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry) were mostly preoccupied with promotion of 
industrialisation, thus, considering social problems a secondary issue. Those 
governmental bodies would prefer to keep labour policy within the limits of the 
existing laws, modifying the latter insofar as that could not be helped and 
safeguarding the interests of employers as much as possible. Schwartz (1969) 
referred to that division within the government as bureaucratic-legalistic versus 
police tradition.6
3 It is worth noting that it was Ministry of Internal Affairs from which the idea came to initiate docile
workers' organisations to exert influence on workers. The social experiment attempted under its auspices 
was later referred to as "police socialism" or Zubatovschina after the name of Zubatov, its main 
ideologist who organised several workers' societies in Moscow. Zubatov thought that workers needed 
moral and ideological guidance and should not be left alone in the hands of employers. The aim of the 
state was to defend the economic interests of workers contributing in that way to peace not only in 
factories but in society as well and tying workers to the autocratic state. Zubatov's concept was that of 
the social monarchy which would restrain the greed and power of industry bosses by coming to the aid of 
the insulted and oppressed (Rogger, 1983). The anti-capitalist ideology of Zubatov's scheme was 
obvious to liberal circles of society that strongly opposed his ideas as threatening the rights of private 
enterprise.
Zubatov failed to reach his goals. An outburst of strikes under the leadership of his followers which, in 
fact, was in contradiction with the intended aims of the movement, led to its end.
6 With the election of the State Duma the situation became even more complicated because the conflict 
of interests of deputies and a complex parliamentary procedures.
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But both those approaches had practically the same implications for the 
development of welfare system as employers were supposed to play a leading 
role in providing social benefits to workers. Because of the constant deficit of 
the state budget, the economic problems caused by the war with Japan and 
consequences of the 1905 Revolution the state was not prepared to accept 
any financial responsibilities for social welfare. As cost containment 
considerations were of a major importance at that time the Tsarist government 
favoured welfare policies that enabled it to introduce some social measures 
without incurring much additional expenditure or raising taxes.
Industrialists were dependent on the state because the legitimacy of 
capitalism was not clear-cut. Process of industrialisation started under the 
conditions of the absolute monarchy and expansion of industry was not 
spontaneous but to a large extent initiated and supported by the state. Quite a 
lot of factories depended on the state orders rather than on mass 
consumption.
Entrepreneurs were not well organised politically, their regional 
organisations often being stronger than nationwide ones. As a result, they 
failed to work out a unified proactive policy on labour and welfare problems to 
lobby it through the government. For example, the activities of the Society for 
the Promotion of Russian Industry and Trade (1867-1917) demonstrated that 
attempts of bourgeoisie to influence the Tsarist government in its own 
interests were "quite indecisive... and exclusively advisory in nature" 
(KynpMHHOBa (Kupriyanova), 1996: 61).
Employers' reaction to the government's social welfare proposals was 
mainly negative in a sense that they tried to defend their own interests at 
workers' expense. That, in turn, contributed to a further alienation of 
entrepreneurs from their employees.
Paradoxically, many industrialists favoured a political change first claiming 
that workers’ unrest was caused by their political rather than economic 
infringement. Therefore, the problem could be solved by implementing political 
reforms first, by granting workers political rights and improving state
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administration mechanisms. Employers blamed the state for concessions it 
made to workers in economic matters.
Workers could be divided into two groups depending on how employers 
participated in workers' welfare (Schiltze-Gavernitz, 1901). One group of 
workers practically was not dependent on employers in settling welfare 
problems. They relied either on support of relatives in rural areas or voluntary 
provisions to secure themselves and their families against consequences of 
illness, disability, unemployment and death. The voluntary provisions included, 
for example, kassy vzaimopomoshchi (mutual aid societies) or special funds 
contributions to which were made jointly by employer and employees. But 
such forms of welfare associations were not widely spread, especially in the 
regions of Central Russia (Walkin, 1963).
The second group of workers was more closely tied to employers through a 
wide range of occupational welfare arrangements. Employers often provided 
housing and other facilities for employees on factory grounds (schools, 
churches, shops, etc.). The truck system was used in many industrial 
enterprises. However, availability of most occupational benefits depended to a 
large extent on employers' good will and they could be considered as gifts, but 
not rights.
In 1913 employers' per annum expenditures on maintenance of schools, 
creches, hospitals, etc. amounted to 3.7 per cent of annual payroll plus 4.5 per 
cent on workers' insurance, medical care, housing, that made over 8 per cent 
of payroll in total (Crisp, 1978). There were several reasons for employers to 
provide occupational benefits.
► Owners of some enterprises, especially large, prosperous and usually 
well managed ones, preferred to improve the living conditions of employees in 
order to prevent strikes which by interrupting the process of production caused 
serious damages to employer.
► Strong ties that most workers maintained with their native villages as well 
as attitude of the government and society to entrepreneurship in general made 
employers resort to welfare provision as a means of stabilisation of labour 
force. Crisp (1978) argued that seasonal employment was one of the factors
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contributing to increase in expenditures of large firms on housing and various 
social security provisions in an effort to attract and hold labour which made for 
high labour unit cost.
► Provision of social services to employees was employers' pragmatic 
reaction in the absence of both mutual aid and community support (Russell, 
1991).
► Some employers perceived improvement of workers' well being as their 
moral commitment. Such an attitude often originated from religion. For 
example, Old Believers and Jews traditionally lived in communities where the 
rich cared about the poor. In early Old Believers communities engaged in 
industrial production the hereditary principle was abandoned in favour of 
accumulation of wealth in the interests of the community (Blackwell, 1968).
It was characteristic of the Russian society that workers, as a rule, were not 
required or encouraged to contribute directly to voluntary occupational plans. 
However, the latter in fact were financed by workers indirectly through low 
wages. It can even be suggested that wages were set up taking into account 
that employers should provide social benefits as well.
It is worth noting that welfare provisions were not implemented in all 
industrial establishments. Some private enterprises were run on paternalistic 
lines providing various services and facilities for workers whereas many 
employers were indifferent to the poor working conditions and labour 
management. Quite a number of entrepreneurs considered Russian industry 
to be too weak to provide welfare for workers and advocated promotion of 
private initiative to enhance economic status of the country.
Factory legislation and social insurance
In the late nineteenth century the state began to directly intervene into 
activities of enterprises with a view of improving workers' life by legalising 
some welfare provisions, which had already been available in factories and 
were deemed important by general public. Thus, provision of medical 
treatment and payment of benefits out of fines levied on workers were made 
compulsory.
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The 1885 Law provided for the establishment of a special fund to 
accumulate fines from which workers were to be paid in cases of temporary 
inability to work, pregnancy (not more that a half of earnings two weeks prior 
and two weeks after the delivery of a child), loss or damage to property due to 
fire, flood, etc. (up to two thirds of six-months wages) or in other cases subject 
to approval of factory inspectors. Those regulations can be regarded as the 
inception of compulsory occupational welfare.
The Tsarist state approached workers' welfare and labour problem first 
through the enactment of factory legislation. Rimlinger argued that
"traditional dependence and protection, whatever its meaning in practice, 
was never challenged by the liberal ideas of individual freedom and equality. 
The challenge to patriarchal subordination in Russia came from egalitarian 
ideas of the revolutionary socialist movement". (Rimlinger, 1971:168).
In contrast to this generally accepted view, von Laue (1962) suggested that 
as industrial development required cheap labour, caring for workers' welfare 
and promoting industrialisation turned out to be conflicting commitments. The 
state intervention in social affairs in the interests of workers' by means of 
regulating industrial relations and introducing factory legislation could be taken 
as a liberal break- through in the wake of the abolition of serfdom in order to 
ensure freedom of contract to encourage industrial development. On the other 
hand, protective labour legislation was a corollary of the still semi feudal 
nature of the Russian state because
" in feudal society protection against arbitrariness and oppression was more 
important than from the loss of income" (Rimlinger, 1971:175).
In the early 1880s the Factory Inspectorate was established to supervise 
employment environment in all industrial enterprises employing more than 50 
workers. During industrial boom and peak of labour unrest in 1885-1887 the 
first factory laws were passed prohibiting night work for women and the minors 
and enacting employment and wages regulations. The Factory Inspectorate, in
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fact, became the mediator between employers and employees in securing 
legal protection and prevention of abuses against workers.
At that time in its policy towards occupational welfare the state proceeds 
from employer's liabilities. The Accident and Death Compensation Law passed 
in 1903 was employer liability law to be executed through courts that made it a 
part of the civil rights. Employers were to pay cash benefits for accidents 
during the work hours amounting up to two thirds of previous earnings in case 
of total disability, though coverage was limited. Workers were no more 
responsible to prove the negligence on the part of employer but there was the 
provision on carelessness of worker at work that would free employer from his 
obligations.
The intensity of social welfare activities of the government was directly 
connected with outbursts of workers' strikes. The 1905 Revolution showed that 
something was to be done to calm workers down. A few state commissions 
were set up to inquire into the living and working conditions of industrial 
workers and to work out measures of their improvement. The Tsarist 
government was forced to introduce legislation on workers' organisations and 
social insurance (CTenaHOB (Stepanov), 1997).
The necessity to launch social insurance was proclaimed in the Manifesto 
of December 12, 1904. A number of draft laws on health care, housing, 
pensions, etc, were worked out by the government but only two of them -- on 
health and accidents insurance -- were finally brought to the State Duma in 
June, 1908 while others four, including those on pensions and housing, had 
been declined.
In the late 1890s the idea of the state participation in social insurance 
became quite popular among employers. It can be explained by the fact that 
several projects, which envisaged individual employer’s liability, were then 
under discussion. Employers’ attitude was openly hostile: they claimed that it 
would put too much a burden on employers. Recommendations worked out by 
different employers' organisations during 1880-1905 reflected employers’ 
willingness to vest the solution of social welfare issues in the state. The 
Congresses of Entrepreneurs of the Southern Russia openly declared that the
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state had to participate financially in social insurance plans together with 
workers and employers.
Introduction of social insurance had enforcement, administration and 
financing dimensions. Flora and Heindenheimer (1981) argued that 
constitutional dualistic monarchies tended to be the first to introduce social 
insurance legislation because of the necessity to win support of the hostile 
working class; the existence of the developed bureaucratic machine to 
implement new arrangements and the wish to shift financial burden to urban 
classes.
The government expressed no intention to participate in social insurance 
programmes that probably would have been in natural accord with the alleged 
paternalistic claims of the Tsarist regime. Witte, one of the most influential 
finance ministers and ideologist of the reforms, which were aimed to improve 
social and economic situation in the country, strongly opposed the idea of the 
state supported social insurance.
Social insurance in Russia just as in many Western countries started with 
protection in case of industrial accidents. The law was passed in 1893 
providing for protection against job-related illnesses, injuries and deaths 
though the coverage was limited to workers of only three occupations: mining, 
railroads and the navy. It required equal contribution from employers and 
workers to be administered through partnerships ("tovarishchestvo").
The government's intervention in social welfare had one more dimension. 
McDaniel (1988) commented that even those laws that did manage to be 
enacted were very unevenly enforced: laws on books did not always achieve 
practical significance both workers and employers showing little respect for 
law, often violating its provisions.
In his critique of Russian insurance legislation Lenin (JlemiH, 1971) pointed 
out that laws had to envisage some build-in mechanisms enforcing their 
implementation, one of the most important being sanctions for non- 
compliance. All the legal acts mentioned above failed to incorporate the 
necessary provisions. Enforcement was usually executed by non-legal 
methods like police intervention in the time of industrial unrest. Besides,
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factory inspectors who were supposed to control the implementation of laws 
and regulations were unable to do the job properly because their number was 
insufficient. There was no effective workers control, either; at least until 
sickness funds were established in 1912. It was yet another proof of inability 
or, probably, the lack of interest of the Tsarist government in the 
implementation of policy decisions that meant in practice leaving workers once 
again at good will of their employers.
The introduced social insurance regulations were incomplete in the part 
concerning coverage of risks. Insurance provisions for the old-aged, disability 
or unemployment were never seriously discussed.
The dramatic process of emergence of social welfare in the Russian Empire 
in the late nineteenth century -  the beginning of the twentieth century is 
indicative of failure of the Russian absolutist monarchy to accept new realities 
and comprehend the necessity of social change. McKean defined attempts of 
the last Tsarist governments to build up a social welfare system based on the 
German experience as "half-hearted, grudgingly conceded measures of social 
reform" (McKean, 1990:180). The Tsarist regime was unable to break
"a vicious circle, when calls for change led to greater repression which in 
turn led to further calls for change" (McCauley, 1988:130).
2. Health Services for Workers: Factory Medicine and Compulsory 
Health Insurance
Organisation of health care for workers
The origin of enterprise-based health care in the Russian Empire can be 
traced back to the late nineteenth century when health care services for 
general public and for workers were separated. The latter were called 
"fabritchnaya meditzina" (hereinafter referred to as factory medicine). The term 
covers health care services in kind provided for workers by and at the expense 
of their employers.7
7 The other health services were:
- zemskuya meditzina - health care in rural areas provided by zemstvo (local self-government bodies), 
established in 1864;
- gorodskaya meditzina - health services provided by city authorities to urban population;
- private health services.
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Dementiev (fleMeHTbeB, 1912) distinguished five types of health services 
for workers:
■ factory hospitals where workers received comprehensive treatment (primary 
and secondary care, home visits). They operated in 6.8 per cent of factories 
covering 43.9 per cent of all industrial workers in the country;
■ "priemniy pokoy" (a small hospital with up to four beds) where only primary 
care and emergency services were provided, other cases treated on 
agreement with local health agencies. 2.3 per cent of factories with 6.7 per 
cent of workers were covered by such arrangements;
■ primary care services in 20.6 per cent of factories covering 25.4 per cent of 
workers;
■ health services provided on agreements with zemstvos, city authorities or 
private health services (3.8 per cent of factories with 5.6 per cent of workers);
■ health services, provided occasionally, for example, by doctors visiting a 
factory several times a week were available in 4.7 per cent of factories with 2.5 
per cent of workers. Dementiev regarded them as unsatisfactory level of 
health provision.8
Thus, about 84 per cent of all industrial workers in 38 per cent of factories 
were covered by at least one type of health services.9
There was a direct correlation between the level of provision of health 
services and the size of a factory: as a rule, in large enterprises they were 
organised better than in smaller ones. For example, hospital services were 
provided in almost 70 per cent of enterprises with more than 1000 workers and 
only in about 6 per cent of enterprises with 50 to 100 workers (3a6nyAOBCKMM 
(Zabludovsky), 1956).
It is noteworthy that the Tsarist government urged employers to provide at 
their expense health services for workers.
Law "On the Establishment of Hospital Premises at Factories and Plants in 
the Moscow Region" was enacted in 1866 stipulating the opening of hospitals
8 The data are based on the Factory Inspectorate statistics. There were 14,247 factories reporting to it in 
1907.
9 The data are taken from Vigdorchik (BnrnopMHK. 1912) and are consistent with figures cited by other 
authors, for exam ple, Solov'ev (Co/ioBbeB, 1913).
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in factory premises at the expense of employers. It ruled on the ratio of beds in 
such hospitals and the number of employees (approximately one bed per 100 
workers).
The Industry Statute (clause 52) prohibited charging workers for medical 
treatment provided by employers in enterprises with more than 100 workers.
The 1866 Law was passed as a temporary measure to cope with the 
outburst of cholera in the central regions of Russia. It explains why it was 
formulated in general terms that caused difficulties in its interpretation. The 
law did not contain any stipulations on conditions of care, number of medical 
personnel to be employed, treatment of the dependents, comprehensiveness 
of treatment (primary and secondary care) and types of industrial undertakings 
(size and industry) where the Law was to be applied. But a Russian saying 
goes that no other arrangement lasts longer than a temporary one.
Factory medicine legislation and its consequences
The 1866 Law is the formal beginning of factory medicine in the Russian 
Empire.10 Its enactment even before the adoption of factory laws in 1880s was 
undertaken by the state to involve employers in health protection of workers 
under the influence of two factors.
First, hygiene conditions in Russian factories, especially big ones with many 
people working in congestion, were very poor. There was a permanent threat 
of epidemic outbreaks dangerous to the whole society, including tuberculoses 
and sexually transmitted diseases. It especially became evident for authorities 
and general public in the late 1860s when the country had to cope with the 
epidemic of cholera.
Second, in general, the status of health services in the country was poor as 
well. Their administration in urban areas was in the hands of special state 
bodies (Prikazi Obtchestvennogo Prizreniya). But in the majority of towns they 
were virtually non-existent or of a poor quality. Health services for peasants, 
as it was already mentioned, were provided by zemstvos established in 1864.
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In those circumstances the state tried to convert occupational health services 
into the channel of health care for workers.
In 13 towns where about 18 per cent of all factories (18.5 per cent of 
workers) supervised by the factory inspection were situated every person was 
levied with a special hospital due -  bolnichniy sbor. It was not abolished after 
the 1866 Law had been passed. The city authorities remained responsible for 
provision of health care free at the point of delivery for all groups of population, 
including workers. Employers were only liable for primary health services to 
their workers in cases of accidents and emergencies and not required to 
organise hospitals.11
Unfortunately, the data found by the author is not enough to appraise 
employers' attitude to health obligations imposed on them. But the fact that 
forty years after the enactment of the 1866 Law many employers failed to 
introduce health care services in their enterprises could serve as indirect 
evidence that their attitude to it was negative.12 Financial considerations were 
apparently the most important for employers to take such a position as 
provision of health care required considerable spending on their part. The 
obligation to open hospitals was especially difficult to implement both 
financially and organisationally for small factories and even not necessary in 
those areas where the level of public health care was satisfactory. It was two 
times more expensive for an average employer to provide health services in 
his own hospital than to pay for workers' treatment elsewhere (seven and 
three roubles per worker a year, accordingly) (flaHCKMM (Dansky), 1914). 
Share of hospital expenses fell down from 66 per cent in 1897 to 59 percent in 
1907, priemny pokoy -  from 16.4 per cent to 6.8 per cent while share of
10 The government's policy on factory medicine was quite inconsistent. In 1867, for example, the State 
Council decided that in spite of the 1866 Law being a temporary measure it had to remain in force 
without any amendments while in 1908 the Senate ruled exactly the opposite.
11 The role of factory medicine should be evaluated with caution. According to Pogozev’s estimates, 
only 1.8 million out of 10 million workers or about 18 percent were covered by factory inspection. O f 
the remaining 82 percent only railway men and minors were provided with some health care other 
workers being treated as population at large.
12 According to the data of the Third State Duma, 19 per cent of the permanently employed workers and 
28 per cent of the temporary employed in 1912 did not get any health care in their enterprises.
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primary care increased from 11.7 per cent to 27.9 per cent, respectively 
(AcTpaxaH (Astrahan), 1911).
But nevertheless factory medicine slowly developed. The number of 
factories, which had their own hospitals, increased from 710 (514.8 thousand 
workers) in 1897 to 964 (798.3 thousand workers) in 1907. By the end of the 
period health services of all types were provided at 5439 factories with 1,5 
million workers covering 84 percent of factory workers -- 500 thousand 
workers more in comparison with the year of 1897. Expenses on health care 
also increased from 4 million roubles to 9.4 million roubles. Average annual 
expenses per worker rose from 3.91 roubles in 1897 to 6.13 roubles in 1907 
(AcTpaxaH (Astrakhan), 1911).
The significance of factory medicine for Russian society is emphasised by 
the fact that it was always in the centre of debates on the improvement of 
health services in the country. There was no consensus in the ruling elite on 
the problem and main propositions advanced were:
• to develop health services on the already established patterns;
• to transfer factory medicine under the auspices of zemstvos;
• to introduce insurance principle through bol'nichnaya kassa (sickness 
fund).
But whatever proposals for reforms were discussed they implied 
participation of employers in health care provision. In his letter to the Minister 
of Internal Affairs in May, 1866, the Moscow Governor stressed that 
employers' obligation to provide compulsory health services for workers was 
justified because factory owners got the major share of profits gained from 
employment of workers who often lived in very poor conditions (fleMeHTbeB 
(Dementiev), 1912). Some officials believed that joint efforts of zemstvo and 
employers could be a better solution (for example, establishment of one 
hospital in the locality to provide health services either for several factories or 
to workers and local people together).
Zemstvo leaders and some groups of doctors advocated creation of a 
national health service to be administered by zemstvo or city authorities. 
Employers would have to pay special contributions to run the service instead
of offering in-kind provisions. Factories where hospital conditions complied 
with the set standards might be exempt from paying contributions. Financial 
issues dominated debate as zemstvo supporters acknowledged that funds 
coming from employers could be used to raise the standards of health care 
offered to public at large. They insisted on free health services for population. 
One of the arguments against the establishment of sickness funds was that 
while health services developed as free for ordinary people workers would 
have to pay to sickness funds under insurance schemes.13
Workers' organisations, factory doctors, some factory inspectors and the 
socialist movement demanded that health care should be organised at factory 
level and managed by workers through self-governing sickness funds 
(BurflopHMK (Vigdortchik), 1912). In early 1900s trade unions suggested that 
health services for workers should be provided through trade unions and 
financed by their members.14
The idea of workers' right to preferential treatment was put forward to justify 
the importance of factory medicine. It was substantiated by statistical data on 
accidents and morbidity, which were higher among workers than in other 
groups of population. New health risks inherent in industrial employment -  
accidents and occupational diseases -  required special attention to be paid to 
workers' health needs and to training doctors with necessary skills to treat 
workers.
13 These ideas were comprehensively expressed in the decision of the Moscow Gubemskoye Zemskoye 
Sobranie in 1887. In particular, it was proposed to levy a special tax on enterprises in manufacturing — 
three rubles per worker for factories with more than 16 workers — for organisation of health services for 
workers. Capital expenditures on hospitals providing medical treatment only to workers should be borne 
by employers.
The Health department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs declined the proposal. It ruled that i f  health 
services in factories were not satisfactory employers could come to agreements with zemstvo on a 
voluntary basis, the number of beds to be determined in accordance with the 1866 regulations. At the 
same time hospitals providing satisfactory care for workers were to remain under factories' authority.
14 Bolsheviks were very active promoters of insurance principle. They controlled a special magasine 
"Sotzial'noye Strakhovaniye" (Social Insurance) published since 1913 that for a long time was the only 
Bolsheviks' legal mass media. The party programme on social insurance was comprehensive: to cover all 
workers in all industries; to provide protection from all risks; to give full compensation of lost income; 
to include the dependents; to be run on self-governance principle; all expenses to be covered by 
employers.
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Employers failed to display any definite stand on future development of 
health services in the country showing the lack of evident interest in changes 
in health care. They were fully responsible for financing and administering 
factory health services without any strict control on the part of the state. At 
first, zemstvo had the right to interfere but in 1893 the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs issued the decree vesting all rights in connection with factory medicine 
in special Offices on Factory Matters (Prisutstviya), set up at regional level in 
1886. Thus, employers could easily control their expenditures on health 
services.
Factory medicine was a very good example of dualism of occupational 
welfare as a halfway between charity and rights, public nature and private form 
of provision. Vigdorchik (BurflopHMK, 1912) noted that its public nature rested 
in:
• provision of health services free of charge;
• compulsory character;
• explicit state regulations.
He regarded factory medicine as a form of compulsory health insurance, 
concerned only with provision of health services for workers. The function of 
payment of sickness benefits was exercised through a limited range of 
compulsory and voluntary health insurance arrangements. For instance, 
compulsory sickness insurance was first introduced in 1861 for workers in 
state-owned factories and railways. Special partnership was to be established 
in every factory to accumulate up to three per cent of wages to pay out health 
benefits and pensions. According to incomplete data by the year 1902 about 
600 thousand workers were covered by either voluntary or compulsory health 
insurance (3axapoB (Zakharov), 1968).
The 1912 Health and Accident Act was the first social welfare law to be 
debated in the highest elected legislative body and attracting much public 
attention. It took the State Duma eight years to pass it.15
15 Two draft laws on compulsory health insurance were discussed in the State Duma. The one was 
worked out by the government, the other — by a special committee set up by the State Duma. Both
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The Act provided for cash benefits in case of sickness, maternity and death 
to be financed by both employers and workers. The latter's contributions 
amounted to up to two per cent of wages, those of employers constituting two 
thirds of workers' instalments. Thus, employer's individual responsibility was 
replaced by his collective liability with workers. Benefits compensated 50-66 
per cent of wages for workers with families and 25-50 percent for the lone 
workers and were to be paid from twenty six to up to thirty weeks per year.16
Coverage was limited by enterprise size and industry and spread to 
enterprises with more than 20-30 workers in manufacturing, mining, foundries, 
and inland water transport. Special bol'nichniya kassy (sickness funds) were 
set up in factories to be administered by joint committees of labour and 
management. In that way workers gained the right to participate in 
administration of health insurance.
The Act regulated mainly payments of sickness benefits. It was 
acknowledged in general terms that members of sickness funds had the right 
to health care. But how they were to get medical treatment turned out to be 
much debated issue. In accordance with the government draft health services 
in-kind were to be provided by employers and only cash benefits to be paid by 
sickness funds. The idea of the State Duma was to transfer employer-owned 
health services to sickness funds and to increase employers' contributions to 
help funds to survive. But different parties represented in the State Duma 
failed to reach an agreement on dissenting views under the pressure of the 
government and the government draft was adopted with minor amendments 
(CTenaHOB (Stepanov), 1997).
The Act stipulated for insurance of workers in case of temporary loss of 
income in the form of benefits to be paid by sickness funds and for provision 
of health services at the expense of employers.
Sickness funds got the right to organise a provision of health services for 
family members of the insured and some of them began to do so. They grew
proposals provided for the establishment of sickness funds but with different coverage and level of 
benefits as well as the degree of workers' participation in management.
16 All the indicators set by the Act were lower than in other European countries.
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interested in using employer-owned health care facilities as they lacked 
resources to set up their own health services (ConbCKan (Sol'skaya), 1913).
Employers succeeded in reducing to minimum their obligations to workers 
and got considerable control over sickness funds. For example, they were 
granted the right to propose sickness funds draft statutes, which in many 
cases were finally imposed on workers.
The enactment of the 1912 Act undeniably worsened the terms of health 
care provision. For example, there used to be no official limitations for workers 
to get free medical treatment. In accordance with compulsory health insurance 
rules laid down by the Insurance Council workers could be treated at the 
expense of their employers only as members of sickness funds in case of 
illness without loss of ability to work and, in case illness caused loss of ability 
to work, for not more than four months.
In a number of regions Prisutstviya insisted that large enterprises employing 
over 500 workers should open their own hospitals. Though provision of 
secondary care was left to employers, the first aid and primary care were 
made compulsory. In other cases (secondary and maternity care) workers 
were supposed to use local health services on the same conditions as other 
local people, employer compensating treatment on per diem basis. Dansky 
(flaHCKMM, 1914) argued that such limitations threatened the development of 
factory medicine and in practice workers in areas with poorly organised health 
services would be denied any health care.
Employers' reaction to the 1912 Act was neither hostile nor uniform..17 As 
the date of enforcement of the law was not directly stipulated employers had a 
room for manoeuvre. It was planned to establish 3198 sickness funds with 2.3 
million members. The year after the law had been passed 484 funds were 
registered, but only 21 of them with 16.4 thousand members set forth to collect 
contributions and pay out benefits. 2167 sickness funds with 1.7 million 
members functioned by January 1st, 1915. The control over the enforcement
17 The detailed account of the debates around the adoption and enforcement of 1912 legislation 
(response of bureaucracy,, industrialists and revolutionary movement as well as workers themselves) can 
be found in several studies (McKean, 1990; OrenaHOB (Stepanov), 1997).
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of the 1912 legislation was to be exercised by factory inspection but it must be 
kept in mind that there were only 230 factory inspectors in the whole Russian 
Empire.
The system, which emerged as a result of the 1912 legislation, though 
regulated by the state, was fairly independent of it in terms of financing and 
administration. Provision of health care was separated from payment of 
benefits and, therefore, compulsory health insurance covered only payment of 
benefits through sickness funds. Factory medicine survived as an independent 
division of health care.
Employers continued to play the main role in protection of workers’ health 
contributing to compulsory health insurance and paying for medical treatment. 
But while the latter was both financed and provided by employers, sickness 
benefits were employer-subsidised because workers had to contribute as well.
Conclusions
Workers' welfare and factory medicine as its part came to the forefront in 
the mid XIX century after the abolition of serfdom and initiation of a series of 
reforms in the Imperial Russia.
Russian policy makers were evidently influenced by the Bismarckian ideas 
-  as in Germany where bourgeoisie was weak and had to fight with aristocracy 
innovations in social policy in the Russian Empire came, as a rule, from the 
above, i.e. from the state. As soon as the Tsarist regime realised a need to 
establish national system of social protection it turned an eye on occupational 
welfare in an attempt to make it a significant component of emerging social 
welfare system. In the new social surroundings employers were urged to 
provide social services for their employees. It was one of the main reasons 
why occupational welfare was relatively well regulated by the Russian state: 
incremental voluntary occupational welfare provisions could not contribute to 
consistent social policy.
Making factory medicine compulsory was among first measures undertaken 
by the Tsarist government on the way of building up welfare system. The 
ideology justifying the existence of employer-provided health services was
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derived from an assumption quite strong in society that employers were to be 
held responsible for health protection of their workers because of the nature of 
industrial process. Therefore, for more than half a century workers got medical 
treatment free of charge at employers' expense. The network of health care 
facilities was created in factories separated from other health services in the 
country. Factory medicine financed and administered by employers became 
an inherent feature of Russian society.
The way factory medicine developed and compulsory health insurance was 
introduced quite explicitly demonstrated that the Russian state was unwilling to 
participate in a new system neither financially nor organisationally and did it 
utmost to shift social responsibilities for workers' health to employers. The 
official authorities never promoted the idea of the state participation in social 
insurance.
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Chapter 6 
Occupational Welfare and Health Services in the Soviet Union
The emphasis in Chapter 6 is made on the specific properties of the Soviet 
social policy and occupational welfare -- ideologically conditioned public 
consumption funds, rigid state regulation, particular trends in development of 
occupational welfare, its main features and types. Formation and functioning 
of enterprise-based social funds are disclosed in detail. As to occupational 
health care, it is presented in its social, legislative and organisational outlooks.
1. Social Policy and Occupational Welfare: General Issues
Evolution of the Soviet social protection system
The Soviet welfare state was extensively researched by many scholars in 
various aspects (Madison, 1968; Rimlinger, 1971; George and Manning, 1980; 
Dixon and Makarov, 1992).
The Soviet welfare system of 1980s was not established once and for all 
immediately after the 1917 October Revolution. It had a long history of 
development in coverage, types and value of benefits, organisation and 
financing. The Soviet social policy should not be looked at as something static. 
It was modified ideologically and organisationally though measures 
undertaken to adjust welfare system to new challenges were not always 
successful.
The formation of the social protection system began with introduction of 
unemployment and occupational sickness benefits for all employees 
(unemployment benefits were abolished in 1930 to be re-established in 1991) 
and then of non-occupational sickness benefits. Disability pensions for the 
elderly were instituted in 1922, old age pensions for workers in several 
industries in 1928, their coverage extended in the following decades to include 
even clerical staff. One of the major events was the 1956 pension reform 
aimed at raising pensions. In 1964 and 1970 peasants-members of collective 
farms were incorporated into the centralised social security system (pensions, 
sick leave, maternity benefits, etc.). The payments were rising as well. By
1980s a wide range of social benefits covering major social risks was granted 
to population.
The first social protection regulations enacted as early as December. 1917 
were based on the Bolsheviks' comprehensive social insurance programme. 
Then the role of the state budget gradually increased and in the late 1930s 
social insurance funds were incorporated into the state budget. Since that time 
until the early 1990s social benefits were financed through the state budget in 
accordance with the centralised plans.
The public social funds were earmarked in the budget as obschestvenniye 
fondi potrebleniya -  public consumption funds (PCF). Social benefits and 
services, first of all social security, education and health, used collectively and 
considered by the state most important, were financed from these funds. PCF 
accounted for about one third of people's income; the ratio between cash and 
in- kind benefits was approximately 50/50.
It was only in 1971 at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) that improvement of the well being of the Soviet people 
was officially declared the main priority of the state. But statistics showed the 
tendency for a gradual decrease in the share of the budget social 
expenditures. They fell from 36.2 per cent in 1970 to 32.5 per cent in 1985, 
including expenditures on health and sport -  6.1 per cent and 4.6 per cent, 
respectively, whereas appropriations on the national economy increased from
48.2 per cent to 56.8 per cent.
Deacon (1992) gave a plausible explanation why 1970s-1980s efforts to 
turn economy to attainment of social goals failed. Pointing at a link between 
the level of economic development and the scope of social policy he stressed 
that the Soviet state faced a need to balance between social equality and 
economic efficiency, personal freedom and state guaranties. It was essential 
in this context to distinguish between the Marxist and Leninist doctrine on the 
role of welfare and social policy objectives in the socialist society and the 
extent to which real developments, theoretical and practical, matched it. The 
theoretical assumption was that first it was necessary to create a solid 
economic foundation for social policy. But maintenance of the already created
economic system required more and more resources. In practice it happened 
that the task had not been fulfilled that could not but negatively affect the 
social protection system.
Kornai (1997) suggested that in the Soviet Union an attempt was made to 
implement social policy objectives, which were not adequately backed by 
economic resources. He referred to the phenomenon as "a premature 
welfare".
Occupational welfare including a wide range of social benefits was 
undoubtedly an integral part of the Soviet social policy. There are estimates 
suggesting that by 1980s social expenditures of enterprises amounted to 
about 20 per cent of public consumption funds (AHTOceHKOB (Antosenkov), 
1987). But it has turned out to be quite difficult to evaluate its real scope. The 
only official data on the subject available are on social funds of enterprises. 
But they are incomplete because a part of expenditures on the maintenance of 
social assets were financed from sources other than social funds. Besides, 
there is even no official information on such an important indicator as the 
number of enterprises, which provided occupational benefits to their 
employees, probably because of substantial variations in the number of 
benefits in different establishments that reported to different ministries. At the 
same time surveys were not widely carried out until 1980s.
Another serious problem is that at present governmental agencies do not 
operate on long-term retrospective data basis and, therefore, are not 
interested in storing information concerning the Soviet Russia. That is why it is 
practically impossible to get any official data additional to already published in 
the official Soviet statistical sources.
Main features and types of occupational welfare
Occupational welfare in the Soviet Union had the following major 
characteristics.
a) Occupational welfare provisions in industrial enterprises were never a 
privilege of the managerial staff, at least formally. They were open to all 
employees. Though there was no formal discrimination certain criteria were
m
used to allocate benefits, as a rule a combination of need/achievement 
approaches and the length of service. Typically it was low-paid workers or 
workers with children who were target groups.
In this connection it should be mentioned that the scope and value of 
benefits in governmental bodies and party and ideological apparatus which 
officials formed the elite of society were bigger than in other places. That 
system was especially developed in Moscow.
b) Occupational benefits were usually provided in-kind through programmes 
directly financed and administered by enterprises and based on their social 
assets.
It had two significant implications:
• accent was made on collective rather than individual consumption;
• enterprises had social assets on their balance sheet.
c) Enterprises could also offer cash benefits to employees in the form of 
social assistance. They paid lump sums for workers on some occasions, for 
example, the birth of a child, but had no right to provide supplements to such 
monetary arrangements guaranteed by the state as pensions or sick pay.
d) Enterprises also paid social insurance payroll contributions. Their size 
depended on industry and was adjusted from time to time to economic 
conditions. These contributions were included into the state budget and 
amounted to about 5-6 per cent of its revenues. Workers did not pay anything 
to social insurance.
e) Apart from social benefits in-cash and in-kind enterprises administered a 
number of social security benefits (sickness and family benefits, maternity 
leave). It meant that the employed received their social benefits financed from 
public consumption funds via their enterprises.
Housing used to be one of the main components of occupational welfare. 
By 1980s the share of housing stock of industrial enterprises and other 
organisations amounted to 60 per cent of the total national housing stock. 
Enterprises built and maintained blocks of flats for their employees or gave 
them credits either to build housing individually or to join special construction 
co-operatives.
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Measures to support families with children and to improve women's working 
conditions were another important element of occupational welfare. 
Enterprises spent substantial resources on children services developing a vast 
network of nurseries and kindergartens, summer camps and other leisure 
facilities for children. They could also pay maternity benefits additional to the 
state-provided ones.
Great attention was paid to health care, recreation and organisation of 
holidays. Some enterprises owned health centres or health stations, recreation 
and rest facilities or covered workers’ expenses on holidays and recreation 
elsewhere, paid for additional vacations.
Quite widespread was provision of such services as canteens, laundry, dry 
cleaning, food shops, repairs, etc. on enterprise premises.
Enterprises were involved in provision of durable consumer goods and 
foodstuff either distributing them among employees free of charge or at 
wholesale prices. Some of them financed agricultural farms, which supplied 
foodstuff for canteens and individual consumption.
State regulation of occupational welfare
Occupational welfare was explicitly regulated by the Soviet state through 
financial and administrative mechanisms. Mishra (1981) pointed out that the 
state was to decide what type of benefits to provide and how much money 
could be spent on them. Social facilities were often a "part of the deal", 
maintained by an enterprise in accordance with decision of the state 
authorities. However, in many cases enterprises had a choice what social 
services exactly to provide. The composition of occupational welfare in a 
particular enterprise depended on social needs of its employees (housing, 
food supply, health care and recreation, etc.) In the framework of the state 
regulations enterprises had discretion to choose how they will follow state 
guidelines and what amount of money allocate for occupational welfare. As a 
result occupational benefits were quite unevenly distributed between 
enterprises and the package offered to employees varied (OECD, 1996).
In order to meet its social policy objectives the state regulated in the sphere 
of occupational welfare:
• amount of resources to be earmarked for it;
• its major components;
• its organisational forms.
The explicit connection of occupational welfare with the state social and 
economic policy is revealed in mechanisms of its financing.
Enterprise expenditures on occupational welfare were divided into capital 
investment and current expenditures. Capital investment included financing of 
construction and repairs of housing stock, kindergartens, health services and 
other social assets as well as purchase of equipment and instruments, fleet, 
etc. The emphasis on in-kind provision led to high share of capital 
expenditures: in 1970-1980s half of the Social and cultural measures and 
housing fund (hereinafter referred to as SCH fund) was spent on capital 
investment (flermpb (Degtyar), 1984). It reflected the state policy according to 
which enterprises were obliged to spend not less than 50 per cent of the SCH 
funds on construction of housing and other social assets. Lump sum payments 
and credits for employees engaged in individual or co-operative housing 
construction were included into current expenditures.
To have a full picture of the size of occupational welfare in Soviet industrial 
enterprises it is necessary to take into account the existing social infrastructure 
which major indicator was the value of fixed social assets accumulated in the 
past.
Occupational welfare and enterprise-based social funds
Funds specifically set up in enterprises to finance occupational welfare were 
called social funds. They accumulated financial resources for construction and 
maintenance of social assets and for other activities intended to meet various 
social needs of employees. These funds were used collectively to improve 
living standards of employees, to stimulate their active participation in 
production process in the interests of the development of the national
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economy, to improve labour discipline and to contribute to the increase in 
labour productivity.
The system of social funds dated back to 1920s when widely spread after 
1917 October Revolution remuneration in-kind was substituted by allotment of 
resources to special funds. They were created only in profit-making state (or 
with state participation) enterprises special rules being applied to the 
subsidised ones. Such social funds were not organised in private enterprises 
that still existed at that time on assumption that participating in distribution of 
profits even in the collective form, workers would became interested in 
development of the private sector against the nature of the dictatorship of 
proletariat.
Since 1923 various social funds were established in state enterprises until 
1928 when a Decree "On Funds of Improvement of Working Conditions of 
Employees" was adopted by the Soviet government, which substituted all the 
previous legislation. New funds were financed from profit-after-tax and spent 
on a wide range of social benefits. Shares were fixed for housing -- between 
75 and 85 per cent -- and recreation -- up to 5 per cent. Funds could also be 
spent on canteens, creches, nurseries, laundries, libraries, etc.
To stimulate employees, directly or indirectly, social competition fund, 
remuneration fund and management rewards fund were established. In 1936 
the director's fund was set up in industrial enterprises to replace all previously 
existing funds and to accumulate 4 per cent of net planned profit and 50 per 
cent of extra-profit (difference between gained and planned profits). The 
percentage was equal for all enterprises. The idea was to encourage 
employees to work better as well as to make the system simple and effectively 
manageable by consolidating all funds in one. Programme of spending, 
proposed by director, was subject to trade union committee's approval.
The list of activities to be financed from director's fund included: a) housing 
(50 per cent of the fund); b) improvement in the living conditions by providing 
social services (creches, dining rooms, health services, etc.); c) payment of 
bonuses to best-performing workers; d) capital expenditures; e) 
encouragement of technical innovations.
During the World War II director's funds ceased to function because it was 
necessary to mobilise all resources for wartime needs. However, in 1946 they 
were restored subject to certain changes in regulation. For example, the share 
of resources allocated to funds was no more differentiated depending on 
industry. The size of fund was limited to 5 percent of industrial personnel 
payroll.
In 1955 director's fund was transformed into fund of improvement of social 
and cultural conditions and development of production.18 It was to be 
established in enterprises which attained the planned targets for output, 
decrease in costs of production and profits. The major innovations included 
possibility of gradual increase in the share of profit apportioned to the fund and 
rising of the upper limit. For a long time resources to various funds had been 
allocated in accordance with enterprise belonging to a particular ministry. It 
resulted that the size of funds in enterprises of the same industry could have 
differed just because they reported to different ministries. Under new 
conditions the share was fixed for the whole industry regardless of ministry in 
charge.
The reforms of management of the national economy of 1965 affected the 
way social funds were formed. Three special "economic incentives" funds 
were created in industrial enterprises: production development fund, material 
rewards fund, social and cultural measures and housing fund (SCH fund). The 
two latter were aimed to finance the bonuses and enterprise social welfare 
initiatives. Mechanism of payments to these funds changed several times 
during the following decades but it always depended on indicators of 
enterprises economic performance. In 1966-1990 about 17 per cent of profit of 
state industrial enterprises on average were allotted to the three funds 
mentioned above.
In 1970 resources of economic incentive funds amounted to 84.4 per cent 
of all funds in industrial enterprises rising up to 92.6 per cent in 1985. The 
share of improvement fund which still existed in enterprises that had not
18 It should be noted that each of the funds mentioned was first created in industrial enterprises and later 
on introduced in other organisations.
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established economic incentives funds decreased from 0.9 per cent to 0.17 
per cent, accordingly. In 1985 the share of material rewards fund in economic 
incentives funds amounted to 41.8 per cent, SCH fund -  15.8 per cent, slightly 
decreasing as compared with 1970 (42.9 per cent and 18.6 per cent, 
accordingly). (L(eHTpanbHoe CTaTiiCTMHecKoe ynpaBnemie (Central Statistical 
Agency), 1990).
Financing of occupational welfare from enterprise-based social funds 
differed in a number of ways. Some of them were included into the cost of 
production, others financed from profit.
The size of social funds depended mainly on an enterprise efficiency. One 
of the major concerns always was to secure a right correlation between 
enterprise input into the national economy and the amount of its social 
expenditures. Though the scope of some spending, for example, on the 
maintenance of the social assets and agricultural farms, was determined by 
the size of social assets rather than performance indicators.
There were other than social funds sources of financing occupational 
welfare that were not, for accounting purposes, directly named as social 
expenditures, for example, on constriction and maintenance of social assets in 
enterprises which had their own construction or repairs branches. In that case 
resources actually spent on social assets would be calculated as a part of 
other planned activities but unrelated to occupational welfare.
Enterprises could specifically allocate some money from profit on 
maintenance of social assets (housing stock, kindergartens, etc.) or 
agricultural farms; and, at last, resources of trade unions that have their own 
social budget.
It should also be noted that enterprises social expenditures could be divided 
into current spending and capital investments in social infrastructure that 
amounted to about 20 percent of the total social spending of enterprises. 
Therefore, they were not counted as a part of public consumption funds that 
covered only current expenditures.
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SCH fund.
SCH fund was the most important of all funds for occupational welfare 
covering approximately 90 per cent of the total social spending of an 
enterprise. Sometimes social expenditures of enterprises were even equated 
with the amount of SCH fund.
It was formed from profit as a fixed percentage of material rewards fund and 
originally financed construction of housing and other social assets only. Since 
1986 some other expenditures previously covered from the budget (costs of 
maintenance of housing, kindergartens and other health and educational 
facilities, compensation of the difference between wholesale and retail prices 
for agricultural products produced by farms, belonging to enterprises, etc.) 
were also paid from SCH fund. Approximate structure of its expenditures is 
given in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1
The structure of SCH fund expenditures, %.
SCH fund 1975 1980
Total 100 100
including
capital investment 50.5 43.9
culture and education 18.8 14.3
health care and recreation 14.2 21.7
customer services 8.4 12.6
other social and cultural activities 8.1 7.5
Source: adapted from 3aropynbKWH m KonecHMKOB (Zagorul'kin and Kolesnikov), 
1983, p.29.
For a long time in the bulk of enterprises SCH funds amounted to about 30- 
50 percent of material rewards fund. The latter, in turn, was formed from 
profits on the basis of several performance indicators, which were defined for 
each industry (increase in labour productivity, share of high quality products in 
the total output, level of efficiency, etc). Two or three indicators were usually 
used at a time including target on the growth of labour productivity. In early
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1980s an attempt was made to directly link the size of SCH fund to one 
indicator such as, for example, productivity of labour or profit. It was suggested 
that for each one percent increase of a selected indicator the fund would grow 
by 2-4 per cent14.
The size of SCH fund mainly depended on the fulfilment of plan targets: if 
plan was overfulfilled/underfulfiled SCH fund would increase/decrease 
accordingly. The stimulating role of SCH fund featured in its connection with 
the material rewards fund, or, to put it other way, with final results of an 
enterprise performance. In fact, it undermined to a certain extent its social 
function as no limits were set to secure means enough to meet social needs of 
employees (for example, per capita social expenditures).
A part of SCH funds was amalgamated in ob'edineniya (Soviet equivalent of 
a corporation) and ministries got the right to finance some of their social 
activities: construction of social assets important from the point of view of the 
whole industry, supporting social expenditures in enterprises which suffered 
temporary losses in the process of development of new technologies, 
additional remuneration of well-working enterprises.
Other funds used for social purposes were small and insignificant. For 
enterprises, which were called «planned inefficient enterprises)), the amount of 
social expenditures was set in absolute figures by the ministries concerned.
Main trends of development
The general tendency in development of occupational welfare was 
determined by ever increasing attention to social function of enterprises and 
was reflected in the following processes:
► The growth of the total enterprise expenditures on occupational welfare. 
During the period of 1971-1985 the size of SCH funds in industry, which
19 The ratios for each industry were set by the government but ministries concerned got certain 
discretion to change them depending on social needs of employees of a particular enterprise. But it often 
happened that norms failed to be keeping with changes in economic situation when, for example, the 
share of profit allocated to finance expenditures on maintenance of social assets was not adjusted to 
gradually growing size of social assets. As a result, enterprises were forced to spend SCH funds on 
purposes which diverted means from fulfilment of their statutory objectives (fIoji030B (Polozov), 1978).
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played the most important part in enterprise social spending, doubled 
(AHTOceHKOB (Antosenkov), 1987).
► The search for more efficient ways of utilisation of means spared for 
social purposes. The major trend was to develop services to meet social 
needs of workers of a particular enterprise; to concentrate efforts on needs 
which could either be solved by an enterprise only or enterprise could do it 
more effectively than public agencies. In order to reach those objectives the 
rights of enterprise in management of social programmes had been gradually 
extended.
► The cooperation with local authorities in solving social problems in an 
attempt to overcome negative aspects of industrial approach to social 
services. Its major drawback was that local authorities had practically no say in 
control over enterprise-based social benefits. For example, they could not 
send children to enterprise kindergartens even if there were free places there 
unless their parents worked at the enterprise in question.
Thus, the aim of cooperation between enterprises and local authorities was 
fully to utilise social assets of enterprises; to bring together interests of 
enterprises and communities. Its most widespread form was the pulling 
together of funds of enterprises and local authorities for housing and social 
services construction followed by their joint use. In case of housing the flats 
were distributed proportionally between participants.
2. Health Services for Workers and the Soviet System of Health Care
Outline of development of occupational health care
As it has been shown in the previous chapter prior to the 1917 October 
Revolution industrial enterprises played a significant part in provision of health 
care for workers. Factory medicine survived in the Soviet Union though its 
organisation and financing was drastically modified. In the course of 
transformation of enterprise-based health services were integrated into the 
national health service.
Health care for workers in the USSR developed along the following lines:
• integration of factory medicine into the national health system;
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• special treatment of workers;
• preferential treatment of workers.
Two basic options were available after the 1917 October Revolution: either 
to develop insurance medicine further, that would mean preserving separation 
of health services for workers from health authorities, or to organise special 
provision of medical treatment to workers within the unified system of health 
care.
Formation of the National health service with the state assuming 
responsibility for people's health was the principal tendency. After the 1917 
October Revolution for a brief period employer-provided health services were 
transferred without indemnity to sickness funds, but in February 1919 they 
were placed under the auspices of the People's Commissariat of Health (the 
then ministry) established in late 1918. It was the logic outcome of economic 
development when process of nationalisation of industry was underway 
causing dramatic increase in the number of people, employed in the state 
sector.
In early 1920s insurance contributions were introduced as a source of funds 
supplementary to the state budget. The intention was to finance provision of 
health services for workers under the auspices of the health authorities. It 
happened during NEP (New economic policy), the period in the Soviet history 
when the state allowed private business to develop, and brought major 
changes -- financial and administrative -- in health care.
a) In accordance with the decree "On Social Insurance in Case of Illness" 
(December, 1921) a share of the unified social insurance fund was 
apportioned to a special fund to be spent on health services for the insured 
only (the so-called Social insurance fund for health / Fund D). State industrial 
enterprises were to contribute 4.5 per cent of payroll, state departments - 3 
per cent of payroll, all other enterprises and organisations - from 5.5 per cent 
to 7 per cent of payroll. Social insurance administration got the right to 
introduce stimulating and penalising rates depending on enterprise efforts in 
improvement of working conditions.
129
b) Sections of health services for the insured (rabmed) and workers' 
insurance councils were established in the People's Commissariat of Health 
and local health departments.
The emerging system of organisation and financing of health care was a 
combination of National health service and compulsory health insurance 
models. Health services for the insured were provided by the health authorities 
in agreement with the insurance bodies and trade unions and financed from 
the state and local budgets and insurance funds. The latter were considered 
supplementary to the budget and were charged to a special bank account to 
be spent on the insured only. Special councils were set up to coordinate the 
activities of the health authorities, insurance agencies and trade unions.
At that time belonging to labour force was the main eligibility criterion for 
free health care. It was provided to: those working on labour contract and 
members of their families, the disabled due to labour, families of survivors. 
Family members included parents, children, brothers and sisters aged up to 16 
or 18 if they studied; disabled children regardless of age if they became 
disabled before the age of 16 and were fully supported by the insured.
Health services rendered via insurance system included first aid in acute 
cases and accidents; primary care; maternity care; hospital care with full 
board; home visits and rehabilitation. Medical treatment was provided either in 
separate or local clynics. In the first case health services were financed 
exclusively from insurance funds directly via sections of health services for the 
insured (rabmed). In the latter case insurance funds covered only expenses 
incurred by the insured to be treated first in the waiting lists.
But in practice those arrangements failed to fulfil their main aim -  to secure 
better treatment of the insured. Insurance funds were supposed to be 
supplementary to the state and local budget allotments and intended to 
improve health services for the insured, first of all, working in heavy industry. 
However, as state financing was insufficient insurance money, in fact, played a 
more significant part as the main financial source for health services and were 
often spent on those not insured.
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In 1927 sections of health services for the insured (rabmed) were closed as 
duplicating the work of other departments and failing to pay enough attention 
on prevention. Later Social insurance fund for health (Fund D) was put under 
the auspices of the health authorities and incorporated into the state health 
budget to unify the supervision of health care system. It was actually a formal 
establishment of the National health service financed from the budget and 
organised by the state bodies.
It meant that insurance mechanisms in-built into the health system were 
regarded inappropriate for the unified health system and guaranteeing 
preferential treatment of workers. That was where enterprise-based health 
services stepped in again.
Factory medicine had managed to survive through all these years.
Employer-provided health services in many cases were not closed
immediately as
"it is very risky to destroy immediately old, bad organisation of health 
services before a new system is fully established -- it may cause
dissatisfaction of the wide masses of the working" (LUTei4H6epr (Shteinberg),
1926: 34).
Because of lack of funds local health authorities were often forced to make 
agreements with enterprises to draw money to finance health services for 
workers. Sometimes they even moved their health services to enterprises or 
introduced payment for medical treatment of workers in local health services.
During NEP many enterprises initiated the organisation of health services 
for their workers at social insurance expense on agreement with health 
departments. For example, by 1923 there were 200 health services in Moscow 
factories, though it was claimed that only 20 of them were well equipped 
whereas 180 failed to comply with standards (LUaxrenbAflHLi (Shakhgel’diantz), 
1978).
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Table 6.2
Network of Occupational Health Services in Soviet Industrial 
Enterprises* (numbers)
1940 1950 1965 1970 1975 1976
Health centres 
total
479 675 1,196 1,445 1,353 1,348
including those 
with hospitals
— 472 960 1058 933 925
Number of beds — 38,063 147,327 186,567 202,875 209,769
Average
capacity
—
— 153 176 217 227
Health stations
total
including
8,261 11,290 29,257 32,262 34,290 34,609
doctor1 s 3,206 5,435 5,425 3,268 2,529 2,485
paramedic's 5,055 5,855 23,832 28,994 31,761 32,124
* The data is for the USSR.
Source: 3axapoB m XoTbKO (Zakharov and Khot'ko), 1963; UJaxrenbflnHU 
(Shakhgel’diantz), 1978.
The data of Table 6.2 show^ rapid development of the network of health 
services for workers. During the period of 1940-1976 the number of health 
centres in the USSR increased almost threefold while the number of beds in 
enterprise hospitals grew by the factor of 5.5. According to Kudriavtzev 
(KyflpnBueB,1998), by the late 1980s of 1,348 health centres 935 provided 
secondary care.
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State intervention in occupational health services
Enterprise health services underwent many changes but explicit state 
intervention into provision of health services in-kind by enterprises always 
remained. The state regulated the following issues:
a) industries where health services were to be opened, usually heavy 
industry undertakings (steel, coal, mining, and chemicals);
b) size of enterprises in which setting up of health services was compulsory;
c) type of health service and, consequently, the range of medical treatment 
provided to workers.
The first regulations on enterprise health services were issued as early as in 
1921. One of the government decrees stipulated the necessity to establish first 
aid stations and organise recreation facilities for workers. Next year the 
People's Commissariat of Health ruled that such stations were to be organised 
in any enterprise employing more than 100 workers. The purpose was to 
develop a system of health services as prevention centres promoting health 
education providing medical treatment in case of emergency rather than 
primary care units. According to Zakharov (3axapoB, 1968) there were 1,064 
first aid stations in the country by 1927.
In 1924 legislation allowed for a special form of organisation of health 
services for the insured. 20 Enterprises could contribute to maintenance of 
local health services that provided medical treatment to their workers on 
agreement with local health departments concluded with participation of trade 
union representatives.
The following services could be opened in enterprises depending on the 
number of employees: first aid stations -  more than 100 workers; 
ambulatoriya 21 -  more than 500 workers; hospitals -  more than 3,000 
workers (one bed for 100 workers, or one bed for 75 workers if working 
conditions were judged unhealthy).
20 The statute "On Participation of Trade Unions and Enterprises in Health Protection of Workers" 
(1924)
21 A small polyclinic providing a limited range of primary care services.
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Local health department with approval of trade union committee and 
enterprise management appointed medical personnel. A supervision of day-to- 
day management was vested in a special council consisting of a director of a 
health service, representatives of the trade union and management.
Expenses additional to those approved by the People' Commissariat of 
Health were incurred by an enterprise. However, there was a possibility to 
finance enterprise health services from health insurance fund subject to a 
preliminary agreement with local health department. Health authorities could 
also transfer health services to enterprises on agreement; in this case 85 per 
cent of health insurance funds went to those enterprises.
Eventually, the range of services provided by the first aid stations had 
increased and they were transformed into health stations with more functions 
to fulfil. According to the statutes adopted by the People' Commissariat of 
Health in 1930, their main objective was primary care and prevention. The 
next step was the establishment of enterprise health centres often referred to 
as medsantchast, which, in fact, became one of the most widespread types of 
health services in Soviet industrial enterprises.22 The aim was to have health 
services closer to workers to provide high quality medical treatment, to 
undertake preventive measures with a view of bringing down morbidity levels 
and fighting occupational and infectious diseases, to improve working 
conditions (lilnxoBa (Shikhova), 1979). Therefore, occupational health 
services developed from the first aid and health stations to health centres 
which could be complex establishments including polyclinic, hospital, health 
stations and even recreation facilities.
It should be noted that medical treatment for workers were not only 
rendered by enterprise health services. In order to meet workers' needs 
enterprises co-operated with local health authorities. Subject to the degree of 
the latter's involvement it could be:
-- polyclinic or doctor's health stations opened in an enterprise as branches 
of the local health services;
22 Activities of health centres were regulated by the special statutes of the People's Commisariat of 
Health "On Health and Sanitary Department" adopted in 1938 and then amended several times.
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-- doctor (tzekhovoy terapevt) specifically employed by a local polyclinic to 
treat workers of industrial enterprises situated in the area.
-- beds reserved for workers in a local hospital in case enterprise health 
centre provided only primary health care services.
All these arrangements were aimed to ensure preferential and high quality 
treatment of workers of enterprises situated in local health services catchment 
area. Medical personnel, especially in local polyclinics situated in town 
industrial areas, was supposed to undergo special training as well as to know 
well labour conditions in the near-by enterprises.
Interaction between the state and enterprise in occupational health care 
had several aspects.
The state-regulated types of health services to be established in an 
enterprise mostly depended on the number of employees and industry. The 
1934 state regulations specified that health services for workers should be 
provided in:
■ ambulatoriyas offering services of consultants of main specialities in 
enterprises with 6,000-9,000 workers;
■ doctor's health stations organised in enterprises with 1,000-6,000 
workers employing up to three doctors depending on industry;
■ first aid stations employing nurses in enterprises with 400-1,000 
workers or in branches of large enterprises if they were situated far 
enough from enterprise policlinic or doctors' health station. 23
The 1968 Ministry of Health regulations required enterprises to open a 
special section in health services (tzekhovoy uchastok) to cover 2,000 workers 
(or 1,000 workers in chemicals, oil refinery, coal and mining) in enterprises 
employing more than 10,000 workers.
23 It was a recommendation of the All-Russian conference of representatives of local health departments 
in August, 1934, later approved by the People’s Commissariat of Health, that was reorganised into 
Ministry of Health in 1946.
Enterprise-based health services had dual lines of accountability: they 
reported directly to local health department, first of all on medical issues, and 
coordinated their activities with local polyclinics. On the other hand, they 
reported to the management of an enterprise, especially on financial issues.
Enterprises were responsible for provision of premises and maintenance of 
equipment, furniture, etc. of health stations, ambulatoriyas and health centres. 
They paid for fuel, electricity, telephone, transportation of patients in acute 
cases, etc.
The state contributed to financing of enterprises health services: local 
health departments paid salaries to medical staff, purchased high technology 
medical equipment and soft materials. Technical staff (cleaners, hospital 
attendants, etc.) was on an enterprise payroll.
Main features of occupational health care
Occupational health care can be classified according to three main criteria.
a) People whom services were supplied to:
• employees only in the so called zakritiye health centres (inaccessible 
to dependents and patients from outside);
• dependents and local population.
b) Scope of services provided:
• comprehensive (as in policlinic or hospital) in health centres ;
• limited, usually first aid and nurses, in health stations.
c) Geographical location:
• inside an enterprise territory;
• close to an enterprise but outside its territory.
The following were the main features of the system of enterprise health 
services.
a) Occupational health services functioned first of all in enterprises, which 
were obliged to supply health care for their workers. Other enterprises 
financed and provided medical treatment for their workers at their own 
discretion. Only about 20-25 per cent of workers in the USSR were covered by 
such provision (ApxunoB m floKpoBCKan (Arkhipov and Pokrovskaya), 1966).
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b) Health care was provided in- kind mostly through health centres or health 
stations, sometimes hospitals.
c) The functions of health centres were not limited to prevention and first aid 
but typically included curative treatment as well.
d) Occupational health services were supplementary to the national health 
service because workers still remained eligible for medical treatment through it 
(local policlinics, hospitals, and tertiary care services).
Moreover, enterprise health services usually provided a limited range of 
medical treatment to include mostly primary care and first aid. As a rule, 
enterprises had no capacity to organise specialised treatment with the help of 
consultants, doctors typically made home visits from local policlinics. Thus, the 
majority of workers intensively used the National health service that, as a 
result, was the combination of industrial and regional organisation. 
Implementation of the principle: of preferential treatment of workers would be 
impossible without involvement of the whole network of health services.
The major trend in development of the system of occupational health 
services in Soviet industrial enterprises was extension of:
range of services provided to workers. For this purpose in 1970s some 
small enterprise health centres were merged (see Table 6.2).
coverage as the size of enterprises obliged to establish health services 
gradually decreased. For example, if according to 1934 regulations health 
centres were opened in enterprises employing more than 10,000 workers, in 
1968 that indicator dropped down to 4,000 workers.
Conclusions
The unprecedented model of people’s welfare was built up in the Soviet 
Union in compliance with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Whatever its 
peculiarities, positive or negative, it will take quite a specific place in history. 
But it would be utterly wrong to think that this model was isolated from the past 
and has nothing to bear upon the future.
The state regulation of everything in the country could not but pertain to 
occupational welfare. It was intended to combine social welfare (meeting
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social needs of employees) and economic (giving enterprises a room for 
manoeuvre to stimulate labour force productivity) purposes. That would 
entwine the social policy and the organisation perspectives of occupational 
welfare.
The way that it worked was demonstrated by occupational health services, 
which found themselves at the crossroad of both perspectives belonging to 
enterprise and the National health service at the same time.
First, they were a joint venture financed by the state and an enterprise and, 
second, provided preventive as well as curative services to workers reporting 
to local health authorities on medical issues.
In the times of dramatic social changes in the post-Soviet Russia similarities 
of the Soviet model with the Western practices mentioned in Chapter 1 are 
another reason to believe in the future of occupational welfare in Russia. It is a 
phenomenon inherent in the Russian society rather than merely an 
undertaking of the Soviet power.
Occupational welfare outlived two political regimes so different in ideology 
and organisation because it was embedded in the texture of society and, in 
one way or the other, supported by the state.
Though it should be mentioned that the Soviet Russia made much more 
systematic use of occupational welfare and was more heavily involved in its 
financing and regulation. But both the Tsarist and the Soviet regimes attached 
big importance to occupational welfare in social protection of population. It led 
to some common characteristics of occupational welfare in the Imperial Russia 
and the Soviet Union:
► occupational welfare was initiated from below, from the depth of society, 
taking advantages of enterprises in providing social services over other forms 
of social organisation;
► occupational welfare was to contribute to solve labour market problems in 
the course of industrialisation;
► the state institutionalised the emerging forms of satisfying social needs of 
working people;
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► occupational welfare was free of charge for employees and all parties 
involved were used to it.
The mentioned above implies that changes in ideology or political regime in 
Russia had not dramatically affected occupational welfare. It had 
demonstrated an ability to adjust to new situations. Therefore, there is no 
reason to suggest that occupational welfare should go away with the Soviet 
times as it definitely has a potential to survive in a new environment.
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Chapter 7 
Occupational Welfare in the Post-Soviet Russia
The purpose of Chapter 7 is to examine the status of occupational welfare 
and its health care component against the background of social policy and 
liberal reforms in the post Soviet Russia. It deals with the new social insurance 
system and enterprise social insurance contributions, types of occupational 
welfare, divestiture of enterprise social assets,
Occupational health care is explored in the three main dimensions -- 
compulsory health insurance contributions, enterprise-based health centres 
and other provisions (voluntary health insurance, medical treatment in the 
national health service).
1. Social Policy and Occupational Welfare in the Post-Soviet Russia: 
General Issues
Social policy and market-oriented reforms
The era of post-Soviet Russia formally began with the cessation of the 
Russian Federation from the USSR and the declaration of the independent 
Russian state in December, 1991.
It had been preceded by the decade of political attempts to modify the 
existed system using the potential of socialist ideology and planned economy 
and preserving the leading role of the Communist party.
Intention was to increase the rate of growth of national economy and to 
overcome the so-called "zastoy" (stagnation) when indicators of economic 
development and labour productivity traditionally exploited to demonstrate the 
advantages of socialism were gradually worsening. For example, an annual 
growth rate of labour productivity decreased from 5.4 per cent in 1961-1970 to
3.2 per cent in 1981-1985 (LlempanbHoe CTaTMCTimecKoe ynpaBneHHe 
(Central Statistical Agency), 1990).
In social policy the increasing importance of human factor of production in 
accelerating development of the national economy was stressed. 
Improvements in the living standards were to contribute to enhancing
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economic potential of society and vice versa. As it meant stimulating, first of 
all, the working people the role of occupational welfare had to be more 
substantial. In accordance with the 1989 Law on Enterprises their competence 
in setting up and disposing of social funds was enlarged to encourage 
enterprises to spend more on social welfare. Workers were given more rights 
in social funds management.
In the early 1990s two major events in political and economic life radically 
influenced social situation:
• rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emerging of the 
Russian Federation as an independent state; and
• introduction of liberal economic reforms often referred to as the Gaydar 
reforms after the name of the then Acting Prime Minister. Their ideology 
was based on strong belief in the advantages of market economy.24
Contemporary social problems flew from two circumstances. First, 
indications of mounting social tensions could be found long before 
transformation had started. Social programmes adopted in the 1970-1980s 
failed to bring significant positive results, for example, to eliminate shortages 
of consumer goods. Second, contrary to bright expectations, the first 
outcomes of the 1990s market-oriented economic reforms were very poor. 
Price liberalisation, restrictive income policies and privatisation led to dramatic 
social changes in the Russian society:
• the fall of birth rates and increase of mortality rates resulted in reduction 
of population. The rate of natural growth dropped from 2.2 to -6.4 per 
1000 of population for the period of 1990-1999. As a result, population 
of the Russian Federation decreased from 148.0 to 146.6 million 
people;
• morbidity rates increased and epidemic situation worsened;
• the number of people living in poverty grew and, even according to the 
official statistics, reached about one third of population;
24 When the reforms started, the Soviet ideology came into conflict with market principles, at least as 
they were understood by Russian policy-makers: almost anything opposite to the Soviet practices was 
automatically regarded acceptable.
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• the number of unemployed increased from 6,712 thousand people in 
1995 to 9,094 thousand people in 1999, their share in economically 
active population grew for the same period from 9.5 per cent to 12.8 per 
cent;
Instead of improving individual capacity to secure the personal well being 
the reforms brought on a substantial increase of people in need of social 
protection to include not only the disabled, pensioners or unemployed but 
often the employed, too. In 1995 minimum wage was about 13 per cent of the 
subsistence minimum. Many people were unable to maintain their traditional 
standards of living and it caused feeling of uncertainty and pessimism. High 
income inequalities, producing concentration of wealth and poverty were 
characteristic features of Russian society.
The system of social benefits formally covering almost all risks that had 
survived the Soviet times with minor modifications was not backed by 
adequate material resources. Benefits were very small and could not secure 
decent living for their recipients. For instance, survivor’s pensions amounted to 
about 16 per cent of subsistence minimum in 1995. Though the state 
promised to maintain the rights to free education and health care their scope 
and quality fell substantially.
Measures undertaken in the field of social welfare failed not only to improve 
living standards but also to keep them on the pre-reform level. It is difficult to 
argue with some foreign experts who pointed out at the three crucial problems 
in the social sector reforms in Russia:
• lack of comprehensive reform concept and clear priorities (social issues 
were often solved in an ad hoc manner);
• unclear responsibilities (lack of collaboration between federal and local 
authorities and different agencies dealing with social matters);
• lack of financial and economic planning (the reforms were carried out 
without thorough financial and economic feasibility analysis) (IL0.1995).
After ten years of the market-oriented reforms Russia still faces the problem 
of working out of a new social policy that would take the modern realities into 
account. New ideology has acquired special significance in the process of
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revision of social policy concepts. Social values accepted by society, 
understanding of such notions as equality and equity; attitude to private 
property have been changing. Promotion of the principle of personal social 
responsibility influences labour motivation and individual consumption 
behaviour.
Economic and financial considerations begin to play the paramount role in 
adopting social policy decisions.
The state expenditures on social welfare have been constantly decreasing. 
The so called residual principle of financing so severely criticised in the late 
Soviet times meant that social sector was allocated resources left after funding 
other branches of the national economy. If the Soviet principle is believed to 
be "residual" then the new principle can be referred to as "minimal": the share 
of social expenditures in both federal and local budgets amounted to 8.1 per 
cent of GDP in 1999.25
Apart from the budget, social measures are financed from four extra 
budgetary social funds (Pension fund, Employment fund, Social Insurance 
fund, funds of compulsory health insurance) established in the early 1990s to 
increase and better target social welfare spending 26.
Organisational and administrative mechanisms have become much more 
complicated with development of the mixed economy of welfare and gradual 
emergence of voluntary and private agencies alongside the state institutions. 
Tendencies to decentralisation and shifting social welfare activities to a local 
level have been strengthening. The greater scope of social obligations is 
vested in the local authorities on the assumption that people's needs are 
better known locally and, therefore, not only resources can be targeted more 
efficiently, but additional funds raised to satisfy local needs. This development 
and the rise of political status of local authorities (the heads of regional
25 They slightly grew from the beginning to the mid 1990 (10 per cent of GDP in 1995) and then 
dropped again by the end of 1990s.
26 Since 1993 budget system in Russia has changed. In the Soviet Union budgets of lower levels of the 
state power were included into those of higher levels. Now regional and local budgets, including 
Moscow and St.Petersburg as special regions, are autonomous and excluded from budgets of higher 
level. Thus, local administrations have more flexibility in their budget policy. Social expenditures in 
federal and local budgets as well as by social funds should be summed up to have the full picture.
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administrations (governors) are now elected) have given them much more 
power to set social policy priorities.
An emerging new model of social policy is evidently designed to increase 
the role of market in satisfying social needs of peopleA to overcome state 
paternalistic ideology and centralised distribution and provision of social 
services, to level negative social consequences of market relations by creating 
safety nets for disadvantaged and to put social welfare spending in line with 
the economic status of the country. But apart from prospective vision of the 
situation by policy makers, it should be well thought out in terms of practical 
measures to be undertaken to reach planned goals.
Enterprises and new state social insurance
Enterprises have always played an important part in social policy through 
provision of occupational welfare to the working people who constitute a great 
part of population. Now they have also been affected by changes in social 
policy per se and in their place in contemporary Russian society. Many state 
enterprises have been privatised and, thus, become independent from the 
state authorities -  regional and ministerial -- having got more competence in 
managing and handling their financial resources.
Enterprises are presently involved in social policy via occupational welfare 
arrangements consisting of:
• compulsory contributions to the state social insurance;
• voluntary welfare provisions in-kind and in-cash to their employees.
The network of social insurance funds to which enterprises pay
contributions is given in Table 7.1. It shows that the federal government 
evidently tries to get more resources from enterprises to finance national 
social programmes. It is proved by the ratio of compulsory to voluntary 
occupational welfare, which is definitely in favour of the compulsory one. 
Employers’ compulsory social input makes nearly a half of payroll. In such a 
situation it is difficult to speak about liberal economic incentives for industry. 
Labour cost survey of about 3,000 enterprises in 1998 disclosed that
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compulsory contributions to the state social insurance funds reached about 90 
per cent of their total social spending (see Table A.3 in Appendix A).
Table 7.1
Social insurance funds
Fund Supervision Coverage Funding
Pension fund The Ministry of Labour 
and Social Development*
Retirement, 
disability and 
social pensions
28 per cent 
of payroll,
1 per cent of 
individual 
earnings
Employment
fund
The Ministry of Labour 
and Social Development*
Unemployment 
benefits, re­
training and job 
placement
2 per cent of 
payroll
Social
Insurance fund
The Ministry of Labour 
and Social Development*
Maternity 
benefits, sick 
pay, recreation.
5.4 per cent 
of payroll
Compulsory
health
insurance funds
The Ministry of Health Provision of 
health care 
services
3.6 per cent 
of payroll
* Until 1996 Pension fund and Social Insurance fund were supervised by the Ministry of Social 
Protection when it merged with the Ministry of Labour and the Federal Employment Service to form the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Development.
Source: adapted from OECD,1995.
It urges enterprises to find ways and means to lessen their payments that 
are calculated as a percentage of payroll. Illegal way to achieve it is to lower 
payroll. There are accounting techniques used by enterprises, including 
"double accounting" or employing people without official labour contracts. 
Private organisations often try to escape registration with social funds in spite 
of the threat to suffer penalties for failing to comply with regulations.
It has taken almost a decade before first signs of economic stabilisation 
appeared. Naturally it is early to speak about influence of these developments 
of the social sector that still finds itself in a quandary.
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It was originally assumed that the shock therapy measures undertaken in 
1991, despite of the first negative effects, would soon lead to improvement of 
economic situation, enterprises would prosper and pay to social funds. But the 
level of industrial output fell dramatically -- in 1995 it was merely a half of the 
1991 level. The tendency of the number of the economically active population 
to decrease (falling from about 75 million people in 1992 to 70.4 million people 
in 1999. (I~ocKOMCTaT (Goskomstat), 2000) should be also taken into account. 
As a result, the share of wages and salaries in household income has 
diminished. Delays in payment of wages and salaries are quite common. 
Enterprises often fail to pay compulsory contributions in time and funds 
constantly experience financial difficulties.
Occupational welfare and its types
The attitude of enterprises to new developments in the social sector is not 
clear though they have no option, for instance, whether to participate in 
compulsory social insurance or not: employers' contributions to social funds 
are deducted from the payroll simultaneously with payment of wages and 
salaries. Besides, no research is yet available to evaluate their point of view 
on new social insurance obligations. Together with the lack of official data on 
the subject it leads to the fact that Information from the field is of a conflicting 
character
The scope of occupational provisions has been gradually shrinking.
There are still enterprises providing social benefits in- cash and in- kind to 
their employees that are now voluntary: according to the 1989 Law on 
Enterprises they can allocate resources for social purposes independently. 
Those involved in two kinds of social schemes - compulsory and voluntary -- 
have additional headache of how to balance them and to cope with both 
paying considerable compulsory contributions and carrying out their own social 
plans.
Nothing has been undertaken by the state so far to encourage enterprises 
to maintain or develop occupational plans. On the contrary, the state policy 
implicitly provides for diminishing role of enterprises in organisation of social
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services in-kind. For example, the 1994 programme of the development of 
industry stipulated that enterprises be freed from social assets. The federal 
government started with its own enterprises: social assets of some federal- 
owned enterprises were transferred to the local authorities by special decrees.
However, Dolgopyatova (flonronBTOBa, 1995) mentioned that when in 1991 
her group conducted the first round of interviews with directors of industrial 
enterprises the feeling was in the air that enterprises would start quickly to get 
rid of social assets. But during the second round of interviews in 1994 
researchers were surprised to find out that many enterprises despite financial 
difficulties continued to maintain quite a number of social services for their 
employees. These findings are supported by other surveys carried out by such 
bodies as the Ministry of Economy (MuHMCTepcTBO 3kohommkm, 1995) and the 
World Bank (1996) that revealed that Russian enterprises provided several 
social benefits. Table 7.2
Industrial enterprises providing social benefits, % of the sample
mid 1994 1990/1991
child care / childcare subsidy 66 79
health care facilities 70 71
food subsidy / canteens 78 83
foodstuff / consumer goods 60 52
construction of new housing 50 73
housing/housing subsidy 55 59
holiday resort/holiday subsidy 45 57
transportation / subsidy 57 57
other 21 17
Number of benefits
more than three 72 79
more than four 58 67
Source: adopted from: the World Bank, 1996:56.
Analysis of other studies highlights the following issues.
The average share of non-wage items of labour costs such as housing,
social protection, culture, etc. in industry was relatively stable during the 1990s
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making about 40 per cent of the total labour costs as average (see table A.2 in 
Appendix A).
The study on divestiture of social assets by Russian industrial enterprises 
carried out by one of the TACIS (Technical Assistance to CIS) projects 
(KoTOBa (Kotova)1999) found out that that the majority of respondents:
• failed to express unconditional intention to divest social assets;
• thought that it was unlikely to improve the financial status of enterprises 
(only 15 per cent of them said that divestiture did influence positively 
economic status of their enterprises).27
The World Bank survey (1996) explicitly demonstrated that Russian 
industrial enterprises were not only inclined to continue to provide 
occupational services and to maintain their social assets but occupational 
welfare objectives still appeared to be among their main priorities.
Table 7.3 shows that, first, workers welfare is one of the main concerns for 
enterprises and, second, the number of managers who think this objective is 
important even increased -- from 60 per cent of respondents in 1990/1991 to 
69 per cent in 1994.
Table 7.3
Main objectives of industrial enterprises,
% of respondents..
1990/1991 1994
Not
important
Of some 
importance
Important Not
important
Of some 
importance
Important
Sales 15 15 70 8 13 79
Employment 30 30 40 30 33 37
Workers 
income/  
welfare
12 28 60 7 23 69
Profit 17 22 61 7 13 80
Privatisation 61 10 29 45 17 38
Shareholders 
' dividends
81 9 10 32 29 39
Source: adapted from World Bank, 1996:: 35.
27 Expert Institute study (Ha6HyjiHHa (Nabiullina), 1993) suggested that an average amount of enterprise 
profit spent on social programmes was 21 per cent (compared, for example, with 36 per cent as the share 
of investment in production and 6 per cent as payment of dividends).
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There is a difference in the way benefits in- cash and in- kind can be got rid 
of. The former are easily cancelled enterprises just stopping to pay them. In 
the latter case discontinuance is more problematic as it involves closing down 
social assets when enterprises have to decide what to do with social assets in 
which so much has already been invested.
Importance of different occupational welfare services in meeting employees’ 
needs varies (Commander and Jackman, 1994; Shalev, 1996). Some of them, 
if not provided by an enterprise, can be more or less easily obtained 
elsewhere. But others can be in short supply in community and, therefore, 
their cancellation is likely to affect employees in a much more fundamental 
way.
Surprisingly little seems to have been done about restructuring of enterprise 
social assets despite the fact that now enterprises have more options in 
organisation of occupational welfare:
■ in the absence of the state explicit regulations enterprises, in fact, can 
provide any social benefits they deem important for their employees, including 
those, which were not traditionally included into their domain, for example, 
occupational pensions;
■ new mechanisms such as insurance, especially voluntary health and 
pension insurance, are available. In the long run it may be more suitable for 
enterprises as it allows for more flexibility than other options. But existing 
statistical data show that new methods are not used well -- for instance, 
occupational pensions amounted to 0.3 percent of enterprises social spending 
in 1998 (see table A.3 in Appendix A);
■ commercialisation of social assets when they supply services for fee to 
local population might be promising. Unfortunately, there are no data on how 
widespread it is. But it may be assumed that -- apart from other reasons 
hampering divestiture -- purchasing power of population limits possibilities of 
using enterprise social assets in this way.
149
Divestiture of enterprise social assets
At present one of the key issues of occupational welfare is the fate of 
enterprise social assets.
Privatisation rules contain only general guidelines on what can be done with 
them. The principal piece of legislation on the matter is the Presidential 
Decree No 168 signed in 1993 and setting up a differentiated approach to 
social assets of privatised enterprises.
In accordance with the mentioned above Decree social assets can be 
privatised subject to approval of employees. They should continue to provide 
services that they originally used to supply. Enterprise social assets important 
for general public are not subject to privatisation and should be passed on to 
local authorities. The two parties can also conclude voluntary agreements on 
joint operation and financing of social facilities of enterprises.
Some enterprises disposed of their social assets. It is not a surprise as 
many of them are badly affected by economic crisis and experience serious 
financial problems. The obvious way to solve them seems to be to get rid of 
social assets and to transfer them over to local authorities. According to Leksin 
and Shvetzov (JleKCMH m LUBeqoB, 1998), in 1993-1997 80 per cent of housing, 
76 per cent of kindergartens and creches; 82 per cent of health facilities that 
had belonged to industrial enterprises were passed to local administrations. It 
should be noted that some facilities are easier to divest than others both for 
technical (difficulty of access to facilities situated in enterprise territory; poor 
state and, thus, need for investment) and social reasons (different relative 
importance for employees).
The task was to ensure that social assets would continue to operate and 
remain available to workers and local population. But it has turned out to be 
not an easy thing. In many regions authorities have no financial resources to 
take on responsibilities for new social facilities. On the other hand, they 
sometimes object to enterprises intentions to sell these assets in case the 
buyer wants to use them for purposes, inconsistent with their original function. 
It, thus creates additional demand for municipal social services and especially 
concerns the so-called "company towns".
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In order to prevent a conflict between social policy and enterprise 
restructuring objectives the federal authorities may render financial support to 
local administrations in divestiture process by paying them special subsidies 
from the federal budget. But due to financial difficulties the federal government 
often fails to fulfil its obligations. Another problem is that financial mechanism 
of such transaction is vzaimny rastchet (mutual settling of accounts), which 
means reduction by the federal government of the amount of a region's debt to 
the federal budget by the sum necessary to maintain newly acquired assets.
It may be added in conclusion, that if an enterprise already has developed 
social infrastructure, it becomes an objective factor of its life. An enterprise 
can face administrative difficulties in disposing of its social facilities, moreover, 
the divestiture may cause social tensions because it is unlikely that workers 
would appreciate such step.
2. Health Services for Workers and the 1990s Health Reforms
In the modern Russia health care as a part of occupational welfare 
includes:
• compulsory health insurance contributions;
• provision of health services in-kind by enterprise health 
centres/health stations;
• other provisions (voluntary health insurance; organisation of 
mandated periodical screening of employees, payment for medical 
treatment elsewhere).
Legislation on health insurance and compulsory health insurance 
contributions (CHI)
Health insurance in Russia was enacted by the 1991 Law on health 
insurance of citizens of the Russian Federation. It was mainly necessitated by 
financial reasons: the state budget was simply unable to adequately support 
health care system and an urgent need arose to find other sources of funding. 
It was assumed that whereas the state financing at least remained steady CHI 
contributions from enterprises would be a vital supplement to the budget
appropriations28. Thus, CHI contributions became a new important element of 
occupational welfare in Russia.
The Law of 1991 stated that the aim of CHI was to guarantee that people 
would receive health services subject to occurrence of insurance risk. It 
provided for the following fundamental innovations:
-- introduction of CHI with universal coverage;
-- setting up of health insurance organisations (HIC) as independent non­
profit bodies to accumulate CHI contributions from enterprises and local 
authorities and reimburse health services (hospitals, polyclinics) for provision 
of medical treatment. They were also supposed to defend interests of the 
insured and to control the quality of health care;
-- liability of enterprises and organisations to make contributions for the 
employed in the amount stipulated by legislation, local administrations paying 
for those not employed;
- adoption of a basic federal programme of CHI covering a minimum set of 
services provided by the CHI system as well as regional programmes that 
could not be less in their scope than the federal one;
-- introduction of voluntary health insurance for individuals and 
organisations.
Under this law enterprises were granted the rights:
• to participate in all kinds of health insurance;
• to choose a health insurance company;
• to control the fulfilment of CHI contracts.
28 Ideological and political reasons were also important. Health insurance seemed to conform best with 
the spirit of market economy which the Russian leadership was committed to develop. There were two 
major political circumstances that influenced the decision in favor of health insurance:
- The 1991 Law was passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation at a time when the 
USSR still existed. It reflected the intention of the Russian Federation to do things in its own way and 
insurance model was chosen as opposite to budget medicine.
- It so happened that health care issues in the Russian high legislative bodies (first the Supreme 
Soviet and later in the State Duma) were in the hands of strong proponents of market economy and 
health became one of the first areas of "marketisation".
Though the Russian authorities couldn't ignore social objectives of the reforms and all documents 
on CHI were full of social rhetoric. It looked like all other reasons advanced in the course of health care 
reforms in different countries and so well analysed in the OECD Report (1994) and other papers had 
only marginal importance in Russia.
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• to apply for reduction in the size of their CHI contributions if their 
workers' morbidity stabilised or dropped for three subsequent years29.
At the same time enterprises were obliged:
• to conclude compulsory health insurance agreements;
• to pay CHI contributions;
• to undertake measures to improve working conditions harmful to health;
• to give information on health status of the insured.
If introduced such a system would enable enterprises to control use of their 
money and influence activities on health insurance companies. But in 1993 the 
Law was amended and the model of relationships in health care system was 
modified by the establishment of CHI Federal and regional funds as special 
state financial bodies for accumulation of contributions from employers and 
local authorities and ensuring CHI financial stability. They were vested the 
right to conclude contracts with HICs or act as insurers themselves 
establishing direct links with health services.
Motives for such a turn in policy were not clearly articulated. It was asserted 
that in many regions the process of setting up HICs was too slow to meet the 
needs of the new system. It may be also admitted that such a change was an 
attempt of health care authorities at federal and local levels to establish control 
over CHI system, especially in the distribution of financial resources.
As a result there are now five main players in health care: Ministry of 
Health; local health authorities, CHI funds, health insurance companies and 
health services.30 It is very significant that despite the fact that enterprises pay 
considerable CHI contributions they have never been referred to as players in 
the field though sometimes even patients are mentioned among them. It 
means that enterprises are practically devoid of a voice in the CHI system and 
have no control over the quantity and quality of health services. Only two 
representatives of employers out of thirteen members are on the Boards of 
federal and each regional fund in compliance with their statutes. Employees 
do not have any special treatment in the system.
29 Unfortunately, the author has failed to find any evidence that this clause has ever been implemented.
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The position of the five players in health insurance issues are not identical; 
sometimes they even clash with each other. For instance, much attention has 
been drawn to relations between CHI funds and health authorities be it at 
federal or local level31.
Local authorities are bound to contribute from their budgets to CHI funds for 
economically inactive people having the right to determine their quota 
depending on the size of population and its health status. It gives them a 
possibility to substantially change their payments whereas the federal law fixes 
the level of employers’ contributions. Besides, local authorities have proved to 
be inaccurate payers: 25 regions failed to contribute to CHI in 1995 (I"pmunH 
(Grishin),1996).
In many regions local authorities make CHI payments from regional health 
budget, thus simply redistributing health expenditures between the two 
systems. These payments constituted merely 31 per cent of employers' 
contributions, which in 1997 amounted to about 60 per cent of CHI money. 
Enterprises are, thus, cross-subsidising local authorities and actually finance 
to a large extent provision of health services for non- employees.
Since the late 1993 enterprises have paid 3.6 per cent of their payroll for 
CHI separately to the Federal CHI fund and to regional funds: 3.4 per cent -- 
to the regional fund and 0.2 per cent -  to Federal fund the payments covering 
employees exclusively but not dependents. The rate is a political compromise 
rather than economically justified calculation. Even more so because these 
contributions were discussed in one package with contributions to the Pension 
fund which were reduced accordingly to exactly the same percentage.
30 Under local health authorities relevant departments of local administrations are understood. They are 
responsible to both local administrations (directly) and Ministry of Health (indirectly).
31 After the establishment of CHI funds local health authorities lost direct control over considerable 
financial resources. The funds, in turn, have their own interests which do not always coincide with those 
of health authorities. Observers underline the conflicting nature of their relations as both groups have 
been fighting for leadership in the system that makes it difficult to find a compromise.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that the federal legislation does not clearly stipulate the division 
of powers between the state health authorities and CHI funds leaving this task to regions. As they 
actually decide many issues concerning CHI system in their territory it resulted in substantial variations 
in speed and scope of reforms in various regions.
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Financial considerations prominently feature in CHI matters. There is 
general consensus that enterprises should continue to pay CHI contributions 
but their present level is regarded inadequate by many experts. The size of 
contributions proposed by CHI funds, Ministry of Health and independent 
experts ranges from 6 to 10 per cent of payroll. Some experts suggest that 
dependents should be covered by employers’ contributions, others think that 
health services for pensioners and the unemployed should be financed by 
Pension fund and Employment fund, accordingly.
In 1994 the Federal CHI fund suggested to divide the flow of funds in health 
care system. CHI bodies would collect contributions from employers only and 
cover services for the working. Provision of medical treatment for other groups 
of population would be a responsibility of local authorities. But there is no 
evidence whatsoever on any reaction by the health authorities to this proposal 
that is practically ignored. It is quite understandable in the view of financial 
embarrassments of the state.
In 1998 CHI contributions covered approximately 35 per cent of total health 
spending the rest born by federal and regional budgets. They were enough to 
finance current expenditures on provision of medical treatment while capital 
investments had to be made from the budget. In general, the level of health 
expenditures is very low (about 3.5 per cent of the GDP in the mid 1990s). It 
turned out that CHI contributions from enterprises were used to sustain health 
care system rather than to be supplementary to the budget.32
It is usually ignored that the 1993 amendments to the CHI legislation 
substantially affected the role of enterprises initially envisaged by the 1991 law 
which stipulated for the establishment of health insurance companies (HIC) 
Under the 1991 law enterprises were to contribute directly to HIC.
Health insurance was aimed to promote an individual responsibility for 
health, medical personnel responsibility for quality of services and employer’s 
responsibilities for protecting working environment (BBeAeHCKaa
32 It is a paradox that almost every textbook on health insurance says that introduction of CHI as a 
measure to mobilize additional financial resources is premature: at the early stages of transition a 
potential contribution base is shrinking because of a rising unemployment and a growing informal sector. 
Besides, no efficient mechanism to collect contributions is available (Barr,1993).
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(Vvedenskaya),1991). To great regret, these goals have hardly been achieved, 
yet.
Provision of health services in-kind by enterprise health centres
The problem of enterprise-based health centres as traditionally an integral 
part of the national health care is very acute. Preker and Feachem (1994) 
were right to note that potential collapse of these services would require 
massive and expensive restructuring being a time bomb, which few 
governments had adequate steps to defuse.
Emphasis in health policy is usually made on health services of various 
governmental bodies financed from the state budget. For instance, at present 
nearly 20 federal ministries have their own health services. Starodubrovsky 
(1995) holds quite a negative view on such services claiming that they 
consume a major share of federal health expenditures, contributing to 
deepening health inequalities. At the same time health services in industrial 
enterprises are almost fully ignored in health policy and are touched upon only 
when restructuring is discussed.
Prospects of occupational health services are determined by the three main 
options: to keep them, to hand them over to local health authorities or 
commercialise their activities. The last two are, in fact, dictated by the same 
motive -  to improve enterprise financial status by reducing health 
expenditures. The role of health centres in enhancement of health status of 
the employed is typically not taken into account at all. Therefore, it is implicitly 
assumed that local health services have enough capacities to take 
responsibilities over from enterprise health centres.
But statistics for 1990s are alarming: the health status of the working people 
who make about 50 per cent of population has been steadily deteriorating. 
During 1990s mortality rates in working ages (20 to 50) doubled and the level 
of morbidity increased as well.33
33 The statistics on the health status and employment conditions come from Statistical Yearbook 
(respective years), published by the State Statistical Committee (Goskomstat).
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Conditions of employment are among the main factors that negatively 
influence health status of people in employment. In the mid 1990s about 5 
million people, including 2 million women, or about 20 per cent of industrial 
workforce, worked in conditions that failed to comply with sanitary regulations. 
In the majority of enterprises the programmes of improvement of working 
conditions were cancelled.
Worsening economic situation caused deterioration of working conditions in 
almost all industries. Process of technological modernisation is almost halted, 
no new equipment is installed while about 60 per cent of equipment in industry 
is out of date. Supply of special clothes and means of individual protection is 
limited as well.
Deterioration of safety at work has led to an increase in the number of 
injuries at work and occupational diseases. Injuries and poisoning take the first 
place in mortality patterns. The share of occupational injuries amounts to 23 
per cent of the total injury and poisoning cases. Approximately 10,000-11,000 
cases of occupational diseases and poisoning are registered every year. It 
means that as average 6.3 per 1000 workers suffered from industrial injuries. 
In 1995 there were 55 cases per 10,000, over 6,700 people died.
Average age of contracting occupational diseases is 40-45 years. In almost 
95 per cent of cases workers become chronically ill and often lose ability to 
work. According to Ministry of Health data, by the end of 1990s there were 
about 200,000 people suffering from occupational diseases.34
Since 1989 there has been an annual increase in average length of 
sickness absence from work. In 1993 it amounted to 71 days, or 987 cases 
per 100 workers.
Another factor that is detrimental to the health status of the employed 
people is a decline in the quality of health care. Introduction of CHI has not 
brought positive changes into health care provision: the quality of health 
services has been falling. Russia has re-discovered such diseases as polio 
and tuberculosis, practically non-existent in the Soviet Union. People still face
34 Even official sources acknowledge that real figures are likely to be higher because not all cases of 
occupational diseases or injuries are reported.
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problems of access to and quality of treatment and visit the same policlinics 
and hospitals with the same facilities that are very often out-of-date. Health 
services suffer from the lack of equipment and medication, many of them are 
in need of major renovation. There are regions where a patient will not be 
admitted to hospital without his/her own medication, food and sometimes even 
bed linen. Due to widespread poverty the majority of population cannot afford 
to pay for private medical treatment. Mandatory periodical screening is not 
carried out.
The latest available official data on occupational health centres is for the 
end of 1993. At that time there were 757 health centres, 791 doctor's stations 
and 17,000 paramedic's stations with about 70,000 doctors working in them.
The 1993 Presidential decree and relevant decisions of the Ministry of 
Health drew a line between health centres open to local population and those 
inaccessible to it. "Open" health centres are not subject to privatisation and 
should be transferred to local health authorities. "Closed" health centres 
providing health services for the employed only can be privatised with the 
approval of employees.
One of the decisions of the Ministry of Health was aimed to adjust the 
system of enterprise health centres to the environment. Their main objectives 
remained as they were before: to provide specialised medical care to patients, 
to control working conditions, to decrease the level of general and 
occupational illness and occupational injuries, to reduce absenteeism due to 
illness and injuries. The four options as to their status stipulated in the 
decision are given in Table 7.4.
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Status of health centres
Table 7.4
Current status Privatisation
options
Clientele Source of 
financing
Under federal government 
or industry ((ministerial) 
authority
No em ployees state budget, CHI 
funds, enterprises
Transform ed into local 
policlinic -- on the balance 
sheet of local authorities
not specified local population local budget, CHI 
funds
Transform ed into local 
policlinic -- on the balance 
sheet of a state-owned  
enterprise
No em ployees and 
local population
local budget, CHI 
funds, enterprises
Owned by a non-public 
enterprise
Yes em ployees enterprise
Source: the Decision of Ministry of Health N 131 “On health centres”, March, 1994.
No official data are available on the option that is the most widespread. It is 
officially recognised that enterprise-based health services decrease in 
numbers (according to the Ministry of Health by 162 for the period 1991- 
1993). They were mostly transformed into local policlinics, but moire details 
are provided. It shows that implementation of governmental decisions is not 
well monitored by the public and, supposedly, is likely to remain on paper.
In my opinion, the findings of Ministry of Economy survey are very helpful in 
clarifying the real situation. They enable to make an important conclusion that 
the majority of enterprises in the sample continue to operate their health care 
facilities.
Table 7.5
Changes in the status of enterprise health services,
% of enterprises in the sample
conveyed to other 
enterprises
taken over from 
other enterprises
transformed into 
independent legal 
entities
no changes
8.72 2.68 2.68 85.91
Source: Ministry of Economy, 1995: 44
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Some of the surveyed enterprises even increased spending on health care: 
for one enterprise which reduced its health expenditures 5.2 enterprises 
increased them (see Table 7.6).
Table 7.6
Expenditures of enterprises on health care facilities,
% of enterprises in the sample
increased remain the same decreased
Enterprises whose 
expenditures on health 
care facilities
64.90 22.5 2 12.58
Source: Ministry of Economy, 1995:46
Enterprises usually cover expenses of their health services on:
• capital investment;
• maintenance of premises (security, cleaning, repairs,).
• doctors and paramedics at health stations organisation of which is 
not required by legislation and is optional for an enterprise.
The state budget pays health centres for carrying out special federal and 
regional programmes and funds salaries of doctors and paramedics working in 
health stations required by law. As to other staff, their salaries funding 
depends on the policy of local health authorities, doctors’ salaries are paid 
either by local authorities (in case they want to control employer provided 
health care) or enterprise.
The two sources of health centres financing have survived with minor 
changes since the Soviet times; the new ones that emerged in the course of 
health reforms are CHI, voluntary health insurance and fees for services. An 
enterprise might choose to enter CHI system. Then it should conclude contract 
with regional CHI fund or HIC, depending on the model accepted in the 
region.35 In this case health centre will be reimbursed for the health services
35 The CHI has been developing fast- in 1999 it incorporated 90 regional funds with 1170 branches and 
415 health insurance companies. There are several CHI models in Russia. Only in 12 regions out of 89 
reform was introduced in full compliance with legislation: regional funds accumulate money and 
conclude agreements with HIC which in turn act as insurers and deal directly with health services. In 
other models either funds or their branches may be insurers. In 18 regions no HICs were established.
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provided for employees in accordance with regional CHI programme. 
Possibilities to raise funds by attracting local people will also increase: CHI 
legislation permits a person who has CHI policy to apply for treatment in any of 
health services operating in the system.
This option suits local authorities, too, as an enterprise will have to cover 
other expenditures which, in case health centres are transformed into local 
policlinics, would be born by regional budgets.
However, capacities of CHI system should not be overestimated. In regions 
it differs organisationally and by coverage provided. For example, in 20 per 
cent of regions only the working population is covered either fully or partially 
(hospital or primary care). In 34 per cent some groups of population are 
insured for some services. In some regions CHI funds compensate all health 
services for certain expenses incurred by providing treatment to the whole 
population. By the end of the 1990s only about 30 per cent of health services, 
mostly hospitals were included into CHI system.
To join CHI health services must have a license. Under licensing procedure 
an enterprise based health centre should supply quite a wide range of health 
services. It means that small health centres will not be able to get a license or, 
in order to do so, will have to expand the number of services.
Other provisions
There are possibilities for enterprises today to improve the health status of 
their employees by means other than health services in kind. They may 
conclude agreements with local health services on provision of employees 
with medical treatment, additional to this in the national health service; or to 
buy equipment for a local policlinic or a hospital in exchange for health care for 
employees. A group of enterprises can unite their efforts in health protection of 
their employees.
According to health and safety regulations, employers must ensure that 
their workers undergo mandated screening before entering employment and in 
case they are influenced by dangerous factors at work listed in the Ministry of 
Health regulations.
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Enterprises are allowed to pay for voluntary health insurance of their 
employees. Some of them practice group health insurance when employees 
make payments themselves getting the group premium.
Scarce data on this kind of insurance come not from health authorities but 
from insurance bodies. It has not yet been well developed: in 1994 only 0.4 
per cent of enterprise social expenditures were spent on voluntary health 
insurance. To a great extent it is hampered by 28 per cent payment to Pension 
fund levied on voluntary health insurance contributions.
Enterprises might be interested in providing voluntary health insurance for 
its employees for purely financial reasons. First, they are entitled to include 
into production costs social expenses amounting to up to one percent of the 
profit from sales. Second, in accordance with voluntary health insurance 
agreements enterprises usually can retrieve the balance left by the end of the 
year (not spent on provision of medical treatment) and even to receive interest 
on their contributions.
As a rule, managerial staff is fully covered in the first instance while other 
employees may be eligible only for some services. Voluntary health insurance 
is popular with foreign firms or joint ventures that evidently resort to it out of 
habit. With the help of voluntary health insurance policy it is easier to get 
access to the best health facilities, which is especially attractive for areas 
nearby Moscow. Enterprises typically pay an annual sum that enables 
employees to receive certain health services in a policlinic and/or hospital. 
Concern about employees’ welfare is placed the last not because it is 
insignificant but as it is probably the most difficult thing to measure of all the 
mentioned above.
Conclusions
Social policy in post-Soviet Russia has acquired new dimensions. In these 
circumstances occupational welfare at present is characterised by the 
following developments.
First, composition of occupational welfare is now different. It includes 
compulsory contributions to the social funds while occupational services may
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de facto be considered as voluntary. It should be noted that these changes 
failed to contribute to the improvement of the well being of people in 
employment.
Compulsory contributions are administered through the state bodies and 
are often looked upon in purely taxation terms enterprises having no influence 
in running the social funds. Nevertheless the state in Russia relies heavily on 
compulsory occupational welfare to finance its social policy. But the system is 
very likely to encounter all the problems, which typically arise out of the funded 
schemes.
Second, there is an evidence to suggest that despite of the evident lack of 
support from the state enterprises continue to provide social benefits to their 
employees in a new social and economic environment. Occupational welfare 
managed to survive, though it should be admitted that the real picture is 
somewhat sketchy because of the difficulty for an independent researcher to 
find information on the subject.
Occupational benefits are discussed in the framework of enterprise 
restructuring and their social policy identity features only when so called 
"social pillars" are discussed. The state policy towards employer-provided 
social services is evidently informed by the idea that enterprises should divest 
them. Local authorities whose role in provision of social services, according to 
the state plan, should increase are the first claimants. However, it is quite clear 
that on average they lack sufficient economic resources to secure the 
maintenance of divested enterprise social assets.
The recent developments in health care, such as introduction of compulsory 
health insurance and divestiture of occupational health services have done 
little to improve the health status of the working people. Enterprise-based 
services transformed into territorial polyclinics lost potential to treat 
occupational diseases. If general illness can be still cured in the local health 
network, it is practically impossible to get specialised treatment of occupational 
diseases there. The health centres that stay with enterprises -- especially 
privatised ones -- have almost lost all the connections with the National health 
service and, thus, taken out of the context of the health policy.
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In such a situation the fate of occupational welfare, especially its voluntary 
component, depends to a large extent on the position of enterprises. Decision 
to be taken is not an easy one, especially when the state or independent 
experts fail to offer positive technologies how to properly manage new 
occupational plans.
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PART 3
EMPIRICAL PART OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT
Part 3 presents the empirical component of the thesis. It contains 
outcomes of the fieldwork conducted in Russia during the period of 1995-1997 
with the view of finding out what occupational welfare was like, particularly 
health protection of the employed.
The issues of research methodology are specifically dealt with in this Part. 
It envisaged the use of a number of research instruments ranging from 
interviews to case studies. Explanations are provided why a particular 
approach is considered to be appropriate for investigation of the research 
topics listed below and what advantages and limitations such a choice entails. 
It is with this basic position in mind that a final judgement on the merits and 
weaknesses of the present study should be made.
A new environment of occupational welfare is explored. Its predominant 
distinctive feature is introduction of compulsory health insurance, the 
mainstream of health care reforms in Russia. The influence of liberal ideology, 
both in economy and social welfare, with its ideas of a free profit-making 
enterprise and an individual social responsibility which are promoted by the 
state as well as many constraints, in the first place, financial that industrial 
enterprises encounter should be also taken into account.
Despite factors mitigating against occupational services there are non the 
less enterprises that are going on to ensure health protection of employees 
and maintain their own health centres, especially the ones that used to do so 
in the Soviet times. This evident tendency of continuity in the height of 
transformation shows that occupational welfare is an established social 
institution in Russian society. Having more than a century long tradition it is, in 
principle, compatible with a market economy.
To better understand motivation of Moscow industrial enterprises in favour 
of provision of occupational health services two Moscow industrial enterprises 
were selected for case studies, making up a special chapter. As a follow up of
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tie field research some reflection ensuing from empirical evidence are 
suggested for consideration and further examination.
It is presumed that the contents of this Part may be regarded as a 
testimony that my problematic research on occupational welfare has been 
confirmed, on the whole, by empirical studies.
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Chapter 8 
Field Research Project and Its Design
Chapter 8 is dedicated to explaining the design of the field research. It 
clarifies the aim and methods of fieldwork. Ways and means of collecting 
information as cornerstones of any scientific inquiry are discussed in detail 
(interview, case study, etc.).
1. Aim of the Fieldwork
The aim of the field research was to operationalise empirically the evolving 
role of occupational welfare in the Russian welfare state in connection with the 
private-public welfare mix. The study addressed the issues related to health 
protection of the working people. Individual decisions about self-provision were 
not discussed in the thesis, only the supply of health services was analysed.1
The present sample is focused on senior managers of Russian industrial 
enterprises within the broad context of social relations between enterprises 
and the state. Today the mix of the organisation and the social policy 
perspectives as well as the ratio of voluntary and compulsory occupational 
welfare has been undergoing major changes. By relaxing occupational welfare 
regulations the state, in fact, has stopped providing any incentives for 
enterprises to develop occupational welfare. This position is more or less 
clearly articulated in legislation and practical measures undertaken by the 
federal and regional governments and local authorities. As a result, 
enterprises now have more flexibility to decide whether to provide health 
services in-kind to their employees or not. In such a situation management 
attitudes are crucial for the formulation of enterprise strategy on health 
centres.
Three fundamental questions determine the general contours of the study. 
The original questions are:
1 Income loss due to illness was compensated from the Social Insurance Fund to which 
enterprises contributed separately (See Chapter 7 for details).
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• what influence Russian industrial managers' attitudes to their 
responsibility for the protection of workers' health, including provision of health 
services in enterprise-based health centres?
• what motivates them to maintain health centres in a changing 
environment?
• what are the implications of the study of industrial managers' attitudes 
regarding enterprise health centres for evaluating the role of occupational 
welfare in contemporary Russia.
The first two questions are central in the study. They are quite complex 
and presuppose a whole array of explanatory hypotheses rather than a simple 
answer.
The first question was formulated to test managers' attitudes to their 
responsibility in health care protection of employees in changing national 
health service eroded by an introduction of compulsory health insurance. For a 
number of reasons health care is a good case of the state-enterprise 
interaction in the provision of health services for the employed.
a) Health is quasi-public good, so health services can be provided in a 
number of ways and the state-private mix, including occupational welfare, can 
vary greatly;
b) Health care reforms pioneered a change in the social sector: 
compulsory health insurance (CHI) was introduced in Russia in 1991-1993. 
Therefore, by the time the research project started in 1995 the health reform 
had already been implemented for two years;
c) System of CHI funds differs from other social funds established in the 
early 1990s:
regional CHI funds are set up by regional authorities and, therefore, quite 
independent of Federal CHI fund;
regional authorities are required to share contributions to CHI with 
enterprises by paying for those not working.
As a result, CHI contributions are among the most important external 
factors that might influence managers' perception of enterprise role in
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employees’ health protection, in general, and maintenance of health centres, 
in particular. Their attitude to the part enterprises play in health care mix is 
measured by their approach to the state-promoted compulsory health 
insurance.
The second question puts more emphasis on the organisation 
perspective. Managers are seen as influential stakeholders who may have 
certain interests of their own in provision of occupational health services. It is 
generally accepted that top managers have wide discretion in determining how 
their enterprises function and may pursue not only the goal of profit 
maximisation and implement strategies benefiting management rather than 
owners. However, there are still significant uncertainties about what exactly 
motivates, encourages or constrains managers.
The third question concerns evaluation of the prospects for development 
of occupational welfare and enterprise-based health centres in Russia. 
Judgements of this sort are always tentative but they may serve as important 
guidelines for channelling efforts in a right direction.
To be able to answer these questions in a manner substantiated by 
empirical investigation they should be broken down into more specific 
research topics used as focal points for building appropriate data collecting 
procedures, namely
• socio-demographic characteristics of respondents;
• managers' attitudes towards introduction of CHI and health reforms, in 
general;
• their view on enterprise health obligations towards employees and on 
how CHI contributions influence managers attitudes towards their 
health responsibilities, namely, provision of health services in- kind;
• managers' perception of the role the state should play in health care;
• their views on the place of enterprises in CHI system;
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• managers' opinion about the ways enterprises could be incorporated 
into the national health care system;
• their understanding of the role of health centres in the life of 
enterprises;
• managers' motives for keeping health centres.
2. Methods of the Field Research
The data were collected by means of the following methods the choice 
being determined by possibilities of obtaining information:
> Interview;
> Case study;
> Additional sources of information.
Interviews.
Two types of interviews were used: clarification interviews and structured 
interviews. Interviews were selected from a variety of social research methods 
available because of the following reasons.
a) There was an evident deficit of information on the subject, including a 
lack of documentary sources or statistics. Available information was 
fragmentary, and several recent surveys relevant to the subject under the 
study did not even address specifically occupational health services.
b) The policy area evolved rapidly as the consequence of the volatility of 
political and economic situation.
c) For similar reasons the position of enterprise changed as well. They 
became more entrepreneurial and acquired greater flexibility in their 
performance.
Clarification interviews
Clarification interviews at the preliminary stage of the fieldwork were 
conducted with people from the health care and industry networks (see figure 
3 in Appendix A). Qualitative free structured in-depth interviews facilitated the 
construction of an overarching picture of the subject of the research,
170
discussion being carried around a flexible number of questions asked. They 
permitted the disclosure of the main problems in the field and helped to 
understand the modern situation and formulate questions and response 
options for the questionnaire.
Structured interviews
On the basis of preliminary stage results, a special structured 
questionnaire was developed (See Appendix B). It included mainly closed 
questions, so respondents only needed to choose from a given set of 
response options. Such a format was selected to fit the characteristics of 
respondents.
First, they were not used to participate in such kind of research. Closed 
questions were easy to answer as a respondent only had to select one of the 
options. It ensured a higher response rate, as those interviewed were more 
likely to be able to answer effectively. Respondents were also busy at work, so 
the problem of finding time for interviews had to be taken into account. 
Nowadays Russian managers have to value their time high and, therefore, 
shorter interviews were likely to be much more feasible than unstructured 
lengthy discussions.
Second, closed questions were more efficient and culturally acceptable, 
convenient to code and analyse than open, unstructured ones, as they 
produced less variable answers that could be reliably compared. It was 
important for an individual project limited in time. In order not to constrain 
respondents too much an option "other, please, specify" was included into 
response options. It ensured that respondents could express their opinion 
even if it was not reflected in any of the options suggested. Another response 
option used in some questions was "don't know -- hard to say" to 
accommodate those respondents who found it difficult to formulate their 
opinions. Jargon words were avoided, so questions were easy to understand.
The questionnaire consisted of qualitative questions on managers' 
attitudes towards:
• current health reform;
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• employer-provided health services;
• enterprise health responsibilities.
The six point Likert scales were used to measure attitudes. A filter 
question (Q.1) was included to check the level of respondents' expertise and 
the intensity of their opinions. In order to identify the strength of their attitude 
towards the topic in question the ranking procedure was applied (Q.23) when 
respondents were asked to indicate their first, second and third choices.
Data were collected in face-to-face interviews, each questionnaire taking 
about an hour to complete. It allowed me to make observation notes in the 
course of the interviews and to use my impressions and respondents' informal 
comments to interpret the results. The purpose of the research project and 
definitions of the terms used were verbally explained to respondents if 
necessary. Face-to-face interviews helped to insure that all respondents 
understood each question in more or less the same way. Personal contacts 
with respondents helped to avoid misunderstanding and to lessen problems 
associated with recording responses.
One person per enterprise was questioned. In some enterprises I also had 
an opportunity to talk to the head of the health centre which helped to better 
understand what was happening in the enterprises in respect of health 
protection of employees, what was the situation concerning the health centres 
and how their roles had changed.
The data collected was coded and analysed with the help of SPSS that is 
clearly the most popular professional programme used in social and 
behavioural sciences.2
Characteristics of the sample
The sample included 50 senior managers of Moscow industrial 
enterprises. About 25 per cent of the economically active population in Russia
2 In presenting correlation and factor analyses the follow ing abbreviations are used 
* *  correlation is significant at the 0 .0 1 level (2-ta iled );
* correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-ta iled ).
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is employed in such establishments. The latter were selected on the following 
criteria.
a) The sample covered only managers of industrial enterprises. Governmental 
agencies and other organisations were excluded from the study on the 
grounds that their activities in health protection of employees remained heavily 
regulated by the state.
Table 8.1.
Enterprises in the sample by number of employees and industry
Branch of 
industry
Number of 
enterprises
Number of employees
number % 100 -  
500
501-
1,000
1,001-
5,000
5,001
+
Textile/sewing/
Shoes
12 24 3 3 6
Machine
building
11 22 1 3 7
Food
processing
10 20 2 4 3 1
Electotechnics 9 18 2 - 7 -
Automobile 3 6 - - 1 2
Watches 2 4 - - 2 -
Metallurgy 2 4 - - - 2
Chemicals 1 2 - - 1
Total 50 100 8 10 27 5
Source: compiled by the author
In Moscow there are many so called vedomstvennye health services 
belonging to various governmental bodies and non-industrial organisations, 
including the state owned ones. For example, according to the data of 1995 
survey of the Moscow statistical committee that started to record information 
on health centres in the mid 1990s, among 70 respondents 25 were
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governmental agencies of federal and Moscow level; 33 were educational, 
academic and other organisations operating and only 12 -  industrial 
enterprises.
Enterprises in the sample belong to such basic branches of industry as 
textiles, food, machine building, automobile (see Table 8.1). The majority of 
enterprises operate in heavy industry, and many of them are relatively large in 
terms of the number of employees: 27 enterprises employ between 1,001 to 
5,000 people.
b) The survey was focused on enterprises which at the time of the study 
provided health services in kind for their workers via health centres 
(medsanchast) or health stations: 24 of sample enterprises had health stations 
and 26 - health centres. The difference between the two is in the range of 
services provided and the number of staff employed. Health centres operate 
as policlinics supplying a wide range of services, while health stations are 
small, sometimes one-room medical facilities usually staffed with one doctor 
and several nurses. Whereas the former can treat patients independently, the 
latter only provide first aid and contact doctors at local policlinics specifically 
responsible for the treatment of workers in the policlinic's catchment area.
It was suggested that availability of health care arrangements other than 
payment of CHI contributions influenced managers' attitude to their health 
responsibilities. The ones that still operated health centres after several years 
of market-oriented reforms were more likely to be sensitive to health care 
issues reflecting the interplay between compulsory and voluntary health 
obligations, as enterprise-based health centres in industrial enterprises, in fact, 
became a voluntary arrangement. They had to react to the changing 
environment and make decisions about what to do with health facilities. 
Besides, their experience might influence the attitude of other enterprises 
towards health plans.
The majority of the health centres in the surveyed enterprises provided 
services only to employees of that particular enterprise and sometimes their 
dependents and retired. Health stations typically served only employees.
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It turned out to be much easier to obtain information about enterprises 
having in-kind provisions for their employees. They at least had some 
statistical records as well as there were several other surveys available for 
analysis.
c) The chosen enterprises were located in Moscow, the capital of the 
Russian Federation with a population of over 9 million people and about the 
same number of people coming to the city everyday to work. Though some 
authors comment that Moscow among other metropolis is "atypical for many 
reasons" (Gough and McMylor, 1995), for the purpose of this study it is 
suitable for the following reasons.
Moscow is among the first regions where CHI was introduced while in 
some regions its development faced a lot of difficulties. In general, it is a city of 
dynamic social and economic transformations, including privatisation. But 
despite the fact that this is a place where many innovations were introduced, 
quite a number of Moscow industrial enterprises still continue to maintain their 
health centres.
Moscow is not only the seat of the Russian government with all its 
ministries and agencies; it is also the biggest industrial centre. Moscow 
enterprises belong to most branches of industry and experience the same 
problems as their counterparts in other Russian regions, the main one being 
decline in production.
Moscow industrial enterprises are situated within the developed urban 
infrastructure. This is not the case of the so-called "company town" where 
social welfare of population of the whole town depends on the fortune of the 
town-forming establishment. It typically means close links with local 
authorities, whereas in Moscow, as well as in other "multi-enterprise" cities, 
those relations are not so strong.
d) The form of ownership was not specifically taken into account. Though 
it is worth mentioning that the majority of enterprises in the sample were joint 
stock companies (32 public limited companies and 9 partnerships). Six 
enterprises were state-owned, one was a municipal property. However, the 
form of ownership has not proven an important factor that influences the
provision of health services by Russian industrial enterprises. For example, 
the Ministry of Economy study (MuHnciepcTBO 3kohommkm, 1995) failed to 
reveal significant relationships between the form of ownership and industry, on 
one hand, and social developments, on the other. The very existence of health 
care facilities in an enterprise implies that it is either state owned or has just 
been privatised.
There is no consensus among researchers about whether privatisation 
affected significantly the behaviour of the former state-owned enterprises. The 
subject is widely debated both in Russia and abroad. According to some 
commentators, the impact of privatisation should not be overestimated. 
Dolgopyatova (flonronnTOBa, 1995), for example, points out that old industrial 
firms which were converted into joint stock companies in the early 1990s were 
very likely to demonstrate for a long time the behaviour similar to that of the 
state-owned enterprises.
On the other hand, the size of an enterprise proved to be of more 
importance: the bigger the enterprise the more likely it is to supply a variety of 
social benefits. One of the surveys of Russian enterprises (OECD, 1995) 
discloses quite explicitly that size and industry branch is the most important 
factors that influence the development of enterprise-based health services. 
However, Green and colleagues (1986) came to the opposite conclusion that 
there was no evident relationship between these indicators.
Correlation discussed above is valid for voluntary arrangements only. In 
Russia the casual link between the availability of enterprise-based health 
centres, on the one hand, and size of enterprise and branch of industry it 
belongs to, on the other hand, is as follows. If an enterprise is large and 
operates in the priority branch of the national economy, where working 
conditions are typically harmful for the workers’ health, it usually has a health 
centre, as well as provides other social services. Such a situation is a 
consequence of the state policy rather than an individual enterprise choice. In 
the Soviet Union occupational health centres were supported by the state in 
accordance with policy favouring large enterprises in heavy industry. Size and
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industry were interrelated and high concentration in priority industries was a 
dominant tendency.
Therefore, if existence of health centres is taken as a starting point it is 
almost certain that enterprises operating health centres will conform to these 
characteristics. The only problem could be to define what is meant by a "large 
size".
Sampling was carried out according to the official data on organisations, 
which have health centres and health stations. A list containing 70 
organisations was obtained from the Moscow Statistics Committee. The 
second list of 80 organisations was compiled on the basis of information 
published in special reference publications. The Moscow health committee 
provided the third one. The data were crosschecked to exclude double 
counting. As a result, 156 organisations in Moscow that had health centres 
were identified; included 56 industrial enterprises. The number of people 
employed by the sample enterprises amounted to about 160,000 people.
Those enterprises were first approached where I managed to find 
personal contacts or which were selected for their known interest in health 
care. The snowballing technique of sampling was very useful. Typically, a 
respondent that felt positive towards the interview was ready to help me to 
arrange a meeting with his acquaintance in another enterprise (of the same 
branch or situated near by).
To ensure that the interviewed really had information, which addressed my 
specific problematic, senior managers dealing with personnel and social 
welfare were targeted. They were directly involved in the provision of health 
services and knew the situation better than anybody else in the enterprise. 
Occupying high positions in the management hierarchy, they had knowledge 
of the general enterprise policy as well. Finally, their attitudes were important, 
as those actors were in a position to influence decisions on health services.
Pilot study
The pilot study preceded wide-scale interviewing and was intended to:
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► test the content of the questionnaire and its layout. Pilot interviews 
revealed some shortcomings. Several questions proved to be difficult to 
respondents to understand and, thus, their wording had to be altered to give 
the interviewed a clearer idea about what was being asked;
► check how long the interview would last. It turned out that the original 
questionnaire was too long and it took much time for respondents to fill it in. 
Thus, it was shortened to 31 questions to be completed within an hour.
► probe some administrative issues, especially how to approach potential 
respondents. The most efficient way was to phone and explain the purpose of 
an interview and the aegis of interviewer. To ensure respondents' co-operation 
and understanding of the project, they were given information about the aims 
and objectives of the interviews.
Limitations of the study
The available time-money-labour force limited the scale of the study. 
Interviews were conducted by one person; no extra money was available to 
employ additional staff or to cover travelling expenses.
Managers are unlikely to allow access to their organisations unless they 
can see some commercial or personal advantage to be derived from it. That 
means that access to fieldwork was very difficult and may be hedged by many 
conditions about confidentiality. Therefore, the contents of the research 
questions were to a large extent determined by reality rather than by purely 
academic considerations.
The sample was relatively small and geographically homogeneous, 
embracing 50 Moscow industrial enterprises. While the results of the research 
were often preliminary and exploratory, they nonetheless highlighted certain 
important trends in occupational welfare in Russia.
The composition of the workforce in the sample enterprises was not 
considered. It definitely requires investigation since it might be, for example, 
suggested that enterprises have to address specifically to the health needs of 
women employees.
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Interviewed were asked if they would consent to being taped. 
Unfortunately, as no one agreed and it was difficult to put down informal 
comments of respondents in the course of interviews.
Only qualitative questions were included primarily aimed at discovering 
managers’ attitudes rather than at analysing concrete figures. The original 
intention was to ask a few factual questions within the main questionnaire. But 
during pilot interviews it became clear that when respondents were asked to 
provide detailed information they felt uncomfortable and the degree of co­
operation declined. The problem was that in answering qualitative questions 
respondents could express their own attitudes quite freely whereas it was 
necessary for them to consult someone else to complete a section on 
enterprise social expenditure. This required more cooperation on the part of 
managers, as they had to be well prepared for interviews. It was also evident 
that respondents were not always sure what type of information they could 
disclose to an outsider without permission of a higher authority.3
At the inception of the project the objective was to include both enterprises 
with health services and those providing voluntary health insurance (VHI). But 
the clarification interviews made it clear that enterprises providing VHI could 
not be included into the survey because of the following reasons.
First, the information available to the public on VHI, including official 
statistics was scarce. Voluntary health insurance companies were reluctant to 
disclose information about their activities, as competition in the health 
insurance market was intensifying. I failed to find any systematic data on the 
problem, to say nothing about a complete list of industrial enterprises that had 
VHI plans; although in clarification interviews some of the representatives of 
VHI companies mentioned that they had agreements with industrial 
enterprises.
Second, the situation in the field was very unstable. It was quite easy for 
an enterprise to cancel VHI agreement or to change insurance company.
J The World Bank survey faced the same problem. As Lee (1996) noted, in general, the responce rate for the 
qualitative section o f the survey was better than the quantitative section, the most sensitive questions being 
financial detail, costs and profit structure.
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There was an association of voluntary health insurance companies but it 
refused to participate in my study.
Third, from the clarification interviews with voluntary health insurance 
companies’ employees (5 altogether) it became apparent that VHI was more 
likely to be purchased by new organisations such as Russian banks and 
foreign firms. They usually had a healthy financial status and, therefore, could 
afford VHI. Thus, the impulse to buy VHI for employees came from the top 
with no real pressure from the rank and file. Russian management in foreign 
companies typically did not have much say in decision-making as everything 
was done along the external corporate headquarters' guidelines.
In the end, taking all these factors into consideration interviews were 
conducted only in those enterprises that had health care facilities.
The problem of bias
One positive thing to be mentioned is that there was a very low probability 
for bias in answers. In Russia the issue of CHI is not politically sensitive and 
respondents had no restrictions or fears of any sanction that might have been 
imposed on them. They could freely express their own points of view without 
being constrained as, first, the problem was acknowledged to be controversial 
and different views were tolerated, and, second, the interviewer did her best 
not to express her own attitude. There were no loyalty or status barriers 
between the interviewer and informants since all of them had university 
degrees and were equal professionally.
Case Studies
Two case studies supplement the survey results by going beyond the 
confines of a structured interview and probing more in-depth analysis. It 
permitted me to obtain a greater feel for the dynamics involved in decisions to 
supply health care at enterprise level.
Originally, I had no plans to use methods other than interviews. The fact 
that it was difficult for me as an independent researcher to get access to 
enterprises prompted me to make use of case studies. I also turned to a case
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study as a method of social investigation that has the following advantages 
compared with the survey.
In a survey a researcher must at a certain point commit oneself to a 
questionnaire, which limits the type of information that he/she can collect while 
the case studies allow to modify the research design in the process of work. 
Survey research seldom deals with the context of social life or helps to 
develop the real feel for the life situation in which respondents think and act. 
Whilst the questionnaire based on one enterprise -  one respondent approach 
is very useful in obtaining a substantial body of information which is 
comparable, such method limits a fuller understanding of all the aspects of the 
functioning of an individual enterprises and deeper explanations of propensity 
to supply occupational welfare provisions. The case study is a widely used tool 
of exploratory research that gives a greater flexibility in data collection and 
analysis. Closer observation enables the investigator to study nuances in 
attitudes and behaviour.
Accordingly, two enterprises were studied in greater detail. The selected 
enterprises were different in many respects, including history of health 
services provision. One enterprise is well known for its health arrangements; 
the other started to build up health services in the early 1990s. The only 
evident common factor was that they both did provide health services for 
employees. This permitted me to look for similarities and differences and to 
discover what managers of the chosen enterprises shared in terms of 
behaviour patterns. They were ready to provide more information and afford 
me more time and demonstrated a high degree of co-operation.
The case studies used various methods of data gathering: direct 
observation, interviews with managers at different levels of authority, 
interviews with managerial staff at the enterprises health services (doctors and 
nurses), analysis of documentary sources made available through enterprises 
and press. Intensive examination of the selected enterprises helped to better 
understand the current situation concerning their health centres as managers' 
beliefs and attitudes were expressed within a more closely examined social 
context. The findings of the case studies might not be universally applicable,
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but they do contribute to a deeper understanding of the real social relations 
within enterprises.
Additional sources of information
In order to verify the data collected during the field research findings of 
several other surveys relevant to the subject have been used as valuable 
supplementary contextual material.
No special survey of enterprise health or social services in Russia had 
been discovered. Among many studies of industrial enterprises focused on 
their economic behaviour in the new environment, only two incorporated 
substantial sections on occupational welfare:
► survey carried out in 1991-1992 and in 1993-1994, outcomes being 
reported by Dolgopyatova (AonronaTOBa, 1995).
► "Monitoring of Status and Behaviour of Enterprises", a survey of 433 
industrial enterprises conducted by the Ministry of Economy (MuHMCTepcTBO 
3Ko h o m h k m , 1995) to monitor the status and behaviour of Russian industrial 
establishments.
One of its objectives was to collect information on enterprise social 
facilities such as kindergartens, housing, leisure, health care and education. 
Only about half of respondents answered "social" questions, 149 of them 
reported having health centres.
However, the research team acknowledged some methodological 
shortcomings. First, the data were sporadic and did not allow revealing any 
long-term tendencies in the development of social plans. Second, the volume 
of information on social issues received in the course of the survey proved 
insufficient to analyse economic and financial aspects of the functioning of 
enterprise social assets.
The surveys conducted by researchers on foreign companies like, for 
example, the one by Green and colleagues (1986) were studied as well. 
Though having no direct relevance to the Russian reality they, nevertheless, 
demonstrated general trends in the development of occupational welfare in a 
market economy.
Besides, the following surveys were especially valuable.
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1. The World Bank survey of 435 Russian industrial enterprises conducted 
in 1994 (Commander, Fan and Schaffer, 1996). Its aim was to study how 
enterprises adjusted to the shocks of economic transition. The sample was 
stratified by form of ownership, regions and industries. 50 of the sample 
enterprises belonged to the so-called de novo firms-- newly- established ones. 
The questionnaire consisted of 39 quantitative and 89 qualitative questions.
2. Survey carried out by a team headed by I.Tratch, M.Rein and 
A.Worgotter in 1995 (Tratch and colleagues, 1996). The interview team visited 
97 enterprises in Russian regions and was focused on investigating the role of 
social assets between 1989 and 1995.
3. TACIS (Technical Assistance to Commonwealth of Independent States) 
survey covering 92 enterprises in five regions was conducted in 1998 by the 
team of TACIS experts as a part of the project "Social consequences of 
economic reforms and privatisation in Russia" (BuHorpaAOBa (Vinogradova), 
1998 (a), 1998 (b)).
Though these surveys were not centred on health care, exploring, in the 
first instance, housing and child care facilities, they proved to be very helpful in 
formulating hypothesis to be tested through field studies and conceptualising 
evidence from the field.
Conclusions
Formulation of the field research project and its design was not as easy 
task. The study addresses quite specific topics that guided the actual 
collection and analysis of the available data: novelty of the subject itself for 
Russian researcher; scarcity, fragmentation or lack of Russian literature, 
information on enterprises and official statistics were main impediments. For 
financial and organisational reasons the project was limited to Moscow 
industrial establishments.
The overarching aim of the empirical investigation was to get a better 
understanding of what is happening in the field of occupational welfare in 
contemporary Russia. In collecting the data the focus was made on attitudes 
of senior managers' of industrial enterprises to recent health reforms and
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employers' health responsibilities, their motives for keeping enterprise-based 
health centres. For this purpose qualitative analysis is believed to represent 
the most suitable research strategy.
Interviews and case studies were main research instruments used. Each 
of them is focused on a specific data source and represents a certain facet of 
the subject investigated. On one hand, survey in general has advantages in 
terms of economy and the amount as well as standardisation of data to be 
collected. Moreover, fewer incomplete questionnaires and fewer 
misunderstood questions, generally higher return rates and greater flexibility in 
terms of sampling and special observations represent special strength of 
interviews. On the other hand, case study gives an opportunity to gain a full 
sense of social processes in their natural settings. It is argued that, taken 
together, they give a representative picture of the role of enterprise health 
centres in the protection of the workers' health in contemporary Russia.
Realisation of the project had its own difficulties. It was a one-person 
endeavour with all ensuing consequences. To make up a sample of 
enterprises, to establish contacts with a great number of busy people some of 
whom were, moreover, not very eager to cooperate or disclose information 
needed, to process quite a bulk of material and to do technical work required 
time and efforts. But regardless of all that and a lot of drawbacks, I hope to 
have made an unpretentious contribution to achievement of rather an 
ambitious, as I see now; aim to pioneer the study of occupational welfare in 
Russia to introduce my country into academic turnover on the subject. 
Readers of the thesis when forming an opinion about it will have to keep the 
abovementioned in mind.
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Chapter 9
Compulsory Health Insurance, Enterprises and Their Health 
Centres: Managers' Attitude
Chapter 9 presents empirical evidence collected during the survey carried 
out in 1995-1997 in 50 Moscow enterprises providing health services in-kind 
for employees. Its aim was to examine health services in industrial 
establishments in the context of social and health policy and present status of 
occupational welfare in Russia with due account taken of changing aims and 
methods of health policy and enterprise behaviour. It discloses managers' 
attitude to compulsory health insurance as an important element of 
environment in which workers' health protection develops, the role of 
enterprises in the national health care system and place of employer-based 
health services.
1. Managers in the sample
General remarks.
Senior personnel and social welfare managers were selected for 
interviews on the following grounds. First, as a part of senior management 
they had a real chance to participate in taking decisions on enterprise health 
policy. Second, they were directly involved in personnel and social welfare 
matters and knew situation around health centres better than other senior 
members of the staff. This part of managerial staff had influence in the field 
both as decision makers and opinion formers.
In all enterprises in the sample personnel/ social welfare work was 
established as a separate specialist function, but to define exactly the 
activities of personnel department was not easy. The scope of responsibilities 
as well as the status and title of the head of personnel / social welfare 
department and his / her position in the management structure varied in 
different enterprises. There was no common standard applicable throughout 
an industry. Organisation and size of enterprise affected the way personnel/
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social welfare department fitted into policy and decision making process of an 
enterprise.
According to their position in enterprises the interviewed were divided into 
two groups. One group was comprised of deputy directors on personnel and 
social welfare who are the second level from top in enterprise hierarchy. The 
second group consisted of heads of personnel/ social welfare departments. 
Though their status was lower than in the first case they reported directly to 
directors of enterprises and were among five or ten key administrators forming 
a group of senior managers.
The objectives of personnel officers' activities were to ensure the 
adequate supply of labour in terms of quantity and skills; to develop and 
maintain a level of morale and human relationships, which would evoke willing 
and full cooperation of employees in attaining optimum operational 
performance.
To fulfil their task personnel / social welfare departments in Moscow 
industrial enterprises were typically responsible for:
• salary and wage administration;
• education and training;
• staffing;
• full observance of legislation relating to employment;
• employees' welfare.
Personnel / social welfare is generally identified as an element of support 
function as opposed to the task function. Task function is basic performance 
related to the actual completion of the productive process or directed towards 
specific and definable results. Support function underpins the former and does 
not normally have any direct accountability for achieving a specific task end.
The personnel/ social welfare element in Russian industrial enterprises 
has some special characteristics. Industrial occupations are not prestigious: 
working conditions in industry are often bad. At the same time the level of 
unemployment is high. Therefore, recruitment of workers is not a big problem 
especially in a situation when many of the surveyed enterprises have cut 
labour force in recent years. No sophisticated procedures are applied to hire a
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worker. Managerial positions seem to be more attractive but very often 
mechanisms of "personal connections" are used rather than objective criteria 
are used to get the job.
Age, gender and education
Three personal characteristics of managers were examined in the survey: 
gender, age and education.
Table 9.1.
Managers in the sample by age, gender and education, number of
respondents, N=50
Gender 30 -  female 20 -  male
Age 10-31-40 
years old
30-41-50 
years old
10-51-60 
years old
Educational
backgrounds
35 -  polytechnic 15 -  social 
science
Table 9.1 shows the composition of the sample by these characteristics. 
60 per cent of respondents were women and 40 per cent men, or just the 
opposite ratio to gender distribution of manpower in Russian industry where 
the share of women is 40 per cent compared to about 60 per cent of men.
Gender issues were not addressed specifically in the study as in Russia 
gender problems until recently has never been included in mainstream 
research. And not only in this country. Mullins (1993), for example, noted that 
in the West women had tended to be overlooked within many classical studies 
on organisations and motivation, which either focused on men or avoided 
interpretation of gender divisions.
The number of women in workforce was traditionally high in Russia, but 
they rarely occupied high managerial positions and men dominated in the 
administrative hierarchy. From this point of view women in the sample were 
quite successful in professional career.
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Managers in the sample were well educated: 70 per cent graduated from 
polytechnic universities and 30 per cent had degrees in social sciences. It is 
an unusual situation: one of the studies of personnel departments conducted 
in 1989 found out that only 58.7 per cent of their heads had graduate degrees 
(MacnoB (Maslov), 1995).
The fact can be explained by several reasons. First, the majority of 
respondents were women. Employment statistics disclosed that the share of 
the employed with university degrees among women in Russia is higher than 
among men -  15.6 per cent and 18.5 percent, respectively, in 1995 
(rocKOMCTaT (Goskomstat), 1996). Second, Moscow is a big educational 
centre and the level of education of its population is higher than the country 
average. Finally, positions of personnel/social welfare managers are attractive 
to many people with graduate degrees who worked in organisations either 
closed down due to economic crisis, or paying low wages.
The study revealed no significant influence of gender on education (see 
Table 9.2). It arises from the fact that men and women in Russia have equal 
rights to education and there is no discrimination between them, except in 
some occupations perceived to be typically male ones (military, police, etc.).
Table 9.2.
Composition of the sample by gender and education,
% of respondents, N=50
Gender Education Total
polytechnic humanities
Men -  count 15 5 20
% within men 75 25 100
% within education 42.9 33.3
Women -  count 20 10 30
% within women 66.7 33.3 100
% within 
education
57.1 66.7
Total 35 15 50
% within education 70 30 100
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However, the study yielded an important result. Many respondents 
acknowledged that holding senior managerial positions in personnel and social 
welfare field they did not undergo special training and were recruited for their 
jobs from a wide variety of other professions. For example, one of the 
respondents had been a personal assistant to a very high official in a relevant 
ministry. Another one -- deputy director on personnel and social issues -- had 
taken a post of a director of one of the Moscow industrial enterprises.
Respondents on the whole felt that they lacked necessary qualifications. 
Some of them were uncomfortable about it as they recognised a need for 
enterprise to adequately respond to new challenges in the changing 
environment. Personnel departments, which responsibilities were traditionally 
restricted to record keeping and payroll monitoring, set about playing 
multidimensional role in the development of strategies of addressing the 
change.
Respondents were aware of new approaches to personnel management 
and would like to know and apply them. For example, a few interviewed 
admitted that they did not have enough skills for interviewing and using this 
technique effectively.
The curricula of managers in the Soviet educational system -  the 
overwhelming majority of respondents graduated in those times -  did not pay 
much attention to employees welfare management in enterprises. Human 
resources management as a new specialisation began to be taught in the mid 
1990s when importance of involvement and commitment of staff to aims of 
organisation was acknowledged. About the same time professional journals 
appeared, too.
Respondents formed three age groups (see Table 9.3). The biggest group
-  30 people -  included managers of 41 to 50 years old, the rest -- 20 people -
- were equally divided between 31-40 and 51-60 years of age.
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Table 9.3.
Composition of the sample by age and education,
N=50
Education Age Total
31-40 41-50 51-60
polytechnic -  count 5 25 5 35
% within polytechnic 14.3 71.4 14.3 100
% within age 50 83.3 50
humanities -  count 5 5 5 15
% within humanities 33.3 33.3 33.3 100
% within age 50 16.7 50
Total 10 30 10 50
% within age 20 60 20 100
The first and third age groups were equally divided according to education 
-  50 per cent had polytechnic and 50 per cent- social sciences degrees. More 
than 80 per cent of managers belonging to the second group- those between 
41 and 50 years old -were graduated from polytechnic universities.
Therefore, the majority of managers in the sample were educated and 
started working in the Soviet times and were mostly industrial engineers by 
education.
Managers in charge of health care were not specifically trained and came 
from different educational backgrounds. Predominance of women in the job 
might be taken as an indirect evidence of its relatively low status in top 
management. As social issues were of a marginal importance that was quite 
understandable -  they were never expected to be the main concern of 
enterprises -  social welfare function is considered the secondary one.
The well described "vicious circle" in social services (Hasenfeild, 1992) led 
to the situation when relatively low status of personnel and social welfare 
managers among management could be explained by the lack of qualifications 
that, in turn, failed to help to strengthen their role in enterprises.
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Analysis of data indicates that such personal characteristics of 
respondents like age, gender and educational backgrounds in general had 
little influence on their opinions. There were divergences in answers to some 
questions between managers of different age, gender and education but they 
did not enable to define any strong correlation: correlation coefficients 
suggested that predictable influence of these characteristics remained rather 
weak.
Managers' role in decision making on health issues 
One of the objectives of the study was to define the role of 
personnel/social welfare managers in decision-making on health issues. 
Respondents were asked to evaluate methods of participation in working out 
enterprise health policy and style of behaviour in decision-making process 
(see Table 9.4).
Table 9.4
Methods of participation and style of behaviour,
N=50
M ethods of 
participation
number
of
respondents
% o f
respondents
Style of 
behaviour
num ber of 
respondents
% o f
respondents
1 Concept
developer
15 30 9 Centrist 20 40
2 Expert-
consultant
10 20 10 Diplomat 15 30
3 H ead of 
developm ent 
team
10 20 11 Conservative
(tradition)
10 20
4 G enerator of 
ideas
5 10 12 Reform er - -
5 Critic-
opponent
5 10 13 O bserver - -
6 Analyst - - 14 Difficult to 
say
5 10
7 Project
m anager
- -
8 Difficult to 
define
5 10
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Respondents fall into three groups according to the way they participated 
in forming enterprise health policy. 15 respondents saw themselves as 
concept developers who -  unlike generators of new ideas -- worked to 
advance already agreed policies. The roles of experts-consultants or heads of 
development teams neutral in terms of initiative and responsibilities were 
taken by 20 (40 percent) managers totally. Of them 20 per cent perceived 
themselves experts-consultants. They were asked to analyse issues relating to 
employees' health protection and to make recommendations on their possible 
solutions. Those acting as heads of development teams worked to implement 
already adopted decisions.
The rest 20 per cent held an active position either generating new ideas or 
acting as opponents to enterprise health policy. It is worth noting that all 
critics/opponents did not consider the role of enterprise director in working out 
enterprise health policy equally important to that of the board of directors. 
Therefore, they were not constrained by influence of their bosses and could 
openly express their concerns. This method of participation in decision-making 
was tightly correlated with young managers (0.527**) and men (0.408**).
The interviewed did not see themselves as analysts or project managers. 
In the role of analyst personnel manager acts on his own initiative diagnosing 
problems and difficulties. Under project manager a head of a separate unit set 
up on a temporary basis for attainment of a particular task was meant. The 
survey demonstrated that such activities were not carried out in Russian 
industrial enterprises in the field of health protection.
In decision-making process respondents’ behaviour in general can be 
regarded as neutral. They evidently avoided radical options: no one 
considered himself / herself a reformer, that was a person who wanted to seek 
far going solutions of existing problems. At the same time no one thought that 
he / she was only an observer passively watching what happened in enterprise 
with health services having no active role at all. 10 respondents deemed they 
were conservative. They wished to follow traditions of their enterprises 
favouring no principal changes. Correlation coefficients suggested that such 
behaviour is likely to be demonstrated by women (0.408**).
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The majority of managers regarded themselves as diplomats or centrists. 
Diplomats -  15 respondents -- negotiated and mediated between various 
interests in enterprises. They would support decisions suitable for all parties 
concerned since avoiding conflicts was most important for them, the style of 
behaviour rather strongly associated with elder managers (0.345*).
Centrists -  20 respondents- accepted that changes were necessary, 
though not too radical. They were open to new ideas but believed that 
problems related to employees' health protection should be settled within the 
existing system.
Managers in the sample had a real possibility to affect enterprise policy on 
health centres because of their unique position in enterprises. They acted as 
specialist advisers on personnel and social welfare matters and 
implementation of respective policies through other departments of 
organisation. On one hand, they worked in close contact with other senior 
managers, in some enterprises sat on enterprise boards advising fellow 
directors on health issues. Thus, personnel and social welfare managers 
maintained a unique perspective in organisational decision-making as bearers 
of social conscience, reminding senior management of their social 
responsibilities.
On the other hand, they provided specialist knowledge and services for 
line managers to support them in performing their jobs. Personnel and social 
welfare manager was an executor of enterprise policies acting in consultation 
with and taking advice from line managers. Their concern was exclusively 
management of human assets while line managers were also involved in 
management of physical assets. To what extent line managers in surveyed 
enterprises were supported by personnel and social welfare staff was typically 
decided by the top management depending on the nature and characteristic 
features of a particular industry.
There were two groups of factors that influenced the development of 
health centres: subjective, including attitude/influence of major stakeholders, 
and objective (availability of health care provisions in-kind and financial status 
of enterprise being the most important)(see Table 9.5).
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Table 9.5.
Factors influencing development of health plans, N=50
number of 
respondents
%of
respondent
s
1 Personal attitude of director 35 70
2 Financial status of your enterprise 25 50
3 Decision of shareholders’ meeting 10 20
4 Existence of health care facilities 10 20
5 Decision of the Board 5 10
6 Pressure from employees (through 
collective agreement)
0 0
Respondents definitely considered subjective factors the most important in 
shaping enterprise policy towards health matters -  only four respondents did 
not choose one of them at all.
The majority of managers acknowledged the leading role of directors in 
developing health services. They admitted that health policy was very much 
influenced by philosophy of the top management, or, in fact, originated from 
the top of enterprises. Whatever was the scope of their responsibilities 
personnel / social welfare managers acted by consent by delegated authority 
dependent upon the standpoint of top management on duties personnel / 
social welfare managers should perform.
Ten and five respondents mentioned the important role of shareholders 
and the Boards, respectively. It is worth noting that all the respondents ignored 
the influence of employees.
As to objective factors, I expected that financial issues would be crucial in 
shaping enterprise health policy taking into account the present difficult 
financial status of an average Moscow industrial enterprise. Therefore, 50 per 
cent response rate was not as high as expected. Another interesting finding
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was that only ten respondents considered the very fact of existence of health 
centres or health stations as a factor influencing health policy in enterprises. 
The majority of managers did not feel bound by the arrangement to the extent 
that it would force them to continue health care provision.
Answering the question managers could choose several options and the 
analysis of combinations of responses gave the following results.
Nineteen managers selected only one factor, with 15 choosing only 
subjective factors (ten and five choose director and shareholders, respectively) 
versus four respondents who preferred objective factors.
Other respondents opted for two or three factors, with half of sample 
mentioning two options. The most popular combination was that of personal 
attitude of Director and financial status of enterprise (15 respondents) that was 
not at all surprising as it in principle supported the findings of other relevant 
surveys.
Analysis of responses revealed a zero correlation between gender and 
managers' attitude to the role of financial constraints in decision-making on 
health centres. It meant that gender did not influence respondents' opinions on 
the problem at all.
The mentioned above leads to the conclusion that non-economic 
subjective reasons were more important for respondents in issues of 
occupational health care than purely financial considerations.
In 30 enterprises decisions on health issues were taken by reaching 
agreement between senior managers. In turn, health problems were decided 
by those in charge, namely by directors and personnel and social welfare 
managers, in 20 enterprises in the sample. Voting procedures either at 
managerial, shareholders or employees meetings were not used at all.
Though all interviewed said that senior managers discussed among 
themselves problems related to workers health care, in the majority of 
enterprises -  60 per cent -- it happened rarely (less than once a month) while 
in 40 per cent of enterprises health issues were included in top management 
agenda on a regular basis (more than once a month).
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Therefore, only in 17 enterprises where decisions on health care were 
taken by reaching agreement between senior management health matters 
were discussed regularly. It could mean that either top managers made a team 
of people with similar viewpoints, or the stand of director was agreed to 
unconditionally managers and workers having little influence on decision­
making in this field. Health centres were an area where line managers did not 
have much to say unlike other aspects of personnel and social welfare issues 
and health care problems were likely to be resolved by top management.
It is worth noting that respondents mentioned two more officials in 
enterprises influential in shaping health policy -  a head of health centre or 
health station and a trade union leader (in industries that still had strong 
unions) -- both working in close cooperation with personnel and social affairs 
managers.
2. Industrial managers and compulsory health insurance (CHI) in 
Russia
The data in Table 9.6 shows that there is a strong belief among managers 
in the leading role of the state in health care protection. 30 respondents think 
that development of a new health system should not lead to the decrease in 
the level of the state financing. Half of the interviewed considers the state to 
be the major financier of health care meaning, first of all, the federal 
government. Managers are aware of the fact that regional authorities may 
encounter difficulties in funding health care services and do not think that CHI 
should be organised on regional basis and financed mainly by local budgets.
However, it is generally understood that other institutions in society should 
also support health care system and help the government. 25 managers, or 50 
per cent of the sample, suppose that though the state should guarantee 
provision of at least minimum of health services financial resources of regions, 
enterprises and population are also to be used in health care. At the same 
time only one fifth of respondents (ten people) explicitly acknowledged that 
enterprise CHI contributions are one of the major resources of the health care
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system. In fact, they support the present CHI scheme financed by both local
authorities and employers.
Table 9.6
Managers' attitude to CHI, N=50
number of 
respondents
%of
respondents
1 Introduction of CHI should not be 
accompanied by decrease in the level of the 
state financing.
30 60
2 The aim of CHI is to make access to health 
services easier for people.
30 60
3 Minimum health services should be 
guaranteed by the state; at that health care 
system should be built depending on financial 
resources of regions, enterprises, population.
25 50
4 CHI should level regional differences in health 
care.
15 30
5 CHI should be financed from local budgets 
and contributions of enterprises.
10 20
6 People should contribute to CHI. 5 10
7 CHI should be organised on a regional basis 
and financed mainly through local budgets.
0 0
As to personal contributions to CHI, only five respondents agree that 
people should pay for health care. The majority of managers believe that at 
present poverty is so widespread in the country that many people just cannot 
afford to spend money on health care. Thirty managers think CHI can help to 
solve the problem of access to medical treatment while 15 believe that CHI 
should eliminate regional variations in health care.
Correlation analysis reveals several interesting associations. There is a 
strong negative correlation between the two roles of the state in health care -- 
managers either speak in favour of keeping the level of budget financing, or 
advocate guaranteeing at least minimum health services (-.816**). Besides, 
the first one is also negatively associated with a possibility of people 
contributing to CHI (-.408**). Managers who believe that introduction of CHI 
should not lead to decrease in the state appropriations on health care do not 
think that individual contributions on CHI should be introduced. At the same
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time they are likely to assume that the aim of CHI is to level the regional 
differences in health care (.535**).
Better assess to health care is associated with the state guarantees of 
the provision of minimum of health services plus attracting other resources into 
health care system (.408**).
Table 9.7.
Managers on the aims of introduction of CHI, N=50
number of 
respondents
%of
respondents
1 To change the structure of health care 
financing using contributions from 
enterprises to compensate for decrease in 
the state financing
25
50
2 To increase efficiency of health care 
system 20 40
3 To introduce enterprise contributions by as 
a supplementary source of health care 
financing
15 30
4 To improve the quality of health care 15 30
5 To give patients more choice 15 30
6 To make the first step towards 
privatisation of health services. 0 0
Managers think that introduction of CHI was caused mainly by financial 
reasons though other matters were not neglected, either. It ought to be 
remembered that official debate on CHI introduction has been focused on 
issues other than financial. The overwhelming majority of managers (40 
people) believe that the main aim of the recent health reforms is to attract 
more resources into the health care system by levying contributions on 
enterprises, though evaluation of the role of such contribution varies. Among 
them 25 respondents (making 50 per cent of all interviewed) are of the opinion 
that the state wants to use money paid by employers to decrease the level of 
the state financing while the remaining 15 respondents, seem to believe the
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official policy statements considering CHI contributions to be a supplementary 
source of health care financing.
Twenty managers think that the government intends first of all to increase 
efficiency of the health care system, 15 mention improving quality of health 
care and giving patient more choice as targets of introducing CHI.
Table 9.8
Correlation matrix among managers’ opinions on the aims of
introduction of CHI
Enterprise
contributions
as
supplementary
source
Change the 
structure of 
health care 
financing
Improve 
quality of 
health care
Give patients 
more choice.
Increase
efficiency
Enterprise
contributions
as
supplementary
source
1.000
Change the 
structure of 
health care 
financing
1.000
Improve quality 
of health care
-.429** 1.000
Give patients 
more choice.
-.429** .524** 1.000
Increase
efficiency
-.535** -.408** .802** .802** 1.000
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Table 9.8 presents a simple correlation matrix of managers’ opinion on the 
aims of introduction of CHI. Regarding efficiency as the main reason for CHI is 
very strongly correlated with improving quality of care and giving patients more 
choice. At the same time it is negatively associated with changing the structure 
of health care financing and using enterprise contributions as a supplementary 
source of funds. The latter is, in turn, negatively correlated with giving patients 
more choice and improving quality of care.
This indicates that managers, according to their opinions on the aims of 
introduction of CHI, fall into two groups. One is definitely more concerned with 
financial aspects of CHI reforms and the role of enterprise in their financing;
199
that is with factors, directly affecting the life of their organisations. Members of 
the second group pay much more attention to other, non-financial issues, 
related to actual functioning of the health care system.
Managers regard it inconceivable that the state may go so far as to 
privatise health services. They consider privatisation to be an equivalent to 
commercialisation and, thus, introduction of fees for services. It once again 
stresses the fact that the state is still viewed as the main provider of health 
services.
Table 9.9
Managers’ view on the role of CHI bodies, N=50
number of 
respondents
%of
respondents
1 These are one of the many bureaucratic 
structures
20 40
2 Health insurance companies use CHI for 
their own purposes, they hardly serve the 
interests of society
20 40
3 This is a reliable system, useful for people 10 20
4 Have not yet got any particular opinion 0 0
The general impressions managers have got about CHI bodies are quite 
negative (see table 9.9). They seem to be suspicious of the activities of CHI 
funds and health insurance companies. Twenty interviewees are sure that they 
are yet another bunch of bureaucratic structures caring about their own 
interests first. In managers' opinion, these bodies serve their own purpose 
ignoring interests of society. Only ten respondents believe that CHI bodies can 
be trusted and can help to improve the present status of health care system in 
the interests of population.
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Table 9.10
Managers on health insurance companies, N = 50
number of 
respondents
%of
respondents
1 The right to carry out compulsory health 
insurance should be given only to state or 
municipal-owned firms.
30 60
2 Private health insurance companies are more 
interested in money turnover, their activities 
should be under the strict scrutiny.
15 30
3 Establishment of private companies only will 
allow at the first stage to overcome a residual 
principle of health care financing and to create 
favourable conditions for CHI development
5 10
Evaluating the role of health insurance companies managers believe that 
private ones are more interested in gaining profit than caring about people's 
needs. Therefore, the state should control the activities of CHI agencies. As 
table 9.10 shows, the majority of respondents suggest that CHI should be run 
by either the state or municipally owned organisations. Five managers think 
that only setting up private health insurance companies will enable the new 
system to reach its aims.
Table 9.11.
Managers' evaluation of the activities of various bodies in health care
reform, number of respondents; N=50
Positive Rather
positive
Rather
negative
Negative Can’t
say
Have
no
information
President - - 10 15 — 25
Federal
Assembly
- - - 15 5 25
Ministry
Health
of 10 5 5 10 20
Federal
fund
CHI - 5 5 5 10 25
Local authorities - 5 - 5 35 5
Moscow
fund
CHI - 10 5 - 35 -
Local employers 5 10 - - 30 5
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Assessment of performance of various actors in reforming health care 
system in Russia, including federal and local authorities, turned out to be a 
difficult task for managers. Many of them acknowledge having no sufficient 
information to make competent conclusions (see Table 9.11). Thirty five 
respondents have no opinion on the role of the Moscow CHI fund and local 
authorities in promoting health reforms. Five managers do not seem to know 
anything about the activities of Federal Assembly -  they just skip the relevant 
option. It means that the state bodies do not communicate their decisions to 
employers who are not considered by the state as players in the field of 
occupational welfare.
The higher the level of authorities the more negatively respondents 
evaluate their activities. Ministry of Health and local employers are the only 
two bodies that get rather strong positive evaluations, though by the minority 
of the respondents. It is evidently perceived that since the Ministry of Health is 
responsible for health care then it should perform a positive role in protection 
of population health. Besides, almost no exchange of information between 
employers on health issues is carried out and managers typically do not know 
what other employers in their locality are doing in health care provision. As a 
result, 30 managers cannot evaluate the role of other employers in their area. 
Fifteen respondents who assess employers' role in positive terms seem to 
judge by their own activities in the field.
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Table 9.12
Managers on the state of CHI in Moscow,
number of respondents; N=50
1 Formation of CHI system has 
been completed
5 2 Formation of CHI system 
has not yet been completed
30
3 Regional financing 
mechanism has been 
established
4 Regional financing 
mechanism is not yet 
working
20
5 CHI covers only those 
employed
20 6 CHI covers the majority of 
population
10
7 CHI compensate for only 
some treatment
15 8 CHI compensate for almost 
all types of medical 
treatment.
10
9 Only few health services 
joined CHI
10 The majority of health 
services joined CHI
25
11 Have no idea about the 
organisation of CHI system 
in Moscow
Many respondents found it difficult to comment on the stage of 
development of CHI in Moscow. Two polar options covering such major issues 
in the field as coverage and financing have been offered. The response rate is 
low compared to other questions and answers clearly indicated that in general 
managers do not know much on what exactly is going on in the Moscow health 
system. For example, only 20 of them risk answering the question on the 
regional mechanism of CHI financing mechanism. Their perceptions about the 
stage of CHI development in Moscow are quite vague and sometimes even 
wrong. For example, half of managers are sure that the majority of health 
services in Moscow have joined CHI that is not exactly the case. Twenty 
respondents believe that CHI covers only the employed while in Moscow the 
whole population is insured. It can be suggested that managers understanding 
of CHI functioning in Moscow is influenced by enterprise relations with CHI. 
when their real participation in CHI is limited to paying regular contributions.
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Table 9.13
Managers on factors hampering introduction of CHI, N=50.
number of 
respondents
% of
respondents
1 Decrease in enterprises' profits 40 80
2 Incompetence of Moscow authorities. 10 20
3 Political instability 10 20
4 Lack of legislative regulations. 10 20
5 Lack of interest on the part of Moscow 
authorities.
5 10
6 Nothing hampers. 5 10
7 Hard to say. 5 10
The responses summarised in Table 9.13 can be grouped around three 
issues. First, the majority of managers consider financial problems, especially 
decrease in enterprise profit, the most important among the reasons 
hampering CHI development in Moscow. It should also be noted, that 20 
managers, or 40 per cent, selected this answer as the only one option.
This is the major problem for industrial enterprises as poor financial status 
not simply impedes the operation of health programmes but threatens their 
very existence. The state of Moscow industry has declined and the level of 
industrial output decreases. In 1997 for the industry as a whole it amounted to 
only 33 per cent of the 1992 level. In fact, the crisis in Moscow industry is 
worse than in the country in general. Heavy industry suffered most -- the level 
of output in 1997 reached only 9.35 per cent of the 1992 level. On the 
contrary, food-processing industry turned out to be less hit by the crisis. As a 
result the structure of industry in Moscow changed. For the period of 1992- 
1997 the share of machine building and metallurgy decreased almost twofold - 
from 43 per cent in 1992 to 22 per cent in 1997 while the share of food- 
processing industry increased from 15 per cent to 30 per cent.
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Second, unexpectedly, political instability, another important feature of 
modern Russian life, has been mentioned by only 10 respondents. Besides, it 
always goes in a package: all the managers who consider it as a factor 
running against CHI also mention lack of legislative regulations and financial 
status of enterprises. Third, 13 managers choose the activities of local 
authorities as main impediments of CHI reform linking their incompetence with 
the lack of interest in introducing CHI.
3. Role of enterprise in health care with reference to the recent health 
care reforms
One of the aims of the interviews was to find out what managers thought 
about division of health responsibilities in society.
Table 9.14
Managers on division of health responsibilities. N=50
number of 
respondents
%of
respondents
1 The state should assume the whole 
responsibility for health care of its citizens
30 60
2 Employers should contribute to health care 
of employees; it is their social responsibility.
25 50
3 Employers could take part in health 
protection of employees, but only in case 
they have financial resources.
20 40
4 Every person should take care about his/her 
own health.
10 20
5 Expenses on health protection of employees 
are additional non-productive expenditures.
5 10
6 Issues related to employees' health 
protection are beyond employer’s 
responsibilities.
0 0
According to data in Table 9.14 there are two institutions in society, which, 
in managers' opinion, should bear responsibility for the health of the
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employed. The state comes the first with 30 respondents saying that it should 
assume the whole responsibility for health care. Enterprises are the second -  
25 managers believe that it is employers' social responsibility to contribute to 
health protection of employees. Twenty respondents think that employers 
should participate in health programmes only if they have financial means 
while no one explicitly acknowledges that employers should not be concerned 
with employees' health at all.
Perhaps most significant is the combination of opinions. Managers 
typically agree with two statements -38 people all together -  of them 24 
mention the state and employers, 9 -  individual and employers and 5 -  only 
employers.
It is important to note that these five respondents (or 10 per cent of the 
sample) that exclude employers select only one option. Four managers think 
that the state is the most important protector of health status of the working, 
and one manager believes that it is an individual who should care about 
his/her own health. On the other hand, 10 managers, who selected two 
options, do not mention the state. Five of them think about the significant role 
of individuals and social obligation of employers while the other five mention 
only employers but stress the importance of the financial dimension. Here five 
more managers should be added who agree with only one statement, that 
employers should provide health protection only if they have finances.
It should be noted that financial resources and unproductive expenses are 
tightly correlated (.408**). Those who think that health protection expenses are 
not productive - - 10  per cent of managers -  nevertheless agree that if 
employers have financial resources they should participate in workers' health 
protection
It is not surprising that there is quite strong negative correlation between 
the role of the state and individual in health protection (-.612**), meaning that 
managers are likely to favour either the state, or an individual.
Managers who think of employers' participation in health protection as a 
social obligation do not typically have any financial considerations in mind 
(.816**). In fact, they agree that employers should try to carry on their health
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Iresponsibility regardless of the financial status of enterprises. On the other 
hand, managers that are concerned with financial issues seem to be more 
practical and do not approach their role in health care in terms of health/social 
responsibility. There are also significant negative correlations between the role 
of the state, on one hand, and importance of enterprise financial status (- 
.583**) and productivity considerations (-.408**) on the other hand. Managers 
in these cases are likely to be more inside oriented, relying first of all on 
capacities of their enterprises rather than appealing for support from other 
institutions in society.
Table 9.15.
Degree of enterprise participation in health protection of employees.
number of respondents, N=50.
Fully Considerably Partially To some 
extent
Not at all Hard to 
say
0 0 35 10 0 5
Table 9.15 shows that most managers do not think that participating in 
CHI as it is organised now they fulfil their responsibilities as employers in 
health protection of employees in full measure meaning, in fact, that more can 
be done. In general, respondents are very cautious in evaluating their role: no 
one agreed with the extreme options answers concentrating around neutral 
ones.
Introduction of CHI contributions have influenced the attitude of 40 
respondents towards the role of employers in health protection of employees. 
But the extent of such influence is not significant as only 15 managers 
evaluate it as "considerable" with about the same number saying "very little"; 
twenty of them choose neutral opinions (see Table 9.16)
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Table 9.16.
Managers on influence of CHI on their attitude towards employees'
health protection,
number of respondents; N=50
To a great 
extent
To a 
considerable 
extent
To some 
extent
Very little Not at all Hard to 
say
0 15 20 15 0 0
Therefore, introduction of CHI seems to bring little changes into managers' 
attitudes towards enterprise health care responsibilities. If there is any change 
it is evidently in favour of an additional effort to be undertaken to protect 
employees' health as certified by data in Table 9.17.
Table 9.17
Managers on employers’ health responsibilities, N=50
number of 
respondents
%of
respondents
1 Employers should undertake more effort to 
protect their employees’ health, CHI is not 
enough
45 90
2 Employers should be more active in CHI 
system
5 10
3 Employers should rely on CHI. 0 0
The overwhelming majority of managers think they should do more for 
their employees, as CHI is not enough to secure good health status of 
workers. No one believe that employers can fully rely on CHI. Only five 
interviewees suggest that employers should develop more initiative in 
establishing good communications with CHI bodies to use the possibilities 
which might arise within CHI.
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Table 9.18.
Managers on the role of employers in CHI, N=50
number of 
respondents
% of
respondents
1 Employers should have financial concessions 
in CHI system provided they finance their 
own health care plans.
25 50
2 Employers should deal with health insurance 
companies directly without any 
intermediaries.
20 40
3 Employers should have the right to choose 
between health insurance companies.
15 30
4 Employers should provide voluntary health 
insurance.
10 20
5 Present system is ok: employers should only 
pay CHI contributions.
10 20
6 Employers should directly participate in 
taking decisions on CHI.
5 10
The role employers can play in CHI system and opportunities the latter 
provides for enterprises are viewed differently (see table 9.18). First of all, only 
10 respondents think that the present system is ok and there is a need for any 
initiative on the part of enterprises. It means that the majority of managers (40 
people) are ready to consider changes in the way enterprises participate in 
CHI. Though only five managers are prepared to go as far as to participate in 
making decisions on organisation and financing of CHI. Managers typically 
favour certain changes. For example, 20 of then would prefer to deal with 
health insurance companies directly without any intermediates, practically 
bringing CHI funds to naught. This is, in fact, the way it was stipulated in the 
first CHI regulations (see figure 2 Appendix A). The right to choose between 
the health insurance companies appeals to 15 managers.
Two findings are rather unexpected. First, as much as 10 managers 
consider a possibility to pay for voluntary health insurance. Therefore, it is 
surprising that the idea of voluntary health insurance enjoys some popularity
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among managers as all sample enterprises have in-kind health care 
arrangements. The plausible explanation may come from the fact that 
participation in CHI decision making is more tightly associated with voluntary 
health insurance (.667**) than with working without intermediaries (.408**) to 
say nothing about the right to get financial concessions (.333*). It can be 
suggested that for those managers who are likely to favour voluntary health 
insurance it is, first of all, a possibility to influence actively the decision making 
process that counts. They feel that it is much more likely to happen in VHI 
than in CHI.
Second, all surveyed enterprises provide in one form or another health 
services for their employees but only half of the respondents is in favour of 
financial concessions in CHI system in case an enterprise owns health care 
facilities. It is even more surprising as the majority of managers complain 
about financial difficulties experienced by their enterprises. The analysis of 
managers' attitude towards CHI contributions can to a certain extend clarify 
this situation.
Table 9.19.
Managers on CHI contributions, N=50
number of respondents % of respondents
1 Earmarked tax 25 50
2 Ordinary tax 15 30
3 Rather social obligation 10 20
Table 9.19 demonstrates that managers in their majority treat CHI 
contributions as a tax, either ordinary or earmarked; therefore, they do not 
differ from other payments enterprises have to make. Only 10 respondents 
think of them as an expression of their social obligations.
Managers fail to comprehend that CHI contributions are, in fact, their input 
into the health care system, which supply services to their employees as well. 
The majority of respondents reject the idea of employees' right for preferential 
treatment in CHI (10 managers have no opinion on the matter) overlooking the
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fact that enterprises’ contributions amount to a significant share of CHI 
resources.
Table 9.20.
Managers on the amount of CHI contributions, N=50
number of 
respondent 
s
%of
respondent
s
1 Increase 20 40
2 Remain the same 5 10
3 Decrease 10 20
4 Can’t answer/ difficult to predict 15 30
Assessing what is likely to happen in the nearest future with CHI 
contributions few managers believe that they will remain the same while about 
one third find it difficult to predict (see table 9.20). Twenty respondents predict 
they increase while ten managers are of the opinion that they will decrease.
In their comments nearly all respondents have economic crises in mind. 
But they interpret it differently. The argument of those who think CHI 
contributions will increase is: "The state has no money — it needs to raise 
more". It means that 20 respondents are quite sure that the state will first of all 
pursue its interest at the expense of enterprises. On the contrary, those who 
think CHI contributions will decrease suggest that "enterprises just can't pay 
more!»
The overwhelming majority of managers -  45 people -  do not think that 
employees should contribute to CHI. But five respondents who agree are 
concerned about how much employees should contribute. No one think that 
employees should pay more that employers. The answers are almost equally 
divided between "as much as employers" and "less than employers" with a 
slight prevalence of the latter (40 per cent and 50 per cent, accordingly).
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Table 9.21.
Managers on the role of enterprise in the health care system, N=50
number of 
respondents
%of
respondents
1 An enterprise should pay for medical 
services for employees in case of 
emergency.
35 70
2 An enterprise could at its own discretion 
participate in voluntary health insurance in 
addition to CHI.
35 70
3 An enterprise could at its own discretion 
participate in health insurance programmes 
with the right to opt out of CHI.
25 50
4 An enterprise might provide medical 
services in- kind for employees with the right 
to opt out of CHI.
20 40
5 Budget medicine financed from general 
taxation should be preserved
15 30
6 An enterprise should participate in CHI as it 
is organised by the state at present.
7 An enterprise is obliged by law to finance 
and administer its own health insurance 
plans with state-organised health care 
covering only some categories of population 
(disabled, unemployed).
10 10
At present enterprises participate in the state-organised CHI. However, 
there are several other options available (see Table 9.21). The most popular 
view shared by 35 respondents is that enterprises should help their employees 
financially in case of emergency. It is understandable as in Moscow many 
clinics, especially hospitals, officially charge for services they provide. 
Voluntary health insurance is also mentioned by 35 managers. Both choices, 
in fact, have one implication -  managers do not consider any serious changes 
in enterprise position in the CHI system as both options imply that the system
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of CHI stays unchanged while enterprises have to undertake additional 
measures to protect the health of their employees.
Quite a number of respondents think that enterprises should have the right 
to opt out of the system of CHI in case they either at own discretion participate 
in other health insurance programmes or provide medical services in kind for 
their employees. A relatively strong correlation between the two options should 
be noted (.408**). It can be suggested that in both cases exit from CHI matters 
more for managers rather than concrete ways of doing so (either having own 
health centres or concluding insurance agreements).
Only five managers would prefer the most radical variant when an 
enterprise is obliged by law to finance and administer its own health insurance 
plans while the state-organised health care system covers only some 
disadvantaged groups of population (disabled, unemployed). In this case they 
are unlikely to pay employees for emergency medical treatment elsewhere (. - 
.509**) or participate in voluntary health insurance in addition to CHI (-.509**). 
Supplementary voluntary health insurance is also negatively correlated with 
paying for medical services for employees in case of emergency. Managers 
seem to believe that arranging for supplementary health insurance or financing 
and administering occupational health insurance plans will allow them to better 
care about the health needs of their workers who will not need to look for 
medical treatment elsewhere.
Managers' ranking of their views on the role of enterprise in the health 
care system is definitely quite instructive. Table 9.22 shows that 20 of them 
consider provision of health services in- kind with the right to opt out of CHI as 
the first option.
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Table 9.22.
Ranking of the responses presented in Table 9.21,
number of respondents, N=50.
Rank 1 (first choice! Rank 2 (second choice! Rank 3 (third choice!
option option % option %
4. An enterprise 
might provide 
medical services in 
kind for employees 
with a right in such 
a case to opt out of 
CHI.
20 3. An enterprise 
could at its own 
discretion
participate in health 
insurance
programmes with a 
right in such a case 
to opt out of CHI.
20 1. An enterprise 
should pay for 
medical services for 
employees in case of 
emergency.
20
2. An enterprise 
could at its own 
discretion 
participate in 
voluntary health 
insurance in 
addition to CHI.
15 2. An enterprise 
could at its own 
discretion
participate in 
voluntary health 
insurance in 
addition to CHI.
15 3. An enterprise 
could at its own 
discretion participate 
in health insurance 
programmes with a 
right in such a case 
to opt out of CHI.
10
5. The state 
system should be 
preserved, 
financed from the 
general budget 
revenues
10 6. An enterprise 
should participate in 
CHI as it is 
organised by the 
state at present.
10 2. An enterprise 
could at its own 
discretion participate 
in voluntary health 
insurance in addition 
to CHI
4. An enterprise 
might provide 
medical services in 
kind for employees 
with a right in such a 
case to opt out of 
CHI.
5
5
Though voluntary health insurance is the most frequently mentioned 
option though only 15 managers choose it as the first or second preference 
and 5 managers -- as the third option. It is in an obvious contradiction with 
opinions of 45 respondents who do not plan to introduce voluntary health 
insurance.
But this situation might be better understood if one looks at a possibility for 
employers to participate in health insurance plans with the right to opt out of 
CHI. Twenty respondents rank it as the second and 10 as the third choice. It
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may be suggested that an idea of having enterprise own programme appeal to 
managers as they already have experience of managing health services, the 
only difference being that now they provide health services in-kind rather than 
use insurance mechanisms.
Though the majority of respondents mention paying for medical treatment 
of employees in case of emergency, it is ranked only as a third option by 10 
respondents. On the contrary, the idea that the old system, when health care 
was tax financed, should be preserved has rather strong advocates -  about 
70 per cent of the managers who select this option place it as their first choice.
Ten managers do not see a need for any change; they think that 
enterprise should continue to participate in the CHI as it is organised at 
present. It, by the way, coincides with the number of respondents who believe 
that the place of enterprises occupy in the present CHI system is acceptable 
and they should continue just to pay CHI contributions (see Table 9.22).
Table 9.23
Managers on their influence in CHI system,
number of respondents; N=50.
To a great 
extent
To some 
extent
Very little Not at 
all
Hard to 
say
1 Moscow CHI Fund 0 0 30 10 10
2 Moscow 
Department 
of Health
0 0 30 10 10
3 Local authorities 
in your area
0 0 30 10 10
Table 9.23 indicates that managers are very sceptical about their influence 
on the adoption of decisions by legislative and executive bodies, concerning 
participation of enterprises in health protection of their employees. Answers 
appear to be quite uniform. Thirty respondents mention that their influence on 
policy of such institutions as Moscow CHI Fund, Moscow Department of 
Health or local authorities in their area is very little while 10 think they have no 
influence at all. Share of those who find it difficult to answer this question is 
relatively big -  10 managers.
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iTable 9.24
Managers on the need of employers’ associations, N=50
number of 
respondents
%of
respondents
1 This is the task of Federal and local Funds 
of CHI
25 50
2 It is necessary to better use organisations 
at the industry level
15 30
3 The creation of special associations in a 
new form is desirable
10 20
In managers’ opinion, the special bodies should first of all settle health 
care problems; this is the aim of establishment of the system of CHI funds. 
The other half of respondents allows for more active role of enterprises and is 
divided into two groups. Some managers (15 people) are sure that better use 
of employers’ organisations established at an industry level can help them to 
solve problems of employees’ health protection. On the contrary, 10 
respondents do not trust much already established organisations and speak in 
favour of creating new ones that will contribute to improvement of the
situation.
Table 9.25
Managers on functions of employers’ associations, N=50
number of 
respondents
%of
respondents
1 Representation of your interests on local 
level
30 60
2 Representation of your interest on national 
level on strategic issues
10 20
3 Nomination of employers’ representatives 
to the Boards of CHI funds.
10 20
4 Administration and finance of local health 
plans
10 20
5 Use jointly local and ministerial health 
facilities
5 10
6 Organisation of commercial activities in 
health and health insurance
5 10
7 Promotion of international projects and 
links
0 0
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Among the functions that employers’ associations can perform, the 
majority of managers (see Table 9.25) mention, in the first instance, 
representation of their interests at a local level. They do not typically find 
attractive other activities such as representation of employers’ interests on 
national level on strategic issues or nomination of employers’ representatives 
to the Boards of CHI funds.
Administration and finance of local health insurance plans appeal to only 
10 managers. Joint use of health facilities both local and enterprise-based, 
together with other employers appears to be least popular with them.
4. Enterprise-based Health Centres/Health Stations: Role in 
Occupational Health Care
Managers' attitudes to enterprise-based health services are investigated 
with the aim to understand why they would stay despite the changes in 
enterprise and its environment, especially in enterprise-state relations.
Managers were asked to evaluate the influence of the health 
centres/health stations on the following processes in their enterprises (0 -  "no 
influence", 1-- "influence", 2 -  "influence very much").
Managers typically do not think that health services can help much to 
attract employees, but appreciate their role in retaining and stimulating 
workforce that is reflected in 100 per cent positive response rate (see table 
9.27). These are the two most important functions of health centres mentioned 
by respondents. The third ranking factor is creation of a good employer image.
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Table 9.26
Managers on the role of health centres,
number of respondents, N=50
No
influence
Influence Influence 
very much
1 Providing stimulus for employees 0 25 25
2 Trying to keep labour force 0 25 25
3 Attracting employees 30 10 10
4 Creating image of a good 
employer
15 30 5
5 Preserving enterprise traditions 40 10 0
6 Getting a tax relief. 45 5 0
7 Part of a recreation process 20 25 0
8 Constitutional right that goes with 
employment
20 15 10
Though 25 managers in general acknowledge that health centres 
contribute substantially to workers recreation, it is much lower than for the 
three first preferences. It looks that implementation of the rights of the 
employed for health protection is even more important because though it is 
also mentioned by 25 respondents, 10 of them believe that health centres 
contribute to this purpose very much.
Surprisingly, many respondents have almost ignored such function as 
preserving tradition. Managers do not feel enterprises are bound by the 
existing arrangements.
As Table 9.27 demonstrates, managers do not cast doubt on the very 
existence of enterprise-based health services and still want to provide health 
services in-kind. They would rather prefer to discuss practical things. The 
overwhelming majority (35 people) of respondents think that health services 
should be provided only for employees. Those having health posts even
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consider a possibility to expand the range of services offered to workers who 
typically receive not only medical treatment but also medication free of charge.
Table 9.27.
Managers on the future of enterprise-based health services, N=50.
number of 
respondents
%of
respondents
1 Provide health services for employees only. 35 70
2 Expand the range of health services provided 25 50
3 Join CHI 5 10
4 Transfer them to local authorities. 0 0
5 Sell health care facilities. 0 0
The importance of health centres for stimulating employers strongly 
correlates with plans to expand the range of services provided (.600**) while 
their significance in preserving tradition is positively associated with managers’ 
intentions to offer services for employees only (.516**) and negatively 
correlates with joining CHI (-.509**).
Voluntary health insurance is not seriously considered, as 45 managers do 
not have any plans to participate in it in the nearest future. Only five speak in 
favour of joining CHI and nobody agrees that health facilities should be 
transferred to local authorities or sold out. It is interesting, cooperation with 
CHI system is closely associated with employers’ belief that health centres 
influence process of workers’ recreation very much (.395**). It may be 
suggested that employers who are concerned with workers’ health status are 
more inclined to use opportunities arising out of introduction of CHI.
5. Managers’ Attitudes: Factor Analysis
To analyse the typical situations which stand behind the number of 
characteristics and attitudes of managers to CHI and their role in workers’ 
health protection the factor analysis was performed. With the help of rotation
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method varimax (9 iterations) five stable factors were distinguished which 
explained 80.5 per cent of information (1st - 17.662; 2nd - 35.023; 3rd -51.206; 
4th -67.252; 5th -80.457). Both negative and positive correlations were 
analysed coefficients being considered as significant if more than 0.4 (see 
Table 9.28).
Table 9.28
Rotated Component Matrix
1 2 3 4 5
Have competent opinion (Q.1.1) .660 -.438
Have an interest to know more (Q.1.2) .910
Thie development of CHI should not be 
accompanied by the decrease in the level of 
state financing (Q. 2.1)
.890
CHI should be financed from local budgets as 
well as enterprise contributions (Q. 2.3)
.607 .531
CHI should level the regional differences in 
health care (Q.2.5)
.715 -.443
Minimum health services should be guaranteed 
by the state (Q. 2.7)
-.740
Decision of the shareholders meeting (Q. 6.2) .545 .480
Pe rsonal attitude of the director (Q.6.5) -.632 .601
Financial status of your enterprise (Q. 6.3) -.919
Existence of health care facilities (Q 6.6) -.514 .491
Priivate health insurance companies are more 
interested in money (Q.8.2)
.742
Political instability (Q.9.2). .977
Lack of legislative regulations (Q.9.3) .977
Inflation (Q.9.5) .614
Incompetence of local authorities (Q.9.6) .881
Partially (Q.11.2) .910
To a certain extent (Q .11.3) -.665
(Q.13) .515 .439 -.470
Attracting employees (Q.15.3) .406 -.669
Creating image of a good employer (Q.15.4) -.626 .430
Stick to tradition (Q.15.5) -.853
Part of a recreation process (Q.15.8) -.416 .829
Constitutional right (Q.15.9) -.780 .591
The present system is ok (Q.16.1) -.446 .485
Employers should deal with HIC directly 
(Q.16.3)
.501 .827
Employers should choose between HIC (Q. 
16.4)
.663 -.506
Employers should provide VHI (Q.16.5) -.740 -.418
Have financial concessions in CHI (Q.16.6) .663
Ordinary tax (Q.17.1) .804
Earmarked tax (Q.17.2) -.550 .584
Social obligation rather than tax (Q. 17.3) -.740 -.418
Budget system preserved (Q.22.1) .465
Participate in health insurance with the right to 
opt out of CHI (Q.22.4)
.444 .510 .423 -.428
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Provide medical services in kind with the right 
to out of CHI (Q.22.5)
.429 .618 .578
Pay for medical services in case of emergency 
(Q.22.7)
.476
Discuss health related problems among 
managerial staff (Q. 25)
.743
Reaching consensus (Q.26.1) .831
As decided by those in charge (Q.26.3) -.831
Serve only employees (Q.28.2) -.428 .701
Expand the range of services (Q.28.3) -.626 -.650
This is the task of CHI bodies (Q.30.1) -.734 .521
It is necessary to make better use of industry 
health services (Q.30.2)
-.532 .679 -.439
Establishments of employers' associations is 
desirable (Q.30.3)
.977
Representation at the national level (Q.31.1) -.401 .632
Representation at a local level (Q.31.2) .852
Nomination to CHI Fund Board (Q.31.3) .607 .531
Development of local health plans (Q.31.4) -.434 -.666
Extraction method: principal component analysis 
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation 
Rotation converged in 9 iterations.
First factor.
Managers have a competent opinion about CHI. They think that political 
instability and lack of regulations are two main obstacles that hamper the 
development of CHI. Provision of health services in kind does not by any 
mean influence the creation of image of a good employer, decrease of tax 
burden or recreation of labour force. It is important for an enterprise to deal 
with health insurance companies directly without intermediates and to have a 
right to choose between them. Managers consider CHI contributions as an 
ordinary tax. They think that enterprise could at its own discretion participate in 
health insurance programmes with a right in such a case to opt out of CHI.
In their opinion, there is no need to jointly use industry health programmes 
but creation of special employers' associations of in new forms is desirable.
Second factor.
Managers believe that introduction of CHI should not lead to decrease in 
the state funding of health care and health care system should be financed 
from regional budgets and enterprise contributions. They see the aim of CHI in
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eliminating regional differences in health care. But this does not mean, 
however, that the state should guarantee provision of minimum health services 
and health care system should be built depending on financial status of 
regions, organisations and individuals.
Enterprise policy towards health centres is mainly influenced by the 
attitude of shareholders rather than personal position of directors or by the 
very fact of availability of health services. Provision of health services in-kind 
helps managers to attract labour force and create image of a good employer.
They consider CHI contributions as earmarked tax rather than social 
obligation.
Enterprise can at its own discretion participate in health insurance 
programmes with a right to opt out of CHI. At the same time employers should 
not buy voluntary health insurance for employees as supplementary to paying 
CHI contributions and supplying health services in-kind to employees.
Decisions on health care are taken by reaching consensus among 
managers but not by managers, directly in charge of the problem. In joining 
employers efforts to protect workers health nomination of employers' 
representatives to the Boards of CHI funds is the most important.
Third factor.
Managers conceive that CHI should be financed from regional budgets 
and enterprise contributions. Development of health plans is influenced by the 
very fact of existence of health centres.
Decrease in enterprise profits and incompetence of local authorities affect 
negatively the process of implementation of CHI.
Health centres and health station does not help to attract employees or 
carry out enterprise traditions.
Employers should deal with HIC directly without any intermediaries. The 
existing system is not satisfactory: employers should not only pay CHI 
contributions but get financial concessions if they have their own health 
centres.
At that it is desirable that enterprise:
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• participate at its own discretion in health insurance programmes with a 
right to opt out of CHI;
• provide medical services in- kind for employees with the right to opt out 
of CHI;
• pay for medical treatment elsewhere in case of emergency.
There are no plans to continue to serve only employees or expand the 
range of services provided. Managers consider it necessary to make a better 
use out of industry organisations. Nomination of employers' representatives to 
the Boards of CHI funds is mentioned as a function of associations of 
employers. However, managers do not support the idea of their participation in 
administration and financing of local health insurance programmes.
Fourth factor.
Managers know little about CHI and are interested to get more 
information. The development of the health centres is mainly influenced by the 
attitude of shareholders while enterprise financial status does not have any 
importance.
Participating in CHI as it is organised today employers fulfil health 
protection obligations towards employees to a large extent. Existing 
organisation of CHI is ok: employers should only pay CHI contributions. At the 
same time managers would rather advocate maintaining national health 
service financed from budget revenues. Such possibilities as participation in 
health insurance programmes or provision of medical services in kind for 
employees with a right to opt out of CHI are rejected.
Health care problems are often discussed among managers. For the 
nearest future managers plan to provide medical treatment to employees only 
without expanding the range of services. They think that there is no need for 
employers to represent their interests at the national level in deciding health 
care issues.
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Fifth factor.
The fate of health centre depends first of all on the director of an 
enterprise. It is seen as a real possibility of implementation of constitutional 
rights of the employed as well as a part of recreation process.
Managers do not trust private health insurance companies as they are 
more interested to get money and, therefore, their activities should be 
controlled.
It is not necessary for employers to choose between health insurance 
companies or participate in voluntary health insurance. Managers would prefer 
to provide medical services in -kind for employees opting out of CHI.
Health care problems are to be solved by federal and regional CHI funds. 
Representation of employers interests at the national and local levels are
mentioned as the most up to day possibilities.
Table 9.29.
Correlation matrix between factors and selected variables
FACTOR
1 2 3 4 5
Generator of ideas -.401** .632**
Concept developer -.381** .642** .434**
Expert-consultant .977**
Critic-opponent -.298* .352* -.526** -.592**
Head of development 
team
-.387**
Diplomat -.729** -.420**
Centrist -.365* .564**
Conservative -.315* .465**
Gender .437** -.560**
Age .657** -461**
Education -.804** .309** -.311**
The size of coefficients in Table 9.29 suggests a number of rather strong 
influences.
The first factor reflects opinion of expert-consultant with humanitarian 
backgrounds, who do not consider him/herself as a concept developer or a 
critic-opponents and is not likely to behave like a centrist or a conservative. It
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can be considered as “a competency factor” when managers are sure they 
know the situation and can offer specialist advice on related problems.
The second factor positively correlates with critic-opponent style of young 
men. In his case managers seem to try to have quite a practical attitude 
towards health centres. They are ready to adopt new realities and think that 
they can really influence enterprise policies.
The third factor is positively associated with concept developer and 
negatively with head of development team. It can be described as “a factor of 
external influences” when a manager is taking into account events taking 
place in an enterprise environment.
The fourth factor corresponds with concept developer who has technical 
backgrounds. It can be referred to as “a factor of satisfaction / comfort” when a 
manager is content with the existing state of affairs. This factor is strongly 
associated with conservative style of behaviour. At the same time there is a 
negative correlation with critic-opponent and generator of ideas. Therefore, 
managers are not likely to be involved in promoting new ideas and change in 
their enterprises.
The fifth factor correlates positively with generator of ideas and 
conservative style of behaviour. Attitudes seem to be rather strong influenced 
by gender (women), education (humanities) and age (elders). It also has a 
strong negative correlation with diplomatic style of behaviour and critic- 
opponent method of participation in decision- making. It is a factor of 
“subordination” when managers are likely to share opinions and follow the 
patterns established by directors of enterprises
Conclusions
The survey was carried out to define the status of occupational welfare 
and particularly occupational health care in contemporary Russia. It was 
centred on principal issues that, in my opinion, in the long run determine 
conditions of occupational welfare provision.
Political, social and economic environment in Russia has undergone 
radical transformation during the transition period. It cannot but affect all
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spheres of the nation's life. Health care reforms and, first of all, introduction of 
compulsory health insurance (CHI) have changed the scenery in which 
occupational health services operate.
The general opinion is that the state has to play, as before, the leading 
role in health care. It should guarantee at least minimum medical treatment 
through a new system built of the basis of financial resources of federal 
government, regions, enterprises and population. It is regarded inconceivable 
that the state may go so far as to privatise health services.
Though participants in the survey are convinced that the state financial 
allocations for health care should not be decreased, present alterations in the 
structure of health care funding are intended to use CHI contributions from 
enterprises as compensation for factual downfall in the state financing.
These developments determine the role of enterprises in the national 
health service and occupational health care. Respondents in the survey think 
that there are two institutions in society that should bear responsibility for the 
health status of the employed -- the state comes the first, enterprises the 
second. Enterprise contributions to CHI are, in fact, a very substantial input 
into financing the national health care. The majority of respondents treat these 
contributions as a tax, which does not differ from other obligatory payments.
The survey has revealed that the majority of respondents are in principle 
in favour of providing health services in-kind for employees but the degree of 
doing so is a matter of controversy. Occupational health care is considered a 
supplement to CHI that is not enough to secure good health status of 
employees.
Respondents seem to be very cautious in evaluating overall participation 
of enterprises in health protection of the employed; their position has not yet 
taken a final shape. There are, for instance, unsolved problems in 
relationships with CHI (amount of contributions, the right to opt out of CHI in 
certain circumstances, financial concessions in CHI payments in case they 
organise own health care programmes, participation in voluntary health 
insurance).
226
The interviewed are very sceptical about enterprise influence on adoption 
of legislation and executive decisions concerning their participation in the field 
of health care.
Enterprise-based health centres/health stations are the core of 
occupational health care in Russia. In spite of criticism for allegedly being a 
manifestation of paternalism and economic efficiency, pressure on the part of 
government to divest social facilities and financial difficulties there are 
enterprises that still maintain health centres and even intend to expand the 
range of services provided to employees. Impression is that chances of health 
centres to survive surpass those of some other occupational welfare 
components.
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Chapter 10
Case Studies of Two Moscow Industrial Enterprises
Chapter 10 describes general characteristics of the two enterprises and 
their management as well as functioning and funding of health centres. It sets 
out to explain, by comparing and contrasting the two cases and resorting to 
some additional relevant evidence, perspectives of health centres which 
chances to survive in a new environment seem in absolute and relative terms 
to surpass those of other social services as indicated by empirical evidence 
provided by various surveys. Special attention in this chapter is paid to such 
unexplored issue as managers' explicit and implicit self-interests in maintaining 
employer-provided health care.
In the course of the survey it became obvious that a questionnaire was not 
a sufficient instrument of collecting full information on managers' attitudes to 
occupational health care. Observations and informal comments of 
respondents showed that there were some hidden agendas, which could not 
be revealed by means of structured interviews. It transpired that motives 
usually emerging in surveys were likely to be manifestations of only a limited 
number of phenomena deeply rooted in the life of enterprises. It is a result of 
shortcomings of survey as a method of social research rather than ill will of 
managers. Therefore, I have decided to turn to case studies. Though covering 
only two enterprises, they enable to analyse managers' attitudes "in depth". 
Other researchers used such an approach. For example, after completing a 
wide scale survey of Russian industrial enterprises Dolgopyatova 
(flonronmoBa, 1995) came to the conclusion that survey should be combined 
with case study as another method of social research affording an opportunity 
to comprehensively explore enterprise functioning in concrete circumstances.
One of the main objectives of the studies was to better understand 
managers' motivation in favour of provision of health services by enterprises.
This chapter is a logical continuation of empirical research which 
outcomes have been previously analysed in the thesis. Two Moscow industrial 
enterprises were selected for case studies because, first, they both had health
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centres and were well known for commitment to workers' health protection, 
and, second, their senior managers displayed interest in the research. The 
information was obtained through interviews with managerial staff, study of 
enterprises' accessible records and publications in the press.
1. Case One: Kroct
General characteristics of factory and management
Kroct is a well-known Moscow confectionery factory. It was founded in 
1887 at the bank of the Moskva river in the centre of Moscow just opposite the 
Kremlin. In the early 1997 Kroct employed 3,100 people.
Kroct is a true Moscow factory: it is situated in Moscow and sells 75 per 
cent of its products in the city making 30 per cent of its market share. The 
factory covers 6 per cent of the national market, about the same part of the 
output is exported to countries outside the CIS.
During privatisation campaign in 1991-1992 Kroct was turned into an open 
joint stock company. Employees chose the variant of privatisation according to 
which they bought the controlling package of shares (51 per cent of the 
authorised assets) at lower prices. In its determination to stay independent the 
factory still adheres to this policy: it turned down a good outside investor, as 
the management did not want him to get a control over the factory.
Table 10.1
Composition of Kroct shareholders, % of votes
Shareholders % of votes in 1997
Employees and management 30.7
Moscow government 19.7
Foreign shareholders 25.3
Russian legal entities 24.3
Source: Kroct records
10,000 individuals and 150 legal entities hold Kroct shares, the Moscow 
government being one of the major shareholders. The enterprise is controlled
by the management, which is backed by employees and the Moscow 
authorities. Several issues of shares were carried out without any scandal. As 
the Moscow government trusted its shares to the Kroct director (he is on a 
friendly footing with the Moscow mayor and actively participated in his last 
election campaign) it can be assumed that the management controls at least 
forty per cent of votes.
Kroct is a successful enterprise. In 1996 it produced 55,000 tons of 
various brands of chocolate and its profit reached 22 millions USD. The 
market value of Kroct is about 220 millions USD. Its market strategy is quite 
aggressive, basing upon expansion of market share and production under its 
trademark. Therefore, Kroct invests in production, extension of distribution 
networks and purchase of other companies’ shares. Much attention is paid to 
advertising as competition in the industry is becoming very tough.
Kroct has started to make investments in other factories in confectionary 
industry aiming at creating a concern. The factory already owns more than 50 
per cent of shares in 12 subsidiaries and has minor interests in 25 other 
enterprises.
The intention of the management is to produce traditional Russian 
chocolate. Allegedly it differs from Western products and is preferred by the 
Russians: it indeed is very popular all over the country as one of the best in 
the product line.
The chairman of the board of directors is a man in his early sixties who 
started his employment career in the factory and worked his way up to the top 
management. He is a clever, ambitious and energetic person with a scientific 
degree in engineering. His progressive vision of the future helps to work out 
strategic plans of the factory development. Managers often refer to him as the 
driving force of many successful undertakings. He is businesslike and in early 
1990s he knocked together a team of managers -- former factory's employees- 
- many of whom had underwent special training and then returned to continue 
to work in the factory.
Kroct has a good reputation for the way it treats employees. There have 
never been any delays in payment of wages that under the present Russian
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conditions is a considerable achievement. Wages are higher than industry 
average. Workers usually receive bonuses every month plus special bonuses 
by the end of the year depending on profits.
The management view social benefits as a means of securing normal 
employment climate in the factory and stimulating employees to work better. It 
understands the importance of human assets and, as one of managers said:
“Of course, output is important but people who are the foundation of the 
factory, working for its success, are important, too.”
The management takes measures to retain workers who bring profit and 
prosperity to the factory. Social services for workers are seen as an effective 
instrument of reaching this aim. There is a special manager appointed to 
supervise enterprise social activities -- deputy director on personnel and social 
services.
He is a professional Soviet manager and a new person in the factory. He 
is in late fifties and represents the "old directors guild» consisting of managers 
who made their careers in the Soviet times. For many years he held different 
managerial posts in a big meat-processing factory in Moscow. But when his 
factory was bought out by a bank he resigned as he disagreed with the bank's 
policy "destroying the factory". For him it goes without saying that employers 
should offer social support for employees.
Kroct provides a number of social benefits to its employees. For example, 
consumer goods are purchased in market and then sold to workers at 
wholesale prices. The factory has a developed social infrastructure, including 
a canteen, a creche, and a health centre. Kroct owned these social assets for 
a long time except a health centre that was opened only in the early 1990s.
Functioning and funding of the health centre
The health centre, including a polyclinic and a rehabilitation centre, was 
set going after the process of transition to a market economy had already 
started. The Chairman moved the proposition.
Until 1993 the health services for factory's workers were provided by the 
health centre (medsanchast) No 29 financed by the Moscow health authorities 
to ensure health care for employees of nine enterprises. It was at a distance 
from the factory. When the Moscow government ceased financing most of 
health centres for industrial workers Kroct decided to build up its own one. 
There were several reasons for it.
Poor working conditions in the factory were one of the main arguments in 
favour of such a decision. Managers acknowledged that it was not easy to 
work in shops. Premises were old, many production processes, despite 
investment in modern equipment, still required physical labour. Labour 
process was very monotonous, often harmful to the health of workers. But 
because some technologies would necessitate manual labour for some time, 
management felt responsible for keeping up workers' health.
Another reason was that in accordance with the state regulations the 
health of food industry workers should be periodically checked and 
newcomers should undergo medical examination at the expense of the 
factory. With a health centre on premises it was easier to handle the problem.
It is worth noting that Kroct managers rather negatively regard the role of 
the state in provision of medical treatment to people. They stress that the state 
definitely wants to minimise its responsibilities. For example, the Deputy 
Director on personnel and social services put it in the following way:
"..there is clear evidence that the state will be spending less on health 
services, providing only legislative framework for their development. We need 
to be prepared for this ".
The head of the health centre is an energetic man in his forties who 
advocates market-oriented reforms. He shares the ideas of the chairman and 
supports him in his endeavour. He is medical doctor: before coming to Kroct 
he worked in medsanchast No 29 mentioned above. Now he has no medical 
practice and is engaged only in administrative work. He does not express any 
doubt in the factory running a health centre that many apologists of free 
market would think undesirable.
Such an attitude is typical of Kroct managers. For them market economy 
means first of all new opportunities in organisation of the factory life and its 
relations with environment.
Now the policlinic provides health services to about 9,000 people -- 
workers, their dependents and patients on fee for service basis. The health 
centre includes a policlinic and a rehabilitation centre. In the policlinic a wide 
range of services is provided, including consultations on seventeen 
specialities, dental care, laboratory tests, physic-therapy.
The health centre has two lines of accountability: it reports to the Kroct 
chairman and simultaneously follows instructions issued by health authorities 
including the Ministry of Health and Moscow health department. Medical staff 
is on factory payroll and is covered by the same system of bonuses as other 
employees (thirteenth and fourteenth monthly payments; monthly bonuses; 
special bonuses). Doctors have equal rights with other employees and are 
doing relatively better than their colleagues in local polyclinics.
Equipment of the Kroct polyclinic is really modern -- latest technologies, 
some of them unique even for Moscow. It is bought at the expense of the 
factory from net profit. Today to maintain the health centre is not profitable but 
the management is sure that strategic policy of making investments aimed to 
build it up will pay off. The policlinic is situated on factory premises that are 
very convenient for employees who can drop at it during the break. Managers 
use its services quite often, too.
The rehabilitation centre is situated ten km south east of Moscow in a 
prestigious holiday area called Novo-Peredelkino. 12,000 sq. meters premises 
on 39 hectares of land consist of two bedroom apartments with all modern 
conveniences. It provides a wide range of different services such as massage, 
water therapy, inhalation, etc. Sporting equipment can be hired.
The strategies for which the factory is well known in business are also 
applied to development of the health centre as an integral part of the 
enterprise. Kroct does not want any partners in carrying out its activities, so 
that it can stay independent and managers take decisions themselves as real 
businessmen.
It is naturally reflected in Kroct health policy of unwillingness to cooperate 
with near-by enterprises on health issues. Factory contributions to CHI amount 
to two billion roubles a year. Managers do not see a need to influence the 
state health policy but they are convinced that the factory should care about 
health of its employees. Now the factory covers all health centre expenses. It 
is intended to make use of the existing situation in factory interests. Kroct 
management is sure that in the new environment health services will have to 
compete for resources and patients. Managers seek any opportunity to get 
money for the health centre. Therefore, it has been decided that Kroct should 
act quickly to occupy a niche in health services "market". The underpinning 
idea is to finance the health centre from the Moscow CHI fund and fees for 
service.
Health services working in the CHI system are compensated from the CHI 
fund for medical treatment provided in accordance with the Moscow CHI 
programme. The system functions quite simple: more patients you have -- 
more money you get.
The factory wants to sign an agreement with the Moscow CHI fund, which 
seems to be reluctant to do so undertaking different manoeuvres to postpone 
it. The main reason is evident enough: every time a new health service enters 
the CHI system the fund will have to apportion its money between a bigger 
number of health services that means lower compensation rates. But deputy 
chairman and head of the health centre are optimistic about the prospects and 
think that "reaching this agreement is only question of time" because factory's 
intention fully complies with legislation in force. The only problem is the size of 
its health centre. To join CHI it needs to have a licence, which is issued to a 
health service supplying compulsory standard set of medical treatment. It 
might be too much of a burden for a not-very- big enterprise.
Solution is seen in providing health service to population. In Kroct area 
there is no good polyclinic. When Kroct joins CHI local people would only need 
to have CHI policy. Besides, there are a few factories around without health 
services. When in 1996 the Ministry of Health adopted special regulations 
stipulating that employers in industries, where working conditions were harmful
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for health, should arrange for an annual screening of personnel Kroct 
managers immediately spotted an opportunity to receive money from near-by 
factories in case their workers get services and undergo compulsory annual 
screening in Kroct policlinic.
It is a modern one, the staff is well qualified and attentive and, therefore, 
managers hope it can attract clients. Besides, though policlinic is on the 
factory territory, it has a separate entrance and is easily accessible to general 
public: a patient does not need to enter the factory in order to get to policlinic. 
It is planned that Kroct health service owned by the factory will operate as a 
local policlinic. Thus, it will be able to provide high quality health services for 
workers and, at the same time, to get extra resources from treating other 
clients to cover the expenses on medical treatment of factory employees.
Kroct health centre also works on fee-for-service basis charging for certain 
services not included into the Moscow CHI programme. For example, the 
policlinic has right to carry out medical checks necessary to get a driving 
license. For some categories of population -- pensioners, low-income people- 
special rates are fixed.
2. Case Two: LIZ
General characteristics of plant and management
LIZ was founded in 1926 and was one of the biggest industrial 
undertakings in Russia and in Moscow by the 1990s employing about 40,000 
people.4 It is a modern diversified trucks producing enterprise with the full 
production cycle: from materials and parts to assembly of trucks.
LIZ was among the first Russian enterprises turned into joint stock 
companies in accordance with the voucher privatisation plan. Employees 
voted for the variant of privatisation under which they got less then half of 
shares free others being sold at open auctions. As a result, outsiders bought 
quite a bulk that led to a lengthy controversy between them and management. 
This struggle is one of many examples of attempts of industrial enterprises
4L lZ  incorporates a number o f companies in different Russian towns. Under "LIZ" in this study the Moscow  
plant is understood.
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managers to prevent outsiders from acquiring significant influence over the 
respective enterprises.
By the late 1996 the Moscow government became LIZ major shareholder. 
It got quite poor inheritance: the plant was going through hard times. 
Extremely difficult financial status brought it to the verge of bankruptcy several 
times. An extraordinary event happened in 1994 -- for the first time in its 
history LIZ had to stop production lines. Such practices as four days week and 
compulsory vacations were introduced and production having been steadily 
shrinking lay-offs were started. As a result the number of employees 
decreased substantially.
Management style at LIZ practiced by its first director who held that post 
for about 25 years was always very personal. Senior managers were 
supposed to visit shops, to shake hands with workers and to know the old 
cadre by name. Such a partnership was based on the idea that all people 
working in the plant -- from director to worker -- were equally important 
contributing to prosperity of the country. The Soviet state set a priority goal to 
create an efficient automobile industry in the country competitive in the world 
market. It was one of the fast developing industries and LIZ played the key 
part in the process its success being not only of economic but, first of all, of 
political importance. That was one of the reasons why newcomers failed in 
their attempts to introduce an "impersonal", businesslike style of management.
In LIZ working conditions in many shops were harmful to health (dust, 
vibration, high temperature). Therefore, the plant extensively employed people 
from different parts of the country who were attracted by a possibility to move 
to the capital where living standards were better than in other places. After 
several years work they were, as a rule, given permission to stay in Moscow 
on a permanent basis.5 It was for these people that enterprise social services, 
especially housing, were vitally important.
LIZ workforce was quite specific for Moscow enterprises. Up till 1994 
about 20 per cent of workers were short time (employed for 2-6 months). In
3 In the USSR there was a system o fpropiska  when a person was registered with local authorities and had a
stamp in his passport. The easiest way to get propiska  in Moscow was to take the job  in Moscow industrial
enterprises.
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general, the labour force used to be quite stable: the majority of workers and 
engineers worked in the plant for quite a long time (71 per cent for over ten 
years, including 52 per cent -  for more than 15 years). But in the mid 1990s 
labour turnover began to increase (14.5 per cent in 1996).
The level of occupational and general sickness among LIZ workers is 
rather high and no apparent downgrade tendency is observed. The share in 
illness of temporary workers is almost twice as high as that of permanently 
employed.
It is significant to keep in mind that: some performance indicators of LIZ 
health centre are better than in the local health system; despite high level of 
referrals the number of people who became disabled is small, anyway much 
lower than Moscow average.
Functioning and funding of the health centre
LIZ used to have a vast social infrastructure. It owned the whole spectrum 
of social assets -- housing, dormitories, kindergartens, etc. Since 1991 
financial problems grew like a snowball and many social services were 
transferred to local authorities, first of all housing stock and kindergartens. But 
the health centre stays with the plant and though its relations with LIZ have 
changed it is still referred to as " LIZ health centre".
The health centre is a big health service employing 1,300 people, well 
equipped and fully staffed in accordance with the state standards that allows it 
to provide high quality specialist care.
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Table 10.2
Number of personnel in LIZ health centre, 1997; numbers
Number of staff positions
according to the state 
regulations
actually occupied
total including
polyclinic
total including
polyclinic
Doctors 424 190.25* 423.5* 187.0
Nurses 878.25* 350.0 868.0 343.0
Other staff 471.5* 75.0 435.0 75.0
Total 1959.0 622.75* 1903.25* 612.5*
*  It is common practice in Russian health services to divide one post between several 
people on a part-time basis to increase salaries of medical staff.
The health centre includes:
1. polyclinic - 4,500 visits per day (in two shifts), including dentist 
service;
2. ambulatoria in one of the main plant's branches - 320 visits per day 
(160 visits per shift);
3. hospital for 1,400 beds, including emergency unit;
4. three doctors' health stations;
5. 12 health stations.
It is one of the specific features of LIZ health centre that it keeps the 
Soviet standards by running 12 health stations in the plant shops. A health 
station team typically include a paramedic and several nurses.
The management of the LIZ health centre consists of an executive director 
and two deputies: one is in charge of the polyclinic and health stations, 
another -  of the hospital and the emergency unit (see figure 4 in Appendix A)
LIZ health centre started in 1926 as a small health service with two 
doctors and several nurses and paramedics. Since that time the health centre 
developed together with the plant: new buildings were constructed, number of 
personnel increased, modern equipment bought. In the 1970s it was decided 
to build a hospital. LIZ and another Moscow automobile plant, which later
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withdrew from the partnership, financed the project. A new hospital for 1080 
beds opened in 1981 was well equipped and could provide a full range of 
medical treatment. By 1994 the organisation of the health centre had 
improved: one more building to extend its premises was constructed; each 
section in the polyclinic (uchastok) was made to cover less workers (one for 
1,600 workers); reception and registration systems were improved with IT, 
every plant employee got a personal number; two new wards -- psychiatric and 
oncology -- were opened.
Today LIZ hospital has several wards each for 60 beds, including two 
cardiological, general surgery, neuro surgery, cardio-vascular surgery, 
gastrointestinal, gynaecological, urological, eye surgery, trauma and 
orthopaedic. It works in close cooperation with several Moscow medical 
universities, which use LIZ hospital for training and research.
The hospital differs favourably from other health services in the capital as
it:
• has good equipment bought by the plant;
• supplies services all day long so that patients can be referred to the 
hospital at any time;
• provides services for local population of the south district of Moscow: 
every day a local policlinic can refer 30 patients to LIZ hospital;
• is on duty in the city one day a week when emergency patients can be 
referred to it.
The polyclinic with capacity of 4,500 visits a day is situated in the plant 
territory and employs consultants of nineteen specialities. About 75 per cent of 
patients can get a full course of treatment there including:
advice of well-known consultants;
recommendations on work regime;
referral to recreation services.
The health centre used to be financed by the Moscow authorities via the 
department of health. But LIZ also contributed quite a lot paying for:
• new equipment;
• maintenance and repair expenses (buildings, equipment);
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• electricity and gas;
• transport and gasoline;
• catering services;
• extra 25 per cent of the health centre payroll.
LIZ health centre was of a "closed" type offering treatment to employees 
and, therefore, inaccessible to local people. Now it has more freedom of 
action. In general, the share of outsiders has been increasing but LIZ workers 
definitely enjoy preferential treatment.
In the early 1990s LIZ health centre set about to conclude agreements 
with voluntary health insurance companies. Later it entered the CHI system to 
become one of the first enterprise-based health services operating in it. LIZ 
management established working connections with the Moscow CHI fund.
Relations between LIZ and the health centre changed. In 1995 LIZ health 
centre was transformed into a non-commercial medical fund "Medsantchast 
N1 AMO/ LIZ" with LIZ as one of the founders. It is now an independent legal 
entity controlled by a special Council. The latter consists of five members 
representing the Moscow government (now it is one of the former LIZ
directors); LIZ; Moscow Medical Academy, LIZ health centre and a CHI
company.
The health centre has got more freedom of action especially in matters of 
earning extra money. It has led to a certain downfall in the number of LIZ 
patients in the hospital: unlike the policlinic that still treats mostly LIZ
employees being situated in plant territory entrance to which is only on a 
special permit, it also provide treatment to outsiders. As a result the share of 
LIZ workers among the hospital patients decreased to about 55 per cent. At 
the same time it should be stressed that LIZ employees continue to enjoy 
preferential treatment -- they are the first to be served and get all the services 
free of charge.
The health centre values its relations with LIZ very much. The plant fulfils 
previous financial obligations except granting extra percent of wage 
supplement. It puts the health centre in an advantageous position in
comparison with other health services in Moscow. Its management does not
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need to care much about many financial problems whereas funding capital 
expenditures, food, electricity and gas, etc., is a headache for local health 
services because local authorities being short of funds are usually reluctant to 
fully cover these expenditures.
Health stations are a good example of special relations between LIZ and 
the health centre. According to CHI regulations, only health services supplied 
by organisations with a licence can be compensated. Therefore, the Moscow 
CHI fund does pay for services provided by health stations. But LIZ 
management knows that LIZ workers need them. So, the health centre in spite 
of financial difficulties still maintains 12 health stations based in the plant 
shops, redistributing wages of its personnel to pay the stations staff which 
typically consists of a paramedic and several nurses.
LIZ management actively participates in the running of the health centre 
and is always aware of its problems. LIZ obligations to the health centre are 
discussed and approved every year at annual joint meetings of the plant 
managers headed by its Chairman.
3. Evidence from the Case Studies on the Future of Health Centres
Are these cases unique?
Information on Russian industrial enterprises engaged in occupational 
welfare is scarce. Only a few case studies instrumental in explaining why 
employer-provided health services are likely to survive are available. Among 
recent ones are those by Gough and McMylor (1995) and Clarke (1996). 
There are some other examples definitely suggesting that the two cases are 
not unique. The following is taken from Kabalina (1996) case studies on ore 
enterprises in Central Russia. Their aim was to analyse how internal and 
external control affected enterprise restructuring. The conclusion was that a 
widely accepted assumption that insider control might negatively influence 
restructuring was not necessarily true. One of the studied enterprises was 
internally controlled; nevertheless, it proved to be entrepreneurial and 
successful. Its achievements were not impeded by the fact that the enterprise 
kept all its social assets, including a health centre.
2 4 1
The enterprise described by Kabalina is very similar to Kroct as it is 
profitable, has good performance indicators, and discloses a high potential for 
innovation. Social assets do not prevent it from being competitive in market, 
investing in production and employees' health as well. Both enterprises have 
good financial status, despite developing social assets even during the 
transformation period. They have money to spend on social programmes and 
are ready to do so. Their directors and management have a strong positive 
attitude to employer- provided health services.
The only noteworthy difference between the two enterprises is their 
relations with local communities, which are determined by peculiarities in 
geographical location. Kroct is a not-very-big enterprise in the metropolis with 
developed social infrastructure. The other one is the main employer of about
16,000 workers in a small town. It feels responsible to local community and is 
closely tied to local authorities on social matters while Kroct tries to make 
commercial use of neighbourhood.
As to LIZ it has a distinctive feature: it definitely can count on the state 
support. It is one of the biggest industrial establishments in Moscow and a 
general belief is that the state will never let it go bankrupt. A few government 
decrees have recently been passed to help LIZ; a possibility of granting it tax 
concessions has been actively discussed. But its attitude to the health centre 
is similar to that of the two enterprises mentioned above. The Moscow 
authorities have been urging LIZ to sell social assets to raise additional funds 
for restructuring. Nevertheless, LIZ management does its best to resist it in 
order to preserve the integrity of the plant as well as its image of good 
employer well known all over the country. This, in fact, runs against 
speculations that Russian industrial enterprises can use social assets to get 
subsidies from the state.
Differencies between Kroct and LIZ
On the surface the two cases are of discrepant nature. Kroct and LIZ 
belong to different industries and their workforce varies. The first enterprise 
employs 3,000 people and is quite prosperous. It wants to fully control its
health centre, which has been built up quite recently, and to make commercial 
use of it. The second is a large enterprise with about 40,000 employees, in a 
financial quandary but with prospects to improve its performance. It tries to 
keep a traditionally functioning health centre now getting more independence 
from the plant and working in close co-operation with local health authorities.
Kroct is definitely internal-oriented. It considers the Moscow government to 
be rather a source of funds than a partner. The role of the chairman is 
important since he has not only got a very influential personal standing in the 
enterprise but also managed to gather around a team of subordinates who 
share his vision and fully support him in all undertakings.
LIZ, on the contrary, is open to cooperation and sees a partner in the city 
authorities. It is not surprising because the plant needs investments badly in 
order to overcome deep recession. The director and senior management do 
not play too great a role, moreover, during the 1990s LIZ directors changed 
several times.
Similarities between Kroct and LIZ
But in spite of differences, there are many similarities between Kroct and 
LIZ. Both are old enterprises founded long before economic reforms started. 
They have well equipped health centres providing high quality medical 
treatment and are proud of them. Health centres are more important for 
enterprises than other social assets: Kroct having other social arrangements 
definitely favours its health centre, LIZ having divested of most social assets 
tries to find ways to keep its health services.
The matter is that, first, it is recognised that working conditions in both 
enterprises are damaging to workers health and it is unlikely that they will 
improve in the nearest future. Providing health care for workers to some extent 
compensates bad influence of these conditions on their health status.
Second, the Moscow health system is in such a state that, as a rule, it 
fails to ensure reasonable health services for the Muscovites. Therefore, 
workers of Kroct and LIZ are likely to face considerable difficulties in getting 
quality medical treatment through that system.
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Third, both enterprises have already invested a lot of resources in health 
centres turning them into modern establishments and they are not at all 
interested in transferring them free of charge to local health authorities. Kroct 
and LIZ are more inclined to earn money to finance their health centres or, to 
put it the other way, to gain profit from their operation. Attempts have already 
been made to find the ways that would help to go on providing free medical 
treatment to employees.
While acknowledging responsibilities of Kroct and LIZ for their workers 
health, managers understand that health centres cannot survive in the old 
form, which has to be changed. In looking for new means to make efficient 
use of health centres two major possibilities to raise additional funds have 
emerged:
> to join CHI;
> to charge fees for services.
The case studies show that both enterprises are ready to cooperate with 
the state health system as one of the main opportunities for health centres to 
survive. Such collaboration seems advantageous for both parties. Participating 
in CHI guarantees enterprises a substantial financial support as the CHI fund 
covers the provision of medical treatment. In 1997 a new scheme of CHI 
finance flows was introduced in Moscow -- the Moscow CHI fund accumulates 
only employers’ contributions while the Moscow authorities contributions go 
directly to the city health budget. Enterprises, on their part, continue financing 
capital investment thus taking off some of financial pressures on the Moscow 
health system.
In these circumstances managers have a space for manoeuvre: now it 
largely depends on them to choose a right decision in searching for effective 
ways of solving problems related to health centres. The two cases discussed 
give evidence that it is possible to do in a new environment using opportunities 
that it offers in the field of health care for employees
Modern market ideology has come to Russia with its liberal claims that 
social welfare should not be included into enterprise responsibilities. Russian 
industrial enterprises are often criticised for being over-paternalistic and senior
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managers compared with kings. Proponents of market-oriented reforms view 
paternalism quite negatively as a remnant of the Soviet past. Their choice is 
liquidation of social assets that would allegedly improve financial status of 
enterprises.
But Kroct and LIZ experience shows that it is possible to be both 
paternalistic and entrepreneurial. Their management policy towards health 
centres is, in fact, a kind of a merger of old traditions originated back in 
Imperial and Soviet Russia and a newly born market ideology.
Employer-provided health care and managers' self-interests
Importance of occupational health benefits for workers and enterprises is 
well examined while distinct interests of one more stakeholder -- managers-- 
are left aside. It is quite understandable that having their own ambitions, 
power, etc., they acquire personal interests — otherwise self-interests — 
which may differ from those of other major enterprise stakeholders. Very little 
is said about them getting personal benefits out of provision of health care. 
Transformation of social and economic situation threatens the very existence 
of industrial enterprise as social organisation that cannot but affect managers. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate that including managers self interests 
alongside pragmatic-profit and social-paternalistic motives as presented in 
Table 2.2 should expand summary of motives for provision of occupational 
welfare from organisation perspective, (see Table 10.3).
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Table 10.3
Organisation interests in occupational welfare -  revised
Pragmatic-- Profit Social- Paternalistic
production employers'
economic
gains
employers' employees' 
social welfare 
gains
Managers' self-interests
Source: compiled by the author.
The case studies have confirmed that managers' self -interests are of a 
distinct nature and can be divided into explicit and implicit ones.
Explicit self-interests are the ones managers have as all other enterprise 
employees including the possibility of getting medical treatment. In the two 
cases managers actively used health centres.
In fact, in Russian industrial enterprises managers as well as workers 
benefit personally from occupational welfare. It may often be as important for 
managers as for workers since their wages, especially of middle managers, 
usually differ insignificantly. They face the same problems in communities 
where shortage of some social facilities might arise. For example, even in 
Moscow to have a possibility to receive medical treatment in their enterprises 
is equally attractive to managers and to workers because the city health care 
system suffers from a lot of deficiencies.
In connection with this Gough and McMylor (1995) mentioned managers' 
abuse of power when they get extra benefits. But it should be noted that this is 
not only the case of Russian enterprises. The difference between Western 
and Russian organisations is that in the West such practices are 
institutionalised and managers can officially have preferential treatment in 
occupational plans while in Russia they have a touch of "illegality" in a sense 
that typically all employees formally have equal rights but managers using 
higher status actually get more.
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Implicit self-interests are the ones connected with exercise of power: 
health centres contribute to building up managerial power.
Power is a notoriously elusive term to identify within organisations. It is not 
captured in formal organisational charts and is insufficiently studied in 
organisational literature. Research that does exist on power concentrates on 
the very existence of the phenomenon, taking formal organisation and deeper 
power relations for granted. It makes Thompson and McHugh (1995) to note 
that power is a hidden agenda when managerial prerogatives are stressed.
Power is usually defined as ability to exert actions that either directly or 
indirectly cause a change in behaviour or attitudes of other individuals or 
groups. Power is derived from an individual's standing in division of labour and 
communication system of organisation, namely:
• official position in an enterprise;
• personal characteristics such as self-confidence, sensitivity, etc.;
• control over resources.
The notion of power presupposes:
• ability to get something one wants;
• dependence of others upon the resource one controls and lack of its 
alternative sources.
Therefore, health centres ought to be discussed as a source of managerial 
power. I suggest that this notion in connection with employer-provided health 
care has two dimensions — political/economic and structural/spatial.
As far as political/economic aspect is concerned it is displayed in 
managers' control over workers.
In an attempt to explain provision of social services Clarke (1996) explored 
the social structure of an enterprise arguing that both workers and 
management wanted to keep the same mode of relations of production. He 
mentioned that during privatisation in the course of which labour collectives 
were to have preferential treatment management used social services to keep 
their influence over an enterprise. It was a part of social contract between 
employers and employees when availability of social benefits was exchanged
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for workers' loyalty and support of administration of an enterprise. After all, 
managers ought to manage and should be allowed to do so.
Gough and McMylor referring to Polanyi (1944) came to the conclusion
that
"enterprise welfare was an integral part of the ministerial organisation of 
economy and of the provision of welfare in state socialism. It was securely 
embedded in an economic system which in turn was embedded in a cohesive 
set of social relations." (Gough and McMylor, 1995:38).
The case studies revealed that the major difference between health 
centres and other social assets is that health services are most employees 
targeted. Occupational health care is basically supplied to workers of a 
particular enterprise whereas studies on enterprises housing stock, for 
example, found out that many tenants did not work in enterprises, which 
owned it. The same is often the case with kindergartens. Therefore, health 
centres influence social relations in an enterprise in a much more fundamental 
way.
The structural/spatial dimension stems from the fact that managers 
exercise their right to manage within certain domain.
Health services are situated within the boundaries of enterprises shaping 
their territories. Managers make everything possible to have intact these 
boundaries within which they can exercise their power. Russian industrial 
managers are likely to measure their power in terms of quantity / size rather 
than quality / profit. This tendency may be even reinforced when enterprise 
discretion in running health services increases.
This is one of the explanations why managers tend to consider health 
centres as an inseparable enterprise component. It actually questions a widely 
held assumption that social assets can be quite easily separated from an 
enterprise without damaging it. Enterprise general strategy is applied to health 
centres as well. Managers of the two enterprises do not regard them as 
additional trouble or headache. Thus, trying to preserve enterprise as a unit 
where their power is embedded managers are in favour of health centres. In 
attempts to adjust to a new environment problems related to health centres
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are incorporated in enterprise general strategic development plan with the 
motto: if enterprise survives then together with a health centre.
Conclusions
The main conclusion to be drawn from the case studies is that they have 
confirmed the principal findings of the previous chapters on employer-provided 
health care providing an opportunity to discuss several issues in more detail.
Case studies present examples of enterprise that keep their health centres 
and want to further develop them. They demonstrate that occupational health 
care has a great potential to adapt to new realities and, thus, survive in a 
transformation. Both enterprises are among those that consider cooperation 
with the state health system as one of the important elements of their strategy 
of maintaining health centres. They realise that entering CHI can be of a 
substance support of their health plans. At the same time case studies confirm 
the survey's conclusion that managers fail to display political vision and their 
activities are definitely limited by enterprise boundaries.
The case studies enable to introduce into the research on occupational 
health care such an important subject as managers' self-interests.
Traditional interpretations of managers' attitudes to occupational welfare 
leave no place for their self-interests be they of economic or social nature; 
they form a hidden agenda that is very unlikely to be reflected in surveys. One 
can hardly expect personnel and social welfare managers to openly admit, for 
example, that they use health services to obtain any personal gains or are 
ready to advocate enterprise health services in order to keep their positions. 
Indeed, the more social services are provided by an enterprise — the more 
influential managers who administer them. It is much easier for managers to 
choose among socially acceptable and legitimate variants.
It should be stressed that managers are not fully aware of personal social 
and economic gains they can get out of employer-provided health care and 
have difficulties in clearly articulating their interests as members of 
enterprises. No wonder that though traditional motives like production and 
employees’ welfare are very likely to be important for managers they can be
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interpreted differently and are by no means straightforward. For example, 
paternalism can be also viewed as a means of managers’ self- realisation.
In case of occupational health care such managers' self-interests as 
maintaining political and structural power within enterprises can not but 
principally coincide with interests of all enterprise stakeholders, thus 
reinforcing other economic and social considerations in favour of health 
centres. The latter, in fact, become points of crossing of interests of all 
enterprise members. The finding of common grounds between various 
stakeholders, including society at large, contributes to building up the integrity 
of an enterprise as social organisation leading, in its turn, to continuity in 
provision of health services for the employed. The case studies show that 
managers play a significant part in defining health policy of an enterprise and 
their self-interests, both explicit and implicit, facilitate taking decisions to keep 
occupational health services.
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Chapter 11
Some Topics Ensuing from Empirical Evidence
As a follow up of the empirical evidence examined in Chapters 9 and 10 it 
is instrumental to return to some topics explored elsewhere in the thesis. 
Those are the state-related problems of occupational welfare, compulsory 
health insurance and occupational health care, reasons for employers to 
provide social and health services to employees, health responsibility and 
enterprise/house ideology of managerial staff and perspectives of health 
centres survival and development. In addition to the analysis of empirical 
evidence gathered during my field work other relevant data of Russian and 
foreign researches are disclosed, too.
1. Social Policy Related Problems of Occupational Welfare as 
Reflected in Health Care
Compulsory and voluntary occupational welfare: generalisations from 
empirical evidence
Relations between the state and industrial establishments in occupational 
welfare domain are of a paramount importance. They are best reflected in 
interplay between its compulsory and voluntary trends.
The state liberal like rhetoric on the subject of voluntary occupational 
welfare is absolutely biased. It is considered unprofitable and inappropriate for 
an enterprise in market environment whereas enterprises' involvement in 
social policy via taxation and social funds remains extremely high to the extent 
that, in fact, enterprises are the main taxpayers. The share of income tax in 
budget revenues is less than 10 per cent and individuals do not contribute to 
social funds from personal income (except a symbolic one per cent to the 
Pension fund). It indicates that Russian government still largely relies on the 
Soviet model of taxation based on payments of organisations/ enterprises.
In order to change the situation the purchasing power of population should 
be increased because the level of wages has been intact since the Soviet 
times when the existence of public consumption funds from which people were
251
provided with free social services facilitated keeping it relatively low. In the 
early 1990s those funds were substituted by non-budget social insurance 
funds. If the state wants to get more in taxes and/or to make people cover 
social expenditures the need for reforms arises to secure due growth in 
income. But there are no signs of any measures being planned in this field.
Without accusing the state of an "ill will" it can be stressed that two trends 
come into contradiction at the present stage of transformation: on one hand, 
necessity to ensure state expenditures, including social, and, on the other 
hand, promotion of market-oriented reforms with industrial enterprises finding 
themselves in the midst of this contradiction.
The only thing that the state has chosen to do to make the burden of 
occupational welfare lighter for enterprises is to encourage them to get rid of 
voluntary arrangements while preserving high level of compulsory elements. 
Divestiture of social assets in this case looks more like a demonstration project 
to show to the developed world or, to be precise, to the international financial 
institutions how market reforms have been developing in Russia.
It might be argued that the state interference in occupational welfare has 
even increased in the course of transformation. In the Soviet Union 
enterprises were obliged to set up special social funds but they had a certain 
degree of control over them because, first, such funds were spent by an 
enterprise and, second, it had a choice of the concrete ways of doing it. Now 
enterprises pay much the same money to social funds fully controlled by the 
state without having a say in running them, or enjoying any preferential 
treatment.6
The state now tries to squeeze money out of anyone who could have it to 
balance public expenditures. In the case of CHI enterprises must pay 
contributions -  evasion is practically impossible, penalties are imposed for 
delays -  while federal and regional authorities might easily violate their 
obligations to the health system. Introduction of CHI in Russia is a convincing 
example of how under the conditions of budgetary restraints the state is
6 There are a few problems around the issue of how taxation and social funds money should be spent 
with a lot of speculations about fraud and corruption.
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aiming to involve enterprises tightly in bearing a considerable part of a burden 
of health responsibilities not only for the employed but, possibly, for those not 
working.
It has transpired that enterprises may accept certain responsibilities, first, 
in much more limited scope than envisaged by the state and, second, for their 
employees only. Two polar situations which might arise when enterprises
• either participate in social insurance, including CHI, as the state 
programme and feel free from supplying occupational services in 
addition;
• or opt out of the state scheme and provide occupational services for 
their employees.
If the present variant is preserved when compulsory contributions of 
enterprises to the state-run social security system are dominant in their social 
expenditures the financial load on enterprises is likely to increase further as 
only 40 per cent of population is in employment (the dependency ratio is 1,7). 
The possible way of easing it for enterprises with social assets might be tax 
exemptions calculated in accordance with the norms fixed by local authorities.
The existence of enterprises that apart from participation in social 
insurance provide occupational services in-kind to their employees raises the 
problem of a proper balance between compulsory and voluntary occupational 
welfare. In the new system of social funds a high level of redistribution, which 
in democratic society implies a high degree of social solidarity, is preserved. 
However, the state does not provide any incentives to stimulate voluntary 
occupational welfare. The assertion that this is damaging to entrepreneurial 
initiative is at odds with heavy load of social taxation on enterprises.
The state is now preoccupied with compulsory occupational welfare that 
often results in neglecting or underestimating other issues. Enterprises, on the 
contrary, are interested in voluntary occupational provisions covering, in the 
first instance, their own employees. For them voluntary occupational welfare is 
a real thing as it gives an enterprise control over money, quality and range of 
services that can be adjusted to its specific needs. But accustomed to the 
Soviet model when in many cases employer-provided services duplicated the
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state system (at least formally employees covered by occupational plans 
remained eligible for the state social benefits) managers are cautious to 
choose between enterprise-based services and the state-organised 
compulsory social insurance.
The lack of coordination between the state and employers in occupational 
welfare matters could lead to serious problems. Concentration on voluntary 
provisions is likely to negatively influence the state social revenues and 
patterns of social solidarity. Cancellation of occupational services combined 
with a decline in the public system of social welfare is likely to make 
substantial gaps in societal welfare in general.
A flexible system might be viable incorporating both compulsory and 
voluntary occupational welfare into social policy strategy. It would allow 
enterprises a space to manoeuvre and might include various arrangements 
ranging from their involvement in administration of social funds and getting 
preferential treatment for the employed to opting out of the state plans in 
favour for occupational schemes.
In this light vital is the idea of social partnership, which has been promoted 
in Russia since the early 1990. Unfortunately, it does not work well the 
weakness of trade unions being one of the reasons. The tripartite agreements 
imply that each of the partners (the state, employers and trade unions) should 
bear certain social responsibilities. In case of Moscow, according to labour 
statistics, only in 93 of 297 industrial enterprises surveyed in 1997, or 31.1 per 
cent, collective agreements were concluded. Besides, the framework collective 
agreement of the city government, local association of trade unions and 
entrepreneurs stipulates mainly enterprise responsibilities in relations with 
local authorities and in employment matters, including the level of wages. 
There are only two brief references to occupational welfare — employers 
should not reduce the scope of social services provided to employees 
preserving the existing standards; number of personnel and proper maintained 
of services should be ensured. Enterprise-based health centres are not 
alluded at all.
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A special mention is to be made about employers, one of the main players 
in social policy in the field of occupational welfare. Their role and the state -- 
employers' relationships are a neglected subject in research of social and 
health policy in Russia. But one thing is evident -- employers' potential in 
formulating modern Russian social policy is not used. The following reasons 
can be suggested.
Russian enterprises' strategy is often defined as "survival." This concept is 
widely used by Russian and foreign scholars and, in practice, means that at 
present short-term objectives might be given a priority and hinder development 
of a long term strategy as everyday fight for survival evidently prevents 
employers from seeing perspective. As a result, they do not clearly understand 
what part they might play in implementing social policy. For example, 
employers fail to realise the present role of enterprises in social policy 
financing and tend to consider social security contributions as tax-like 
payments to be paid and forgotten about rather than to try to have their burden 
eased or restructured, as distinct from the patterns of behaviour in the West.
Enterprises do not have much trust in the state, which on many occasions 
failed to be a reliable partner trying to get unilateral advantages. They are 
prudent about any new arrangements initiated by the state and do not want to 
"play games" with it and be involved in a broader social policy realising that 
there are discrepancies between the state and enterprises and it is better to 
stay aside in matters that lay beyond their direct competence. As there is little 
rapport between the state and employers in working out and implementing 
social policy measures occupational welfare issues are typically settled 
through a local bargaining process when success or failure depends on the 
status of an individual enterprise.
Therefore, employers are unlikely to be seriously engaged in a nationwide 
social policy as a distinct political force. On the contrary, the state, whether it is 
welcomed or not, will presently continue to be a leader in social policy and 
changes in social welfare will be introduced from the top.
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Compulsory health insurance (CHI) and occupational health care
Enterprise-based health centres are actually an important element of 
provision of health services to employees in kind and every opportunity should 
be used to have their present-day status, functioning, management and 
perspectives examined in more detail, especially in the light of introduction of 
new enterprise health obligations in the form of CHI. Their interrelation is one 
of the vivid examples of compulsory-voluntary occupational welfare mix.
Survey demonstrates that despite the fact that respondents' approach 
towards the state is rather wary because of a common assumption that the 
state always endeavours in one way or another to make use of organisations, 
including enterprises, in its own interests, health care issues have proved to 
be closely linked with the state: Moreover, occupational health services used 
to be explicitly state-regulated. This is generally considered that the state 
should continue actively to participate in securing adequate health care for 
people. Such an attitude may be regarded as an aftermath of a long period of 
functioning of the comprehensive National Health Service in Russia. Managers 
who cannot even imagine the state health services to be privatised do not trust 
private arrangements in this sphere. The dominant view is that the state is a 
better provider than a private organisation. The role of commercial agencies in 
health care is approached negatively with, presumably, a very important 
implication: profit is not good for health services.
It should be noted that establishment and maintenance of health centres 
that are usually well equipped and staffed require considerable funds. It 
explains why they, as a rule, go in a package: if an enterprise can afford to 
maintain a health centre than it almost for sure provides other types of 
occupational welfare. On the contrary, possession of social assets does not 
necessarily imply that an enterprise operates a health centre or a health 
station.
Enterprises' reaction to CHI as the mainstream of the health care reform 
that has been recently underway in Russia is a mixture of resigning 
themselves to the inevitable and handling matters pertaining to CHI with 
caution. It is an indifference that can be accounted by the fact that managers
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seem to be little aware of possibilities their enterprises could have in the CHI 
system.
The majority of managers do not find attractive the right to choose a health 
insurance company or to deal with it directly without any intermediaries. They 
do not even think about an opportunity of preferential treatment of workers in 
CHI: nobody suggests that employees should ask for such a treatment on the 
grounds that enterprises regularly pay CHI contributions. The prevailing 
opinion is that it would be unfair in regard to other groups of population, 
especially pensioners.
Only a few managers admit that they would like their health centre/health 
stations to join CHI. It seems to be rather odd as doing so might help to solve 
financial problems: CHI funds compensate health services for medical 
treatment provided to the insured. It would give enterprises, in case their 
health centres work in CHI, a chance to get back at least some of the money 
they spent on health care for employees.
Managers evidently lack the knowledge about intricacies of CHI operation 
at the national and local level. They do not appear, for instance, to be fully 
aware of what has been happening in the Moscow CHI branch.
Enterprises are reluctant to lobby their interests in the CHI system and do 
not typically maintain contacts with the state bodies on issues of health 
protection of the employed. They do not also appear to have any links with 
other industrial establishments in order to influence health policy of the federal 
or local authorities. In these circumstances managers are definitely more 
inclined to concentrate on matters within their competence.
It seems rather doubtful that Russian enterprises or their associations will 
display any initiative in health care except, may be, in seeking CHI 
contributions decreased for those organisations, which have health centres. 
The national tripartite committee has already negotiated this arrangement for 
almost five years.
The impression is that enterprises, as a rule, want to preserve status quo 
in relations with the CHI system. The fact that the majority of them consider 
CHI contributions as a tax means -  in the modem Russian realities -  that
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enterprises just pay money to the state without expecting any 
reciprocity/mutual benefit.
In general reaction of managers to health care reform and CHI may be 
called a "patient syndrome". They all complain about the shortcomings of the 
existing system and express dissatisfaction with the way it works. Managers 
respond as patients who failed to receive appropriate treatment. It is indicative 
of the fact that they perceive themselves in the CHI system as users rather 
than people who have any other stake in it. There are many grounds to justify 
such behaviour. Even in Moscow that has a developed health care 
infrastructure in terms of the network of health services and medical personnel 
available the situation leaves much to be desired. For instance, according to 
the Moscow department of health, 60 per cent of medical equipment is out of 
date.
Managers’ responses in my survey were definitely influenced by the state 
of the health system in Moscow. Though in Moscow with its developed health 
infrastructure the closure of health centre is not a disaster, managers think 
that the city health services are in a poor state and there is a real danger for 
workers to be left without any medical treatment at all.
Many health centres in Moscow enterprises used to work in close contact 
with local health authorities that compensated enterprises some expenses. 
Staff was paid from local budget while enterprises supplied and renovated 
premises, purchased and maintained equipment and paid for gas/electricity, 
etc. But in 1991 the Moscow government ceased to financially support the 
majority of enterprise-based health centres and resolved that enterprises were 
free to take over full responsibility for them.
The state policy towards employer-provided health services is concerned 
with drawing additional resources into health care and on coordinating 
occupational health care with local health networks. The matter is that 
provision of medical treatment by an enterprise duplicates local health 
services. Under the National Health Service every citizen is eligible for 
treatment in his/her locality and a worker can go either to a local policlinic or to 
an enterprise-based service. In 1997 the Moscow government adopted a
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concept of development of the health care system aimed, first of all, at 
strengthening locally- based health care with almost no place left for 
enterprise- based health centres. They are only mentioned in the context of 
the necessity to better co-ordinate the activities between health services 
belonging to the Moscow government and other organisations, though nothing 
is said about how it should be achieved. Besides, city authorities are mostly 
concerned with services that supply medical treatment to the Federal 
government/ President administration/Duma staff (for example Presidential 
medical centre).
As a result, health centres in industrial enterprises were practically cut off 
Moscow health care system and at present report only to directors of 
enterprises. Their relations with the Moscow health authorities are restricted to 
supplying information on medical statistics (morbidity patterns, including 
occupational diseases and injuries, etc.). Medical staff is now on enterprises 
payroll like other employees. The local health authorities are not informed on 
financial aspects of health centres performance. Managers, in turn, do not 
consider health centres to be a part of the city health system.
Only several enterprises at the time of the survey co-operated with the 
Moscow CHI fund. There are certain limitations on both sides for enterprise 
health centres to join CHI.
In this case a health centre should have a licence. To qualify it should 
supply a certain range of health services that can be difficult for small health 
centres or health stations to ensure. It is inefficient for a relatively small 
enterprise, which is forced to give up an idea of obtaining a licence in 
exchange for expanding services provided.
Another obstacle is that health centres are typically situated on enterprises 
territories the access to which of people other than workers is impeded or 
even impossible. For example, to enter the territory of many enterprises it is 
necessary to get a special permission.
Besides, Moscow CHI fund is often unwilling to collaborate with them. It is 
at present disinclined to cover more health services for purely financial 
reasons: the fund would have to spread the same amount of money over
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larger number of health services that would lead to decreasing compensation 
to each of them. That is why some enterprises encounter difficulties in 
negotiating an entry into the CHI system.
It is not supposed that employees should contribute to CHI, the main 
reason being meagre wages of industrial workers as well as low living 
standards in Russia in general. Ordinary people just cannot spare it. If 
Moscow is taken as an example, in 1997, when empirical studies were 
completed, 47 per cent of Muscovites lived below poverty line in comparison 
with the country average of 27 per cent. There was also high polarisation of 
population: the difference between the first and the fifth income quintiles was 
31.6 times. The share of those working in industry among declined to 19 per 
cent of the employed. The average wages of industrial workers were lower 
than the city average.
2. Management and Occupational Welfare: The Role of Health 
Centres
Reasons for provision of enterprise-based health/social services: 
corroborating evidence
The proper knowledge and understanding of the nature of enterprise- 
based services as an intrinsic element of occupational welfare are 
indispensable for its analysis. The evidence that comes from a number of 
recently conducted surveys supports the findings of my study on reasons for 
provision of such services. Though not necessarily devoted to social issues 
these studies contain questions aimed to define the attitudes of industrial 
managers to problems of enterprises performance. Hence, it might be useful 
to scan the corroborating evidence. Tratch and colleagues research (1996), for 
example, gives the relevant instructive information (see Table 11.1).
In the surveys by Russian and foreign scholars employees welfare as a 
rule comes first. There is an evident trend for managers to mention social 
reasons in the first instance and express intention to support employees’ living 
standards. In the World Bank survey (1996) 50 per cent of respondents 
consider social cum ethical motives decisive for continuing to provide
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occupational benefits. Even more, employers are concerned about local 
people -- 22.7 per cent of respondents believe that services supplied via 
enterprises' social assets are important for local communities as well.
Internal labour market considerations -- attracting and stimulating 
employees -  usually come second. In the World Bank survey (1996) they 
were mentioned by 25 per cent of respondents. The survey cited by 
Vinogradova (Bi/iHorpaflOBa, 1996) shows that 43.7 per cent and 17 per cent 
of directors of industrial enterprises think that social assets help them, 
respectively, to retain and attract labour force, 30 per cent - to stimulate 
employees.
Table 11.1
Reasons for provision of enterprise-based social services,
% of respondents
% of respondents
1 To support the living standards of employees 79
2 Benefits and services have always been provided by the enterprise 
and this policy is not going to change
46
3 The reason is a social one 45
4 W e must provide social services to satisfy the work collectives 
requirements
35
5 W e must provide social services to satisfy the trade union 
requirements
25
6 It is a customary practice for all enterprises 10
7 W e must provide social services to satisfy the government 
requirements'
5
8 Social assets are profitable 3
9 W e must provide social services to satisfy the firms' management 
requirements
1
10 Other reasons 0
Source: adapted from: OECD, 1996:110.
There are different viewpoints on the part employer-provided health 
benefits play in labour markets. Robinson (1968) analysing the experience of
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three Western countries -- Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK -  argues that 
housing and travelling arrangements are the most effective ways to attract 
labour force to a particular firm. In his opinion, other benefits (including health 
services) have very little effect on it. The reason is that in these countries
"...level of state provision of welfare services is such that there is relatively 
little that firms can do in the way of additional provision or coverage of such 
things as pensions, health services and so on" (Robinson, 1968:102).
Mikhalev (OECD, 1996) supports this point of view claiming that the 
impact of health and recreation services on labour market is not very 
significant. He refers to the 1993 VCIOM (Russian Centre for public opinion 
survey) study when only one per cent of respondents considered fringe 
benefits more important than salary/wages. Health services provided by an 
enterprise have much less influence than housing and child care facilities on 
decision to retain the job. It is particularly true for urban population having 
better access to health services elsewhere.
Managerial textbooks assert that social expenses are productive in term of 
winning employees’ loyalty and commitment. But it should be taken into 
account that occupational benefits are not the only means that can be used to 
achieve this goal and facilitate increase in productivity: general level of wages, 
opportunities for promotion and possibilities for training and development are 
among other things that might be important. There is no yet response to the 
question why employers would not increase wages to stimulate employees to 
work better and enable them to buy health services outside an enterprise. In 
this case the problem of the so called managerial specialisation, namely the 
share of managers dealing with non production issues, including running 
social assets, will be solved as well.
As to labour motivation, useful data come from a small-scale survey of 
directors of industrial enterprises carried out by the Russian economic journal 
EKO in the late 1996. They were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of its 
various forms, ranging them from "5"- the most effective" to "1"- "the least 
effective". The survey is especially instructive as it compares indicators for two
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years (1992 and 1996) that makes it possible to trace changes in directors' 
attitudes over time. The results are presented in Table 11.2
Table 11.2.
Directors on the effectiveness of various forms of labour motivation
for workers and managers and other staff,
% of respondents
for workers for manaaers and other 
staff
1992 1996 1992 1996
Putting more pressure, using threat of 
unemployment
4.0 1.9 3.8 2.5
Increasing wages 3.8 4.3 3.6 4.1
Increasing financial independence and 
responsibility
3.5 2.6 3.4 3.1
Participation in profits 3.2 1.5 3.6 1.6
Improving working conditions 3.2 2.6 2.4 2.3
Improving enterprise image 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.1
Showing concern for people’s needs 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.8
Social benefits and services 2.4 3.1 2.2 3.0
Moral stimulus 2.0 1.6 2.1 1.8
Involving in management 1.8 1.6 2.5 2.7
Possibility to get education and training — 2.5 — 2.6
Source: EKO, 1996:110.
The Table 11.2 shows that an attitude to such stimulus as "showing 
concern for people's needs" did not change during the four years despite the 
fact that workers could get more in wages. The two stimuli which importance 
increased were wages and social benefits and services. It confirms that an 
idea of social benefits contributing to better work is still quite popular among 
senior managers.
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If responses are ranked, in 1992 social benefits came only the eighth for 
workers and the ninth for managers and other staff. In four years they were 
among the first three (wages, social benefits and concern plus image) for 
workers and (wages, responsibility and image, social benefits) for managers 
and other staff. So, there was an increase in interest in social benefits as 
stimulus for both workers and managers.
According the Table 11.2 such stimuli as concern for people and social 
benefits were a bit more important for workers than managers. During the 
observed period the first stimulus moved up by three positions for workers and 
by one position for managers; the second stimulus was six and five positions 
up for workers and managers, respectively.
The third place in other surveys is shared by profit considerations and 
necessity to create the image of a good employer. 17.4 per cent of 
respondents in the World Bank survey (1996) mention that they can get profit 
from social facilities. Enterprises typically do not want to transfer social assets 
to local authorities free because some of them cost much money and, 
besides, can be used for commercial purposes.
Managers attitudes to employer-provided health services
An evident continuity in enterprise-based health services in Russia 
suggests that either factors which do influence managers' decisions in their 
favour have not changed in the course of transformation or new problems 
which have been brought about can be solved with the help of employer- 
provided health care.
The Table 11.3 sums up arguments "for" and "against" employer-provided 
health care from both the social policy and the organisation perspectives.
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Table 11.3
Arguments "for" and "against" enterprise-based health services.
Against For
Economically inefficient / financial 
burden
Improvement of economic 
performance via increasing labour 
stabilisation and commitment
Wage-earner / consumer choice Care for employees / improvement of 
their health status
Wrong targeting Stability of enterprise as a social 
organisation
Limited social solidarity Support of a local community
Source: adapted from Domanski, 1997: 66; Le Cacheux, 1996: 25-26.
There is nothing in "against" factors that has changed significantly in the 
course of reforms. It is traditionally argued that such kind of health care is 
inefficient in many ways. It is
• a financial burden for an enterprise;
• limiting employees choice as consumers because, though using 
enterprise health services free of charge, they might prefer to obtain 
them elsewhere;
• targeted on the employed while there are other groups of population 
which being in less advantageous position in society need better health 
care;
• undermining social solidarity as employer-provided health services are 
usually separated from the mainstream health care systems.
As market has been only emerging in Russia the profit argument which, as 
a rule, runs strongly against enterprise-based health services is not that 
important since efficiency is likely to be evaluated not only according to purely
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economic criteria. It makes the World Bank experts (1996) to conclude that 
Russian industrial enterprises should be treated as profit-maximising entities 
with some reservations. Of course, financial considerations are significant in 
explaining changes as many enterprises divest their health care assets: in 
extreme cases when an enterprise is threatened with bankruptcy it simply 
makes no sense to discuss health benefits at all. Such "against" factors as 
consumer choice or wrong targeting lie beyond enterprise domain and 
concern, in the first instance, the state social and health policies.
Positive attitude to occupational health services is determined by, first of 
all, workforce considerations. Need for an employer to protect workers' health 
arises from the fact that the working conditions in industrial enterprises are 
often harmful to health and the level of injuries is rather high. Manual labour is 
quite common in Russian industrial establishments.
In many cases it is convenient for an enterprise to have a health centre on 
the premises. In accordance with the 1995 Ministry of Health regulations 
enterprises in some industries (for example, food processing, confectionary) 
are required to check health of potential employees and then arrange for 
regular medical examination of the employed.
The case of a meat-processing enterprise is quite revealing. As injuries 
occur quite often it is necessary workers could timely receive the first aid. 
Besides, the chance for a worker to get the specific and very rare occupational 
disease affecting bones is very high. It is almost impossible for sick workers to 
receive specialised treatment through local health services. One of the tasks 
of the health centre, which has special equipment to check the health of such 
patients, is to diagnose and cure the disease. Pensioners who suffer from it 
are also treated there.
Financial status of an enterprise and attitude of management are the two 
main factors "for" or "against" occupational health services. The research 
leads me to conclude that maintenance of health centres evidently lack any 
economic rationale and in-kind health plans are not backed by sound 
economic calculations. Some managers actually responsible for occupational 
welfare find it difficult to estimate on the spot how much money is spent on
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health care to say nothing about long-term planning. Such a situation is in 
principle characteristic of many enterprises though it is much more apparent in 
badly doing ones. In one of enterprise with a poor financial status a head of 
health service just gives a personal and social welfare manager a list of what it 
needs, including wage bill, and then these requirements are adjusted to real 
financial capabilities of the enterprise at the moment.
When financial status of an enterprise is in jeopardy some provisions may 
be cancelled and quality of health services deteriorates. However, these facts 
should not be overemphasised because medical treatment offered by health 
centres can still be -  and usually is- better than that provided by local health 
services.
Thus, the following paradox is evident. On one hand, financial issues 
dominated every conversation (crisis, economic decline, shortage of money, 
etc.), but, on the other hand, correlation between enterprise financial status 
and its determination to keep health centres / health stations is not simply 
detected. Lack of finances obviously hinders provision of occupational health 
care though it does not necessarily result in closure of health facilities.
Taking into account the important role of management in enterprises, on 
one hand, and lack of close correlation between availability of occupational 
health services and financial status of an enterprise, on the other hand, 
management attitude becomes crucial in explaining why health centres in 
industrial enterprises are likely to survive. To understand managers' motives in 
favour of provision of health services for workers, the frame of reference 
offered in Table 2.1 (see Chapter 2) suggests the two reasons -  
pragmatic/production and social/paternalistic -  that come first on the list of 
reasons for management to advocate health protection of employees. The 
stress is made, therefore, on how do managers treat and legitimise health 
centres. They either care about enterprise performance or about employees' 
welfare claiming recognition of their needs and aspirations.7
7 Rose (1994) questioned the idea that employer-provided social benefits contributed to the 
improvement of living standards claiming that there was evidence that benefits in- kind were not so 
important for the Russians as protection in economic crisis.
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Personal characteristics such as gender and educational level do not 
affect substantially the answers of respondents. Only age appears to have 
some bearing on them. Correlation coefficients demonstrate that opinions of 
respondents 41-50 and 51-60 years old are closer in comparison with that of 
respondents 31-40 years old, while positions of people 31-40 and 51-60 years 
old diverge more. The data might be biased as age is described by the three- 
interval scale while gender and education variables have only the two 
meanings. It helps to trace influence of age on responses more accurately. 
The captured differences can be explained by common sense considerations 
reflecting respondents perceived roles and behaviour in society. For example, 
younger people are inclined to more resolute and boisterous behaviour than 
the elders and are likely to have more liberal attitudes. Respondents of the 
elder ages with life and work experience have more balanced approaches. 
Women are likely to be more concerned about subjective feelings than 
objective reasons as well as about servicing and caring for others.
Although it can be admitted that personal characteristics are not that 
important it does not necessarily mean that managers' motivation is not 
personal. It is simply difficult to say to what extent their decisions are 
personally inspired.
Concept of managers' health responsibility
Managers' conceptual, ideological so to say, attitude towards occupational 
health care that otherwise may be called health responsibility deserves special 
scrutiny.
Their understanding of the notion is quite specific. It might be unrealistic to 
expect managers to use it as a working concept: they do not normally consider 
their involvement in health protection of employees in terms of health 
responsibility. They simply deal with day-to-day problems requiring solution. 
The situation is well illustrated by participants’ indifferent reaction to 
description of my project aims and methods.
There is no exactly defined concept of health responsibility used by 
managers, a few alternatives existing. For managers with a long working
268
experience comparison with the past practices is high ranking. One of the 
interviewed who worked in a food processing factory in the Soviet times when 
asked what health services her factory provided to employees replied: “Almost 
nothing”. But actually their list was quite impressive including a health station, 
free medication for employees and compensation for recreation treatment 
elsewhere.
Managers' vision of their health responsibilities is confined to enterprise 
boundaries. It is clearly illustrated by their treatment of CHI contributions. Their 
introduction does not seem to change the attitude of employers who provide 
health services in kind towards their responsibilities in health protection of 
employees. They are still ready to fulfil some health obligations towards 
employees viewing them in terms of enterprise-based arrangements. 
Managers do not think that CHI payments free them from carrying out 
additional occupational health schemes.
Therefore, it looks like managers' perception of health responsibility is 
restricted to their enterprise only and they are inclined to consider running of 
health centres as an expression of such responsibilities while CHI 
contributions are viewed to be an ordinary tax rather than fulfilment of health 
responsibility to employees and just the minority is ready to treat these 
contributions as health care obligation.
There are several variants of understanding health responsibility 
depending on the degree of enterprise involvement in health protection. While 
acknowledging the supremacy of the state in providing health care to 
population a half of managers explicitly state that employers should also make 
contribution to it thus expressing their health responsibility. What is also 
significant, in spite of financial resources mentioned as a limitation it is 
nevertheless admitted that employers should take part in securing employees' 
health. Of the three institutions which are considered as its protectors -  the 
state, enterprise and individual -  enterprise comes the second, close to the 
state but far ahead of individual.
Managers are cautious in evaluating their present role in employees' 
health protection. The absolute majority mentions that there are some things
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that still can be done and do not seem to be satisfied with their own efforts, the 
more so that they do not think that CHI may offer a sufficient level of health 
care to the employed.
One more thing should be mentioned in connection with managers' health 
responsibility. Managers of various personal standings are exposed to 
processes which have encultured them a shared understanding resulting in 
common attitudes on a number of topics. Regardless of their status, they are 
usually under the influence of what is characteristic of the culture of 
organisation and vice versa -- contribute to maintenance of organisational 
culture.
This unifying approach may also be referred to as enterprise, or house 
ideology. It is not simply imposed on them -  rather managers play an active 
part in putting it into practice through enterprise-based health care. But since 
they are in many cases not versed in operating occupational health services 
and do not have any inter-enterprise organisations they have difficulties in 
independently accessing interests of their organisations and defining the 
responsibility to be assumed.
Managers point out at the crucial role of management in decision-making 
on occupational health care and health centres. They form a vital group in 
working out enterprise health policy for they choose the kind of response their 
enterprises give to social pressures and then implement adopted policies. 
Managers feel themselves in a position to settle health problem. When some 
of them say it is not their responsibility it does not mean the lack of concern 
but is rather an expression of belief in that an enterprise simply cannot afford 
it.
Occupational health care proved to be rather difficult to conceptualise. 
Enterprise health policies are likely to have more to do with ideology then pure 
social or commercial rationality. Domanski (1997) is right to stress that 
employers act out of belief. Believing as they seem to do that provision of 
health benefits will lead to certain positive results management might not be 
fully aware of the scientific basis of its strategies relying more on common 
sense and past experiences.
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By providing occupational health services managers become involved in 
socially valuable activities, in fact responding to widely hold public perceptions. 
It could even be argued that socialism made better use of managerialist 
recommendations.
At present managers stand at the crossroads of two seemingly conflicting 
ideologies -  free market and managerialist. But, in fact, both ideologies are 
basically concerned with the same thing -  improving enterprise performance 
and increasing profit though by different means. But as theoretical 
substantiation of occupational welfare in both cases is not very persuasive the 
attitude to occupational benefits is to a large extent determined by an 
individual employer's own assessments and social outlook.
On enterprise-based health services perspectives
The discussed above empirical evidence provides some information on 
the future of enterprise-based health services. None of the managers I 
interviewed is in favour of closing health centres/health stations. On the 
contrary, they want their operation to be continued. Managers of enterprises, 
which have health stations, even express intention to extend the range of 
services provided.
My findings, by the way, correspond with the results of the TACIS survey 
(BuHorpaflOBa (Vinogradova), 1998; KoTOBa (Kotova), 1999), which has failed 
to discover strongly articulated intention of directors to get rid of social assets. 
Their attitude towards divestiture was rather negative than positive; many of 
them ready to keep social assets subject to certain conditions.
The body of knowledge available on the subject makes it possible to 
identify two contrary viewpoints expressed by the people who have definite 
strategy and work actively to implement it by either building up occupational 
welfare schemes or getting rid of them.
One motto could be read as follows: "Free us from any health obligations! 
We are here to gain profit and have no time to think about health issues". The 
assumption in this case is that health responsibilities should be vested in the
271
state and individuals. So, even if an enterprise has money it will not spend it 
on occupational health services.
The other motto is: "We are ready to do as much as possible for our 
employees". It is somewhat egoistic for an enterprise to neglect social 
solidarity in society at large but at the same time it clearly indicates 
management awareness of health care responsibilities to employees and 
readiness to carry them on.
Between these two extremes the whole spectrum of other opinions lies 
that are not clearly articulated. Some employers just do not have any idea 
about what they should or could do about protecting employees' health and 
how it could affect their enterprises.
It is possible to define the following types of managers' behaviour based 
on combination of their attitudes and enterprise financial status:
• have money -- should maintain health plans;
• have money -- should not have health plans;
• lack of money -  should maintain health plans;
• lack of money -  should not have health plans.
Moscow industrial enterprises, which have health arrangements, are 
very likely to favour their continuation even if they experience financial 
difficulties and are forced to allocate less money on health centres and health 
stations, thus falling into the first and the third groups. This, in fact, challenges 
the now predominant view that enterprises should be willing to cut social 
benefits, including health care provision.
Conclusions
This chapter should be viewed as a proof of occupational welfare 
versatility. As far as occupational health care is concerned, it has many 
nuances that require further elucidation and debate. It is from this standpoint 
that recurring exploration of the above-mentioned issues has been made. 
What is more, in its course a few problems cropped up that may be worthy of 
researchers' attention. Among them the following may be mentioned:
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• practice of coordinating of the state, local authorities and enterprises’ 
activities in the field of occupational welfare;
• rapport of the state and employers in formulation and carrying out of 
social policy, occupational welfare including;
• correlation of compulsory and voluntary health insurance and proper 
balance between them;
• comparison of advantages of pecuniary and in-kind occupational 
welfare benefits;
• funding and managing of enterprise-based health centres in a new 
political, social and economic environment;
• managers' conceptual attitude towards health responsibility and 
enterprise/house ideology;
• education and training of managers to be engaged in occupational 
health care provision;
• methodology of occupational welfare research.
It does not mean that other issues concerning occupational welfare may 
not be taken for consideration.
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Chapter 12.
Occupational Health Care in Russia: A Synthesis of
Reflections
My reading of available material leads me to assert that this thesis is the 
first attempt systematically to analyse the key issues of occupational welfare 
with special reference to health care in Russia. The study has attempted a 
systematic examination of the three elements central to an understanding of 
employment-conditioned health services in contemporary Russian society.
In the first place, the fundamental theoretical problems of occupational 
welfare were approached in the light of research in the West, the Soviet Union 
and post-Soviet Russia. The principal issues addressed in the thesis 
concerned the relationship of occupational welfare to social policy, social 
citizenship and human rights, employment, state and non-statutory provisions 
and economic efficiency, as well as the social assets of enterprises. In order to 
relate the Russian theoretical treatment of occupational welfare to that of other 
developed countries an international comparison of understandings about 
occupational welfare was made, with emphasis laid on divergences and 
common grounds. This permitted a venture towards a general definition of the 
notion of occupational welfare.
The second general objective was to examine occupational welfare and its 
health care component in historical context, tracing its evolution from Imperial 
Russia, through the Soviet era to post-Soviet times, with the specific aim of 
exploring continuities in the policy pathways. Overarching issues as well as 
those which are sector specific are aired: for example, the role of factory 
medicine and compulsory health insurance in the Tsarist Russia and services 
for workers in the Soviet system of health care. More topical are the factors 
associated with the initial outcomes of health reforms in the 1990s, which are 
indispensable for arriving at a projection of future perspectives of occupational 
welfare.
Thirdly, the empirical element of the study related to the reporting results 
of fieldwork carried out in Moscow between 1995 and 1997. Its brief was to
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explore the contemporary status of Russian occupational welfare in the 
context of changing social policy aims and methods, in order to determine the 
factors contributing to the current survival of occupational health plans. 
Evidence from the field concerned the role of enterprises in occupational 
welfare, the functioning of enterprise-based health centres, and the place of 
industrial employers and managers in organising health protection of the 
employed. The findings drew out several important theoretical and practical 
implications that are discussed below.
The theoretical research was underpinned by an extensive reading of the 
substantial ‘grey literature’. This, together with the empirical observations, led 
to the following key conclusions concerning the social role of Russian 
occupational welfare; a universal conceptual approach to the sector; the 
clarification of the position of the occupational sector in the ‘welfare mix’; the 
motives of employers in providing occupational health care; and, finally, the 
compatibility of occupational health care and democratic welfare capitalism.
The Social Role of Russian Occupational Welfare
This study has substantiated an assumption that occupational welfare has 
always played an important social role in the Russian society. Its 
underestimation is an evident error in works of Shleifer and Boycko (1994) and 
Rein (1997). The analysis presented here shows that both Western and Soviet 
scholars have theoretically approached occupational welfare in terms of 
similar issues, such as equality and justice, the role of the state, and the 
access to social services. This is not to say that occupational health services 
in the Soviet Union did not have their own specific characteristics, but in 
principle they performed much the same functions as counterpart services in 
capitalist countries. What is more, in terms of ‘lesson learning’, their 
experience was considered valuable for other countries by such influential 
international organisations as WHO (1978).
Since occupational welfare was by no means an invention of the Soviet 
hegemony - despite specific features it was, in fact, a particular reflection of
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mainstream world tendencies -  the consequence has been that it was not 
doomed to wither away with the communist state.
In essence, then, occupational welfare has deep roots in the Russian 
history and society, spanning more than a century and a half. During all that 
time it has been a channel for the protection of working people against social 
risks. The Soviet state exploited the century-long tradition and the practices of 
the previous political regime by modifying occupational welfare to conform to 
the Soviet welfare system and ideology.
Two Perspectives and General Definition of Occupational Welfare
Any attempts to separate Soviet experience from that of the West are 
artificial and ultimately unproductive. On the contrary, overcoming ideological 
barriers renders a possibility of their interaction. As a result, two approaches to 
occupational welfare, namely social policy and organisation perspectives, are 
suggested.
Working people are not only employees of companies but also members 
of wider society. Thus, the social responsibility that enterprises bear concerns 
not only their employees' welfare but also helps to solve social problems of 
population at large. That is why I propose an approach to occupational welfare 
through two dimensions: the social policy perspective and the organisational 
perspective. Apropos, one of the differences of the Soviet and Western 
approaches to occupational welfare was that the former stressed the social 
policy dimension whereas, in my judgement, in the latter it was more latent.
Understanding this study convinced me of the necessity to make an 
attempt to formulate a wide definition of the concept of occupational welfare. I 
suggest the following wording, albeit one that requires further elaboration:
Occupational welfare, as an integral part of comprehensive social policy, is 
the provision of social services and benefits other than salaries/wages, 
incident to or arising out of employment, in various forms, voluntary or 
statutory, offered through employer in compliance with the interests of an 
individual, organisation, the state and society.
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Occupational Services in the ‘Welfare Mix’
The transition of Russia to a market economy raises the question of how 
welfare responsibilities may be distributed among various sources of welfare, 
such as the state, industry and individuals in a new emerging society: in short, 
who is to pay the social costs of a transition that has already been very high.
As I have argued throughout, the state in Russia always played an 
active part in the working of occupational welfare, trying to incorporate it into 
the general structure of social policy. Thus, the division of welfare was never 
just a private or informal affair, but rather an integral part of the system of 
national social protection welfare mix” - with a specific role.
Today, the stereotypes of free market are very strong in Russia and it is 
generally assumed that everything should be changed and reformed. The 
ideology and practice of occupational welfare have been strongly influenced 
by the Western liberal ideas. In this re-appraisal it is easy to forget the opinion 
of those Western researchers who, whilst stressing many malfunctions of the 
Soviet state, judge its achievements in the social sphere to be not 
inconsiderable and deserving to be taken seriously by Western countries. In 
this environment, the social policy dimension tends to be downplayed and the 
enterprise perspective is given a priority that, in fact, means that the role of 
occupational welfare is underestimated. These trends have serious 
implications for occupational welfare in post -Soviet Russia: the state has all 
but withdrawn its support for occupational programmes, which have become 
voluntary. The lack of co-ordination between social and occupational welfare 
could lead to serious problems. The closure of enterprise social facilities, 
alongside the poor state of public social welfare is very likely to result in gaps 
in welfare provision for the public as a whole.
Provision of Occupational Health Care and Motives of Employers
Occupational health care in contemporary Russia is an integral and 
indispensable part of occupational welfare. Influenced by the historical, social 
and political factors already outlined, it has some specific features.
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Industrial enterprises are major health provision actors, as currently 
occupational health services in Russia in many cases are outside the national 
health service. In these circumstances, the analysis of their role is an 
important component in understanding why Russian enterprises that have 
traditionally maintained occupational health centres continue to do so, despite 
changing economic incentives and political ideology.
A major empirical finding of this thesis is that external factors such as 
the state policy and financial constraints are not decisive in forming industrial 
managers' attitudes towards occupational health services. The introduction of 
new compulsory health insurance and the changing position of enterprise 
within the health care system, which are the outcome of the state policy 
initiatives, do not appear significantly to influence the attitudes of managers 
towards occupational health care provision. On the contrary, the lack of 
financial resources is regarded as an obstacle for implementing health plans, 
rather than provision of health care is considered as undermining the financial 
status of an enterprise. Managers, as a rule, not only accept that they should 
protect their employee’s health, but also in some cases think that they should 
do more. In particular, enterprises would rather keep health centres running 
and expand the range of services provided than divest them.
Managers typically mention reasons that fall within economic-pragmatic 
and social- paternalistic motives in the classification suggested in this study, 
for example, retaining and motivating workers, and creating the image of a 
good employer. But the lack of clear evidence of the contribution of health 
centres to achieving the stated objectives and strong economic rationale 
behind the decision to keep them suggests that managerial attitudes are 
informed by personal beliefs rather than generalised knowledge.
Some enterprises attempt to fuse paternalistic and economic motives, 
namely, not only to provide services for their own employees free of charge, 
but also to profit from the operation of their health centres. Compulsory health 
insurance provides a good opportunity to implement this idea because health 
centres that joined the system are compensated by it for services provided for 
the insured. Enterprises try to attract local people for whom health insurance
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system will pay, as their health centres are better staffed and equipped than 
local health services and, thus, have a reputation of providing higher quality 
medical treatment. For this reason these enterprises are ready to invest more 
in their health centres and even bear losses, at least of a short-term nature.
At the moment, it is clear that the new political, economic and social 
environment in which Russian enterprises operate can hardly be referred to as 
a ‘market’ in the sense accepted in the West. In such a situation it is difficult to 
realise expectations that they should behave as "free enterprises": 
considerations other than profits are important for them as well. Though there 
are a number of factors that would influence management attitudes towards 
social assets, the maintenance of workforce within a company can be 
considered as a tactic for survival in the turbulent environment of 
transformation, and, in this, forms a part of the strategy to retain the integrity of 
an enterprise.
This highlights the third group of motives: that of managerial self-interests. 
Maintenance of health centres, which are usually situated on the site of 
enterprises, may be important for managers in their own personal interests. 
First, they receive medical treatment in enterprise health centres, where 
managers definitely enjoy a better response from clinicians and often have 
access to facilities superior to those in a local health network. There is no 
need for out-of-pocket payments in the form of ‘fee-for-service’ and gratuity 
payments to doctors. Second, for reasons related to motivation and 
compliance of the workforce, health centres serve as a basis of managerial 
influence and power.
While a "political" dimension of managerial power provides mechanisms 
for control over employees, a "structural" dimension is linked to managers' 
perception of their power within the spatial boundaries of their enterprises. 
This is supported by the fact that managers' vision of health responsibilities 
incorporates only enterprise based-health services and excludes 
considerations of broader health and social policy, for example, compulsory 
health insurance contributions.
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The importance of managerial self-interests should by no means be 
interpreted in negative terms, implying that managers either simply ignore 
other functions of occupational health services or merely use them to 
legitimise enterprise health centres. Rather it is evidence of the fact that 
managers are among major organisational stakeholders -- employees, 
employers, shareholders, and wider society -  that have a vested interest in 
enterprise health centres. For managers specifically the significance of health 
centres, that are typically expensive to operate and not necessarily profit- 
promoting, lies in that they help to fulfil multiple objectives: they contribute to 
employees welfare, the standing of the organisation and, not least, to 
managers’ welfare and status.
Occupational Health Care and Democratic Welfare Capitalism
The existence of occupational welfare in contemporary Russia is, in 
principle, compatible with the market economy and democratic transition, by 
serving as a means of continuity in the midst of change. Hence, occupational 
welfare could be one of the survival techniques for a social protection system 
under the current conditions of its near collapse. This is naturally subject to 
certain prerequisites, such as the attitude of companies and the support they 
may receive from the state.
Although the role of the state has been changing because of the evolving 
status of many enterprises with regard to making decisions to maintain or 
close welfare facilities, it would, therefore, be in the interests of the state to 
find ways to incorporate existing complementary institutions that have proven 
their usefulness into a new political and economic environment. Accordingly, it 
would be wise for the state to take into account the potential of enterprises for 
solving welfare problems and support occupational welfare, if only to shift a 
part of its own social responsibilities to employers in a systematic manner. 
Indeed, it is my contention that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that 
occupational welfare has its own role to play in the life of contemporary Russia 
and has a potential not only for survival but also for further development in the 
new environment emerging from market-oriented reforms. However, policy 
trajectories are unlikely to be smooth. While the case studies demonstrate that
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enterprises are ready to co-operate with the state in providing health services 
for employees, at the same time they are unlikely of their own accord to put 
forward any plausible ideas on their social and health care roles, given the 
vagaries of current industrial trends in Russia. Moreover, critically, at present 
there is very little communication between the state and industrial employers 
on health issues.
A Final Defence of This New Approach to Understanding 
Occupational Welfare.
The empirical study has focused exclusively on health services for 
workers; whereas other studies either explore a number of occupational 
welfare provisions altogether or include only their marginal treatment. In the 
existing surveys examined, enterprises have been selected on criteria that do 
not usually take the existence of social assets into account. My sample, on the 
contrary, includes industrial enterprises that continue to maintain occupational 
health services as I has explored the reasons that motivate employers to do 
so, despite opposing rational factors, such as poor financial status and lack of 
the state support.
The investigation combines survey methods and case studies to approach 
the problematic of occupational health services in Russia from different 
perspectives. Such a focused approach permits a deeper understanding of the 
attitudes of industrial managers towards these provisions. Yet, it is inevitable 
that a study of this kind will be limited in several respects. Above all, the 
empirical material available is very fragmented and often contradictory. Thus, 
reliable data on the present state of occupational welfare in Russia are hard to 
obtain. Since the situation has been altering rapidly and the changes are 
poorly documented, even the available data soon become obsolete. 
Moreover, for a large and diverse country like Russia, it would be unwise to 
make too many extrapolations from a locally based, single person research 
which necessarily relied on a relatively small sample of cases.
Neither official documents nor direct contacts with enterprises can produce 
a fully comprehensive and unbiased evaluation. In describing the current state
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of occupational welfare in Russia and the associated changes, one can 
scarcely avoid some reliance on personal impressions gained from various 
sources. There is no doubt that many of the conclusions arrived at here could 
be questioned by those adopting a different conceptual position or drawing on 
different personal experiences. My outlook rests on the fact that the study is 
the first of its kind in Russia and its value, perhaps, lies in its exploratory 
nature. Many of the answers are inevitably provisional and the inferences 
need further investigation.
Speculations on Future Research and Practical Agendas.
It is assumed that this study represents but a first step towards a deeper 
analysis of occupational welfare. Above all, theoretical issues need much 
more attention, not least in reaching consensus on the definition of the 
phenomenon. An important contribution would be further study of its history in 
Russia.
As for other outstanding tasks the following list, although not exhaustive, 
may be offered: the correlation between provisions in cash and in-kind; the 
organisation and financing of occupational welfare arrangements; the specific 
design of occupational programmes; the interaction between enterprises, on 
one hand, and local authorities and governmental and non-governmental 
bodies, on the other hand. This latter area will, perhaps, be the most 
productive of effort, given the increasing role of NGOs. For example, NGOs in 
Russia carry out family planning programmes in enterprise health centres, 
especially where women form the majority of the workforce.
Finally, of particular relevance for the further development of Russian 
occupational welfare is the resolution of the following trinity of problems:
• the elaboration of a new social policy incorporating occupational 
welfare into new institutional arrangements in a society in the 
course of transformation;
• the definition of a compulsory-voluntary occupational welfare mix to 
allow for more effective use of human resources and physical 
capital; and
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• the targeted training of managers of enterprise social programmes 
to ensure their proper functioning and cost - effectiveness.
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES AND FIGURES
Table AT
HOURLY LABOUR COSTS IN MANUFACTURING IN OECD COUNTRIES,
1995
Non- wage labour costs* Rank by 
total labour 
costs
Rank by 
non-wage 
labour 
costs
USD of total 
labour costs
of wage 
costs
Germany
West 20.44 44.9 81.5 1 5
Switzerland 14.66 34.3 , 52.3 2 12
Belgium 18.22 47.5 ' 90.6 3 3
The
Netherlands 15.74 44.3 79.5 4 6
Japan 14.56 41.0 69.6 5 10
Sweden 12.82 41.2 70.0 6 9
Germany
East 12.88 43.1 75.9 7 8
France 13.99 48.2 92.9 8 2
USA 7.42 29.5 41.8 9 13
Italy 12.40 50.3 101 10 1
Canada 6.51 27.8 38.5 11 16
Spain 10.16 45.5 80.0 12 4
Australia 6.07 27.5 88.0 13 17
UK 6.00 28.6 40.1 14 14-15
Ireland 5.89 28.6 40.0 15 14-15
Greece 5.13 39.8 66.0 16 11
Portugal 4.08 44.0 78.5 17 7
* non-wage labour costs include social security, pensions and fringe benefits
Source: Financial Times, 02.1997.
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Table A.2
LABOUR COSTS STRUCTURE IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY, %
LABOUR
COSTS
total
WAGES NON-WAGE LABOUR COSTS
% of Total 
Labour 
Costs
including
housing social protection retraining cultural
and
welfare
services
other
total _ _ compulsory
payments
NATIONAL
ECONOMY
1995 100 60.5 39.5 4.6 28.3 23.4 0.3 3.3 3.0
1996 100 59.7 40.3 3.5 29.9 27.1 0.4 3.5 3.0
1998 100 63.2 36.8 2.0 30.2 27.2 0.3 1.5 2.8
INDUSTRY
1995 100 58.0 42.0 6.2 28.5 26.3 0.3 4.2 2.8
1996 100 57.2 42.8 4.5 30.4 27.6 0.5 4.6 2.8
1998 100 60.5 39.5 3.1 30.7 27.9 0.3 2.4 3.0
Source: adapted from focKOMCTaT (Goscomstat), 1999: 288
Table A.3
STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURES OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, %
Total Compulsory 
contributions 
to Social 
insurance 
funds
Additional
private
pension
insurance
Voluntary
health
insurance
Employees’ 
life and estate 
insurance 
premiums
Compensation 
for job-related 
injuries
Sanatoriums,
vacations
Resignation
allowance
Family
support
Other
1994 100 81.1 0.2 0.5 5.5 - 1.4 0.7 1.9 8.5
1998 100 90.8 0.3 0.5 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.1 2.8
* The data in Table A.3 present results of the two large-scale surveys carried out by the State Statistics Committee (G oskom sta t/  
r ocydapcm eeHHbiu KOMumem no  cm am ucm uK e PO) in  1994 and 1998.
Source: focKOMCTaT (Goscomstat) , 1996: 44-45; 1999:291
Income level & 
economic 
growth
Working conditions
Health of 
workers
Productivity
Level of morbidity 
&
mortality
Cost in 
training, sick 
leave etc.
Figure 1. Health and profit circle
Source: WHO 1997. Public Health and Economy. Report of a National WHO 288
Seminar Bucharest, Romania, 23-25 September. Page 5.
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I. Flow of CHI Funds according to 1991 Law
ENTERPRISES
HEALTH SERVICES
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
COMPULSORY HEALTH 
INSURANCE COMPANIES
VOLUNTARY 
HEALTH INSURANCE 
COMPANIES
II. Flow of CHI Funds changed by 1993 Amendments
FUNDS OF 
COMPULSORY 
HEALTH 
INSURANCE
COMPULSORY 
HEALTH INSURANCE 
COMPANIES
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
ENTERPRISES
HEALTH SERVICES
VOLUNTARY 
HEALTH INSURANCE 
COMPANIES
Figure 2. Flow of CHI Funds
Broken lines show relations outside CHI 
Source: compiled by the author
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Figure 3. Field Work Map
Source: compiled by the author
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRE
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MANAGERS
We would like you to express you opinion as an employer on the problems and ways 
of reforming health care system in Russia, introduction of CHI and, in connection 
with this, on the role of employers in health protection of their employees.
Q. 1. To which extent are you informed about the development of CHI system in 
Russia? circle the appropriate statement
1. Have been aware of the system development for a long time; have competent 
opinion.
2. Have got to know about the system recently, have an interest to know more.
3. Have heard a little about it, have got some information by chance.
4. Have not come across any information.
5. Have not got any interest in this information.
Q. 2. Please, circle the statements that reflect vour opinion.
1. Introduction of CHI should not be accompanied by decrease in the level of the state 
financing.
2. CHI should be organised on a regional basis and financed mainly through local 
budgets.
3. CHI should be financed from local budgets and enterprise contributions.
4. People should contribute to CHI.
5. CHI system should level regional differences in health care.
6. The aim of CHI is to make assess to health services easier for people
7. Minimum health services should be guaranteed by the state, the health care system 
should be built depending on financial resources of regions, enterprises, population.
Q. 3. What aims do you think the government seeks to achieve, starting the current 
health care reform? Circle the number of the appropriate statements.
1. To introduce enterprise contributions as a supplementary source of health care 
financing.
2. To change the structure of health care financing, using enterprises contributions to 
compensate for decrease in the state financing.
3. To improve quality of health care.
4. To give patients more choice.
5. To increase efficiency of health care system.
6. To make the first step towards privatisation of health services.
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Q. 4. What are you impressions about the activities of CHI bodies (funds. HICV?
1. This is a reliable system, working for people.
2. This is one of the many bureaucratic structures.
3. Health insurance companies use them for their own purposes, they hardly serve the 
interests of society.
4. Have not yet got any particular opinion.
Q. 5. How would you evaluate the activities of the federal and local authorities in 
reforming the health care system in Russia? Please, mark in each row.
positive rather
positive
rather
negative
negative can’t
say
have no 
information
President
Federal
Assembly
Ministry of 
Health
Federal CHI 
Fund
Moscow 
CHI fund
Moscow
authorities
Employers
Q. 6. What are the factors that mainly influence the development of health 
centres/health stations in vour enterprise?
1. Pressure from employees (through collective agreement)
2. Decision of the shareholders’ meeting
3. Financial status of your enterprise
4. Decision of the Board
5. Personal attitude of the director
Q. 7. What, in vour opinion, is the stage of development of CHI in Moscow? Circle the 
appropriate in each row
1. The formation of CHI has been completed 2. The formation of the system has not yet been 
completed
3. The regional financing mechanism has been 
established
4. The regional financing mechanism is not 
working
5. CHI covers only the employed 6. CHI covers the majority of population
7. CHI compensates for only some types of 
medical treatment
8. CHI compensate for almost all types of medical 
treatment
9. Only some health services joined CHI 10. The majority of health services joined CHI
11. Have no idea about the organisation of CHI
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Q. 8. Please, from the statements below choose the one that reflects vour opinion 
best.
1. The right to carry out health insurance should be given only to state or 
municipal -owned firms.
2. Private health insurance companies are more interested in money turnover, 
their activities should be under strict scrutiny.
3. Establishment of private companies will only allow at the first stage to overcome 
residual principle of health care financing and to create favourable conditions for 
CHI development.
Q. 9. What are the reasons that hamper the development of CHI in Moscow? Please, 
circle only the most important or write in vour own
1. Nothing hampers.
2. Political instability
3. Lack of legislative regulations.
4. Lack of interest on the part of Moscow authorities.
5. Drop in enterprise profits.
6. Incompetence of Moscow authorities.
7. Hard to say.
Q.10. Please, circle the statements with which you agree
1. The state should assume the whole responsibility for the health care of its citizens
2. Every person should take care about his/her own health.
3. Employers should contribute to health care of employees, it is their social 
responsibility.
4. Employers could take part in health protection of their employees, but only in case 
they have financial resources.
5. Expenses on health protection of employees are additional non-productive 
expenditures.
6. Issues connected with employees’ health protection are beyond employer’s 
responsibilities.
Q.11. Do you think that participating in CHI as it is organised now vou fulfil vour 
responsibilities as employer in health protection of vour employees?
fully partly considerably to some 
extent
not at all hard to say
6 5 4 3 2 1
295
Q.12. Has an introduction of CHI contributions changed vour attitude towards the role
of enterprise in health protection of its employees?
1. Yes
2. No ( if no go to Q 15).
3. Can’t say
Q.13. To what extent introduction of CHI contributions has changed vour position to 
health care protection of vour employees?
to a great to considerable to some extent very little not at all hard to say 
extent extent
6 5 4 3 2 1
Q.14. If it has changed then how (circle the appropriate)
1. Employers should undertake more effort to protect their own employees’ health, CHI 
is not enough
2. Employers should fully rely on CHI
3. Employers should be more active in CHI system
Q.15. How the development of health care plans at vour firm could influence the 
following processes . Please, mark in each row: 0- do not influence. 1-influence. 2- 
infiuence very much
1. Providing stimulus for employees
2. Trying to keep labour force
3. Attracting employees
4. Creating image of a good employer
5. Preserving tradition
6. Getting tax relief.
7. As a part of recreation process
8. Implementation of the constitutional right that goes with 
employment
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Q.16. There are a lot of discussions now about the role which enterprises might plav 
in health care. In connection with this what would be important for vou as an 
employer? Please, circle the appropriate.
1. Present system is ok: employers should only pay CHI contributions.
2. Employers should directly participate in taking decisions on CHI.
3. Employers should deal with HIC directly without any intermediaries.
4. Employers should have the right to choose between HIC.
5. Employers should pay for voluntary health insurance.
6. Employers should have financial concessions in CHI system provided they finance 
their own health care plans.
Q.17. Do vou think that CHI contributions are:
1. ordinary tax
2. earmarked tax
3. rather a social obligation
Q.18. Do vou think in the nearest future would the contributions to CHI system are 
likely to:
1. Increase
2. Remain the same
3. Decrease.
4. Can’t answer/ difficult to predict
Q 19. Do vou think that in CHI system those employed should have (please, circle 
the appropriate)
1. special regime
2. be treated equally with other groups of population
3. no opinion
Please, give a reason for your response
Q.20 Should employees contribute to CHI?
1. Yes
2. No (if no, go to Q.21)
3. Hard to say
Q. 21. In what proportion?
1. More that employers.
2. As much as employers.
3. Less than employers.
4. Hard to say
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Q 22. . At present firms participate in CHI, organised at the state level. What do vou 
think might be other arrangements for a firm to participate in the health care system?
1. Budget medicine should be preserved, financed from taxation
2. An enterprise should participate in CHI as it is organised by the state at present.
3. An enterprise could at its own discretion participate in voluntary health insurance in 
addition to CHI.
4. An enterprise could at its own discretion participate in health insurance programmes 
with the right in such a case to opt out of CHI.
5. An enterprise might provide medical services in kind for its employees with the right 
in such a case to opt out of CHI.
6. An enterprise is obliged by law to finance as well as administer its own health 
insurance plans with the state-organised health care system in this case covering 
only some categories of population (disabled, unemployed).
7. An enterprise should pay for medical services for their employees in case of 
emergency.
Q. 23. Please, rank vou choice for Q.22
1.
2.
3.
Q.24. To what extent vou can in practice influence the adoption of decisions bv 
legislative and executive bodies, concerning participation of firms in health 
protection of their employees:
to a great 
extent
to some 
extent
very little not at all hard to say
Moscow CHI fund
Moscow Department of 
Health
Local authorities in your 
area
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Q.25. Do vou discuss health care problems among the managerial staff of vour 
enterprise?
1. Often ( more than once a month)
2. Sometimes ( less than once a month)
3. Almost never.
Q. 26. How decisions on health issues are usually taken at vour enterprise?
1. Reaching consensus between managers.
2. Voting at managerial meetings.
3. By those in charge.
4. Voting at labour collective meetings.
Q 27. What is vour role in the process of development of health plans at vour 
enterprise? Please, circle one statement in each column.
methods of DarticiDation stvle of behaviour
1. generator of ideas 1. observer
2. concept developer 2. diplomat
3. analyst 3. centrist
4. expert-consultant 4. reformer
5. critic-opponent 5. conservative
6. head of the development team
7 project manager
Q.28. What do vour enterprise plan to do with health centres/health stations in the 
nearest future.
1. Sell health care facilities.
2. Transfer them to local authorities.
3. Join CHI.
4. Provide treatment for employees only.
5. Expand the range of services provided.
Q.29.Do vou plan to arrange for voluntary health insurance in the nearest future:
1. Yes
2. No
3. Hard to say
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Q 30. There are different opinions about whether employers need associations on
federal and local level to help them to solve health care problems. What do vou think 
about it?
1. This is the task of Federal and Moscow CHI Funds
2. The creation of special associations in a new form is desirable
3. It is necessary to make better use of industry organisations
4. Have no opinion
5. Other, please, specify
Q 31. What among their tasks would be the most important for vou (tick the appropriate)
1. Representation of your interest on the national level on strategic issues
2. Representation of your interests on the local level
3. Nomination of employers’ representatives to the Boards of CHI funds
4. Administration and finance of local health plans
5. Use jointly health facilities
6. Organisation of commercial activities in health and health insurance 
Personal details.
Sex: 1. M 2. F
Age:
1. under 30 years old
2. 31-40 years old
3. 41-50 years old
4. 51-60 years old
5. above 60 years old
Education:
Graduate degrees
1. technical
2. humanitarian
3. natural sciences 
other degrees_____________
THANK YOU FOR CO-OPERATION!
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AHKETA RJVL MEHEJ^KEPOB
ripocuM Bac BbicKa3aTb CBoe OTHomeHne KaK pa6oToaaTejifl k npo6/ieMaM m nyTBM 
pecfjopMnpoBaHMfl 3,qpaBOOxpaHeHMfl b P<t>, co3AaHMK> CMCTeMbi o6«3aTenbHoro 
MeflMUMHCKoro CTpaxoBaHMfl (OMC) m b cbh3m c stmm k tom ponM, KOTopyio npeAnpMHTMe 
(opraHM3auMB) MrpaeT b oxpaHe 3flopoBbB cbomx cotpyahmkob .
flna 3anonHeHMfl aHKeTbi o6BeAMTe HOMepa oTBeTOB, cooTBeTCTByiomMx BaiueMy MHeHMio, 
mjim HanMLUMTe CBoe.
1. B KaKOM CTeneHM Bbl MHCfaOPMMPOBaHbl o Pa3BHTHM B POCCMM CMCTeMbi 
o6H3aTeribHoro MeflMUMHCKoro CTpaxoBaHMH (OMC)?
1. 3HatO 0  P33BMTMM CMCTeMbi AaBHO, MMeiO KOMneTeHTHOe MHeHMe.
2. 3Haio HeflaBHO, 3aMmepecoBaH y3HaTb no6ojibwe.
3. Koe-HTO c/ibiman, MMeio cnyMaMHyio MHcpopMauMio.
4. He BCTpenan hm kbkom MHcjDopMauMM.
5. MeHB 3Ta MHcfropMauMfl He MHTepecyeT.
2. OTMeTbTe Te cvxcneHUH. c KOTOPbiMM Bbi comacHbi.
1. Pa3BMTMe OMC He a o jd kh o  conpoBO>KAaTbCH cHMweHMeM ypoBHH roc6iOA>KeTHoro 
CpMHaHCMpOBaHMH.
2. OMC Aon>KHa ctpomtch no TeppMTopManbHOMy npMHUMny, cjDMHaHCMpoBaHMe b 
OCHOBHOM AOJDKHO BeCTMCb M3 6>OA>KeTOB perMOHOB.
3. OMHaHCMpOBaHMe OMC AOJDKHO BeCTMCb M3 6>OA>KeTOB perMOHOB M B3HOCOB 
npeAnpMHTMM (opraHM3auMM).
4. HaceneHne aojdkho npMHMMaTb HenocpeACTBeHHoe ynacTMe b $MHaHCMpoBaHMM 
CMCTeMbi OMC.
5. CMCTeMa OMC npM3BaHa HMBennpoBaTb Heo6ocHOBaHHbie pa3JiMHMH b 
npeAOCTaBJieHMM m c a m a m h c k m x  ycjiyr, B03HMKi±ine b perMOHax.
6. CMCTeMa OMC HanpaBJieHa Ha to, hto6n  MeAMUMHCKMe ycjiyrM 6buiM 6ojiee 
AOCTynHbi ajdi HaceneHMH.
7. Mmhmmym MeAMUMHCKMx y c jiy r ao jdkho  rapaHTMpoBaTb rocyAapcTBO, CMCTeMa 
3ApaBOOXpaHeHMH AOJDKHa CTpOMTCH B COOTBeTCTBMM C CjDMHaHCOBblMM 
bo3mo>khocthmm perMOHOB, npeAnpMHTMM, HaceneHMfi.
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3 KaKHe ue/m. Ha Bam B 3 m n n . n p e c jie n o B a n o  n p a B m e n b C T B O . HaHMHaa CQBPeMeHHvto 
petbopMV 3fipaBooxpaHeHMfi? OdBeume Heo6xoflHMoe.
1. B B ecm  HenocpeACTBeHHbie B3H0Cbi npeAnpMHTMM Ha OMC ksk Aono/iHMTe/ibHbiM  
MCTOHHMK (JjMHaHCOBblX CpeflCTB flJIH CMCTeMbi 3flpaBOOXpaHeHMH.
2. M3MeHHTb CTpyKTypy CjDMHaHCMpOBaHMH OTpaCJlM, CHM3MB TOCyAapCTBeHHOe 
cpMHaHCHpoBaHHe 3a cneT npHBneneHMH cpeACTB npeAnpMHTMM (opraHH3aunfi).
3. YnyHiiJHTb KanecTBO m@ahi4mhckmx ycnyr.
4. f la T b  nauweHTy B03M0>KH0CTb Bbi6opa.
5. noBbicmb acpcpeKTMBHOCTb CMCTeMbi 3ApaBooxpaHeHM«.
6 . C A enaTb nepBbiM iua r k npMBaTM3ai4MM mcamlimhckmx ynpe>KAeHMM.
4 Kaxoe BnenaTjieHMe v Bac CKnanbiBaeTca b uenoM o pa6oTe opraHM3auHM CMCTeMbi 
OMC ((bOHflOB M CTPaXOBbIX KOMnaHMM)?
1. 3 to HaAeJKHan, HywHaa A n *  HaceneHMH CMCTeMa.
2. 3 T 0  OAHa M3 MHOrOHMCJieHHblX 6»OpOKpaTMHeCKMX CTpyKTyp.
3. KoMMepnecKMe CTpyicrypbi Mcnonb3yioT mx ppa cbomx uejieii, ohm Mano cnyxoT 
o6iAecTBy.
4. 0 6  3tom y  MeHH noxa He cno>KMnocb BnenaTneHMH.
5. Kax Bbi oueHMBaeTe newTeribHocTb ueHTpanbHbix m MecTHbix ppraHOB BJiacm no 
PecfaOPMMPOBaHMK) CMCTeMbi 3flPaBOOXPaHeHMH B PO? OTMeTbTe no KaXCflOM CTDOKe
rionojKMTenbHO CKopee
nonojKmejibHo
CKopee
OTpuqaTenbHO
OTpuqaTenbHO 3aTpyflH«Kicb
OTBeTMTMb.
He MMeio
MH$OpMaUMM
npe3MAeHTa PO
OeAepanbHoro 
Co6paHM« PO
MMH3ApaBa PO
OeAepaxibHoro 
cpOHAa OMC
MeCTHbIX
MCnOJIHMTeilbHblX
opraHOB
MecTHoro (J)OHAa 
OMC
pyKOBOAMTeneM
npeAnpMHTMM
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6. KaKHe cbaKTOPbi npeMMvmecTBeHHO bjimbk>t Ha p a3B H T ne  nporpaMM b o6iiacTM
3flpaBooxpaHeHHfl Ha BaiueM npeanpHBTMH? OTMeTbTe HeoOxonHMoe.
1. flaBneHMe co CTopoHbi pa6oTHMKOB (ycnoBMB KormeKTMBHoro floroBopa).
2. no3HL(Hfl (pemeHMe co6paHM«) aKUMOHepoB.
3. no3Muna (peiueHne) npaBJieHMH.
4. JlnHHaa no3m4M« pyKOBOflmenB npeAnpMHTMH (opraHM3auMM).
5. OnHaHCOBaa cmyapua Ha npeAnpMHTMM.
6. HaiiMHMe Ha 6anaHce npeflnpMHTMH o6teKTOB 3flpaBOOxpaHeHHH.
7. Hto xapaxTepHO arm opraHH3aunn OMC b  MocRBe? OTMeTbTe noaxozwmee
1. OopMMpoB3HMe CMCTeMbi OMC 3aBepujeHO 2. CMCTeMa cfeopMMpyeTCfl
3. Co3flaH perMOHaiibHbiM MexaHM3M 
c|DMHaHCOBbix nocTynneHMM
4. OMHaHCMpOBaHMe CMCTeMbi 33TpyAHeHO
5. OMC oxBaTbmaeT JiMiiib pa6oTaioiHMX 6. OMC oxBaTbiBaeT Oonbwyio nacTb HaceneHMH
7. OMC pacnpocTpaH«eTCH JiMiiib Ha OTAeiibHbie 
BMAbl MeAMAMHCKOM nOMOIAM
8. OMC pacnpocTpaHHeTCH Ha 6ojibWMHCTBO 
BMAOB MeAMUMHCKOM nOMOLAM
9. OMC BBeAOHO nmub b OTAenbHbix 
MeAMUMHCKMx yHpe>KAeHMHx
10. OMC BBeAOHO B OOJIbUJMHCTBe MeAMUMHCKMX 
ynpe>KAeHMHX
11. C opraHM3aL(MeM OMC b ropoAe He 3H3kom
8. M3 nPHBeneHHbix Hn>xe BbicKa3biBaHHH Bbi6epme o ah o . b HaM6onbwefl CTeneHM 
QTBenaioLiiee BaweMV MHeHMio.
1. npaBO 3aHMMaTbCH CTpaXOBOM fleHTeribHOCTbHD B 06naCTH MeflMpHHbl AOJDKHO 
6biTb npeAOCTaBJieHO JiMWb npeAnpMHTMHM rocyAapcTBeHHon m MyHMLjMnanbHOM 
4>OpM C06CTBeHH0CTM.
2. MacTHbie CTpaxoBbie KOMnaHMM 6onbiije 3anHTepecoBaHbi b  npoKpyHMBaHMM AeHer, 
MX Ae«Te/lbHOCTb Hy>KHO CTpOrO KOHTpOJlMpOBaTb.
3. TonbKO pa3BMTne nacTHbix cipaxoBbix KOMnaHMM no3BO/iMT Ha nepBOM a ia n e  
npeOAOJieTb OCTaTOHHbIM npMHLJMn (jDMHaHCMpOBaHMfl MeAMAMHbl, C03flaTb yCJIOBMH 
AJifl noriHOMeHHoro pa3BMTM« OMC.
9. KaKMe nPMHHHbi. no BatueMv MHeHMio. o c h o >khhk)t  co3aaHMe CMCTeMbi OMC b BameM 
roDone? OTMeTbTe TOfibKO caMoe Ba?KHoe mjim HanMiiiMTe CBoe.
1. HMnero He ocnoKHaeT.
2. no/iMTMHecKan HecTaOM/ibHOCTb.
3. OTCyTCTBMe 3aK0H0A3TeAbH0M 6a3bl.
4. He3aMHTepecoBaHHocTb MecTHbix opraHOB BnacTM.
5. CHM>KeHMe AOXOAOB npeAnpMHTMM.
6. HeKOMneTeHTHOCTb pyKOBOAMTeneM McnoiiHMTenbHOM BJiacTM.
7. 3aTpyAHHKDCb OTBeTMTb.
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10. OTMeTbTe Te cv>KZieHna. c KOTOPbiMn Bbi comacHbi.
1. rocyflapcTBO aojdkho nonHocTbto B3«Tb Ha ce6a 3a6oiy 06 oxpaHe 3flopoBbH 
HaceneHHH.
2. Ka>KqbiH nenoBeK AOJDKeH npejKfle Bcero caM 0 AyMaTb 06 oxpaHe CBoero
3AOpOBbH.
3. Pa6oTOflaTejin aojdkhn BHecTu cboh BKnafl b oxpaHy 3flopoBba cbohx 
COTpyAHHKOB, 3T0 Bbipa)KeHHe HX COUMaJlbHOH OTBeTCTBeHHOCTH.
4. Pa6oTOAaTenn Moryr ynacTBOBaTb b oxpaHe 3AopoBb« cbohx COTpyAHHKOB, ho 
TO/ibKo b tom cjiyMae, ec/iH Ann aioro MMewTCH cooTBeTCTByromne (pHHaHCOBbie
B03M0)KH0CTH.
5. PacxoAbi no oxpaHe 3AopoBb« pa6oTHHKOB - 3to AononHHTenbHbie 
HenpoH3BOAHTe/ibHbie pacxoAbi.
6. Bonpocbi, CBH33HHbie c oxpaHOM 3AopoBb« pa6oTHMKOB, ne>KaT BHe npeAenoB 
o6n3aHHOCTeH pa6oTOAaiejiH.
11. CHHTaeTe jih Bbi. hto VHacTBva b OMC b tom  bhab xax oho opraHM30BaHO b 
HacTOHiuHH MOMeHT Bbi BbinojiHaeTe cboh o6w3aTejibCTBa xax DaSoToaaTejib no 
oxpaHe 3flOPOBbH CBOHX COTPVflHHKOB? Bbl6ePHTe II oSBe/lHTe Heo6xOflHMOe
1. riOJlHOCTbK) BbinOJIHHK).
2. B 3HaHMTenbHOH Mepe.
3. Bbino/IHHK) HaCTHHHO.
4. B onpeAeJieHHOH CTeneHM.
5. COBCeM He BbinOJIHHK).
6. 3aTpyAHHK)Cb OTBeTHTb.
12. noBJiHHiio jih BBeoeHHe QTHHCjieHMM Ha OMC Ha Bauiv no3nuwo no Bonpocv o 
pojiH npeanpHHTMH b oxpaHe 3nopoBbH pa6oTHMKOB?
1. fla
2. H ei (nponycTHTe Bonpocbi 13 h 14, nepexoAme k 15 Bonpocy)
3. 3aTpyAHHK)Cb OTBeTHTb.
13. Ecjih na  to  HacKOJibKO? Q6BennTe Heo6xoziHMoe
OneHb
CHJlbHO
3HaHHTenbHO B HeKOTOpOH 
CTeneHH
He3HaHHTenbHO CoBceM He 
H3MeHHJiaCb
TpyAHO
CKa3aTb
6 5 4 3 2 1
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1 4 .E c j ih  OHa M3M e H n n a c b . t o  kskmm o 6 p a 3 0 M ?
1. Pa6oTOAaTenio cneAyeT npeflnpnHMMaib AonoxiHmenbHbie ycmjimb no oxpaHe 
3flopoBbn cbohx pa6oTHHKOB, CMCTeMa OMC He o6ecneHMBaeT noTpe6HocTeM
COTpyAHHKOB.
2. Pa6oTOAaTen»o cneAyeT orpaHMHMTbca ynacTMeM b OMC KaK oho opraHM30BaHO b 
HaCTOBU4MM MOMeHT.
3. Pa6oTOAaTenK) cneAyeT nponBJWTb 6onbiijyK) aKTMBHOCTb b CMCTeMe OMC.
15. HacKOJibKO pa3BMTne mchmuhhckhx nporpaMM Ha BauieM npeanpHBTMH 
(opraHH3auHH) Mo?KeT noB/iMHTb Ha cnezivtomiie npoueccbi. OueHMTe. noxonvMcra. 
no KaxcnoM no3HUHM no 6annaM: O-He BnnaeT. 1-BnnneT. 2-cnnbHO BnnneT.
CTMMyjlMpOBaHMe TpyAOBOM aKTMBHOCTM.
CoxpaHeHM e KaflpoB.
npHBneneHM e KaapoB Hy>KHOM KBanMCpMKaijMM.
Co3AaHMe MMMA>Ka npeAnpMBTMa, npeAnpMHMMaTena.
riOAAOpXOHMe TpaAMLJMM npeAnpMBTMB.
CHM>KeHMe HanoroBoro 6peMeHM.
MacTb npo uecca  BoccTaHOBjieHMa pa6oHeM c m jin
Pea/lM3ai4MB KOHCTMTyUMOHHblX npaB 3aHBTblX.
16 CeMHac mhoto roBOPBT o tom dojim. kotopvio npennPMnTHe Morno 6bi cbirpaTb b
CMCTeMe OMC. CKnaiibiBatomeMcn ceMHac b Poccmm. B cbb3m c 3tmm hto 6bino 6bi b3?kho
ana Bac KaK pa6oTOziaTenn?
1. CymecTByKDiuan CMCTeMa yAOBJieTBopMTenbHa: pa6oTOAaTennM AOCTaTOHHO npocTO 
nnaTMTb b3hocn Ha cjDMHaHcnpoBaHMe OMC.
2. Pa6oTOAaTenM aojpkhh npMHMMaTb HenocpeACTBeHHoe ynacTMe b npMHBTMM 
pemeHMM no noBOAy opraHH3aunn m cpHHaHCHpoBaHHa CMCTeMbi OMC.
3. PaSOTOAaTeilM AO/l>KHbl MMeTb AeJlO HenOCpeflCTBeHHO CO CTpaXOBbIMM KOMnaHMBMM 
6e3 ynacTMa nocpeAHMKOB.
4. Pa6oTOAaTenM aojdkhw MMeTb npaBO Bbi6MpaTb Me>KAy CTpaxoBbiMM KOMnaHMBMM.
5. Pa60T0AaTe/lM AOJDKHO 3ai01K)HaTb AOrOBOpbl 0 A06pOBOJlbHOM MeAMLJMHCKOM 
CTpaXOBaHMM CBOMX COTpyAHHKOB.
6. Pa6oTOAaTe/iM AOJDKHbi MMeTb npaBO Ha cfwHaHCOBbie nbroTbi b CMCTeMe OMC 
npn ycnoBMM opraHM3at4MM mmm co6cTBeHHbix nporpaMM no 3ApaBooxpaHeHMK).
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17 Kan Bbi paccMaTPHBaeTe B3Hocbi Ha OMC?
1. OGbiMHbiM Hanor.
2. CneunanbHbiPi Hanor.
3. CKopee KaK coLjiianbHoe o6«3aienbCTBo.
1 8 . KaK Bbi cH H TaeTe. h to  b  6 n n M a M w e M  6 v n v m e M  n p o n 3 0 H neT c  B3 H o caM n  Ha OMC?
1. yBenMHaTCH.
2. OCTaHyTCH T3KMMM >Ke.
3. yMeHbiijaTcn.
4. TpyflHO npeflCKa3aTb.
1 9 . KaK B b i CHHTaeTe. KaKOBO h o j d k h o  6 b iT b  O T H o w eH n e  k paS oTatoum iM  b  c iiC TeM e  
OMC.
1. flonwHbi nonb30Baibcn cneunanbHbiM pe>KMMOM.
2. Ha o6lmhx ocHOBaHMax.
3. 3aipyflHBiocb OTBeTHTb.
yKa>KHTe, no>KanyficTa, noneMy_______________________________________________________
20. Ilon>KHbi nH pa6oTHMKH HecTH pacxoflbi no OMC?
1. f la .
2. HeT. ( nponycTme 21 Bonpoc, nepexoflme cpa3y k 22 Bonpocy).
3 . 3aTpyflHHK)Cb OTBeTHTb.
21. Eonn na. to  b KaKOM nponopuuM?
1. B onb ine , newi pa6oTOflaTenb.
2. B paBHOM flone c paSoTOflaTeneM.
3. M eH b in e, HeM pa6oTOAaTenb.
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2 2 . B  H a c T o n iu e e  B peM n ripexinpHHTHe (o p ra H H 3 a iiH 5 0  vn a c T B y eT  b  c n c T e M e  O M C . 
o p ra H H 3Q B aH H oro  Ha ro cv jiap cTB eH H O M  yp o B H e . KaK B b i C M m aeT e . b  kb k h x  f lp y ru x  
cboP M ax Mo?KeT n pepn pH H TH e  (o p ra H M 3 a u n a ) vnacTB O B aTb  b  p a 6 o T e  cn cT eM e  
3np aB O O xpaH eH M «?  O TM eTbTe H e o 6 x o n n M o e .
1. CoxpaHJieTCfl cucieMa rocyaapcTBeHHoro 3ApaBooxpaHeHHn, c|3HHaHCHpyeMoro H3 
06lHMX 6lOfl>KeTHblX CpeflCTB.
2. npeAnpMflTiie yMacTByeT b OMC, opraHH30BaHHOM Ha rocyflapcTBeHHOM ypoBHe b 
ero coBpeMeHHOM BMfle.
3 . npeflnpHHTMe no wenaHHio noMHMO ynacTHH b OMC 3aiaiK)HaeT floroBop o 
A06p0B0nt>H0M MeflMUMHCKOM CTpaXOBaHHH.
4. npeAnpMHTiie no x<enaHMK) yMacTByeT b CTpaxoBbix mbamumhckhx nporpaMMax, 
nojiynan npn stom  B03M0>KH0CTb He ynacTBOBaTb b o6meH CHdeMe OMC.
5. npeAnpHHTiie HenocpeACTBeHHO oOecneHHBaeT cbohx  COTpyAHHKOB 
MeAHUMHCKHMM ycnyraMH b co6cTBeHHbix MeAHKo-caHmapHbix nacTnx, nojiynan 
npn 3tom  npaBO Ha BbixoAa H3 cHcreMbi OMC.
6. ripeAnpnnTne o6n3aHO no 3aKOHy cjDHHaHcnpoBaTb co6dBeHHbie MeAHAHHCKHe 
nporpaMMbi nnn pa6oTHHKOB, rocyAapcTBeHHoe 3ApaBOOxpaHeHHe npn s to m  
orpaHMHeHO OTAenbHbiMH KaieropnnMH HacexieHHH (HeTpyAOcnoco6Hbie, 
6e3pa6oTHbie).
7. flpeAnpHHTMe onnanHBaeT MeAHUHHCKyio noMomb coTpyAHmoM b  aKCTpeHHbix 
cnynanx.
2 3  npopaHxoipvHTe. nowanvHCTa. B am  B b i6 o p .
1. 
2.
3 .
2 4 . O ueHHTe CTeneHb B a iuero  b jihhhhh  KaK p a6o To aaTe jin  Ha nD3KTHK8 Ha npHHHTHe 
rocvnapcTBeHHbiMH opraHaMH peweHHH. Kacatomnxcn vnacTHH npeanPHHTHH 
(opraHH3aunM) b cncTeMe 3apaBOOxpaHeHHH?
BbicoKan CpeAHHH HH3K3H HeT
BJ1HHHHH
3aTpyAHHK)Cb
OTBeTHTb
M ockobckhh 0OHA OMC
flenapiaMeHT
3ApaBOOxpaHeH
MOCKBbl
MecTHbie opraHbi 
MCnOJlHHTeribHOM BJiaCTH
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2 5 . 0 6 c v x m a e T e  f in  B b i n p o 6 n e M b i. CBH3aHHbie c  oxpaH O M  3,nopO Bbfl pa6oTHMKOB. 
c p e n H  pvKOBOflMTexieii B a iu e ro  n perm pH H TH a?
1. Mado ( n am e, neM  pa3 b M ecau)
2. MHorfla (pew e, neM pa3 b Mecfiu)
3. IIOHTM HMKOrfla.
2 6 . KaK npHHHMaiOTCfl pew eH M H  n o  B o n p o c a M  o x p a H b i 3 ja o p o B b a  c o tp v a h m k o b  Ha 
B a m e M  n p eanp uB T M H ?
1. flocTMweHwe KOHceHcyca cpeflM pyxoBOACTBa npeflnpuBTMA.
2. ripoBefleHne ronocoBaHUB cpeflu pyKOBOflmenefi npeAnpMHTMfl/axuMOHepoB.
3. n o  peweHMK) pyxoBOAMTejieii, HenocpeflCTBeHHO OTBenaiOLAMx 3a flaHHbie  
Bonpocbi
4. npoBefleHne ro/iocoBaHMB Ha o6meM co6paHMM TpyflOBoro xojuiexTMBa.
2 7 . K axoB a B a m a  p o /ib  b  n p o u e c c e  p a3p a6o T K n  CHCTeMbi co iiM anbH O M  3 a m m b i ( b  
to m  MMCJie b  o 6 jia c T H  3 flp aB o o xp aH eH H «>  n a  B a m e M  n pen n p H B T H H ?  O TM eTbTe  
H e o 6 x o iin M o e  n o  K axm oM v c to j i6 u v
n o  M eTonaM  vHacTMB no CTMJ1K) nOBeneHMH
1. re H e p a io p  MfleM 1. Ha6/iK )A aTejib
2 . pa3pa6oTHMK xoHLieriMMM 2. AnnrioM aT
3. aHajiMTMK-npomo3MCT 3. AeHTpMCT
4. 3KCnepT-K0HCyJlbTaHT 4. paAHKa/i-peBOJiiOMMOHep
5. KpMTMK-OnnOHeHT 5. CTOpOHHMKTpaAMAMM
6. opraH M 3aiop  rpynnbi pa3pa6oTHMKOB
7. pyKOBOAMTenb npoexTa b uenoM
2 8 . H t o  Bbi n p aH M pyeTe  n pep n p H H B T b  b  6jiH>xaHLueM 6 v a v m e M  n o  n o B o z iv  o6~beKTbi 
3 flp a B o o x p a H e H H 5 i?  O TM eTbTe H e o 6 x o iW M o e .
1. OTKpblTb MX flJIB CMCTeMbi OMC.
2. npOflOJDKaTb 06cny>KMBaTb TOJlbXO CBOMX pa60THMK0B.
3. PacuiMpMTb o O te M  npeflociaB JineM bix m g a h u m h c k m x  yc /iy r.
4. npoflaTb.
5. n e p e f la ib  Ha 6anaH C  MecTHbix opraHOB BnacTM.
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29. rinaHHPveTe Jin Bbi b 6jin)KaftiueM OvnvuueM nPMHBTb VMacme b no6poBOJibHOM
MeflMUMHCKOM CTPaXOBaHHH?
1. fla
2. HeT
3. TpyflHO CKa3aTb 
yxawMTe, nowanyiicTa, noneMy.
30 E c T b  p a3 H b ie  M H e m ia  o H eo 6 xonHM O CTn o 6 T»eiiHHeHMfl vcmjimm p a 6 oToziaTeneM  b 
pem eHMM n p o S n e M  3 flp a B o o x p a H e H n a  Ha o 6 m epoccMMCKOM h p e m o H a n b H O M  
yp o B H e . H to  B b i 0 6  o to m  n v M a e T e ?  O TM eTbTe H eoO xo nM M oe w m  H a n n m m e  CBoe.
1. 3 to  3aflaHa cfreflepanbHoro m TeppmopnanbHbix c|)ohaob  O M C .
2 . Heo6xoAMMo jiymije ncnonb30B aib  OTpacneBbie/BeflOMCTBeHHbie opraHM3ai4MM
3. >KenaiejibHO co3flaHne cneunanbHbix accouMauMM paOoTOAaieneM b hobhx  
cpopMax
4. He MMeio onpeaeneH H oro  MHeHMa
5. flpyroe, HanMLiime_______________________________________________________
31. KaKMe M3 BQ3MO?KHblX (faVHKUMH T3KMX o praH H 3au M H  (acco iiM au M M ) H a n 6 0 Jiee  
a irrv a r ib H b i n /iB  B a c ?  flonH eP K H H Te H e o 6 x o n M M o e .
1. npeacTaBMTenbCTBO MmepecoB pa6oTOAaieneM b AeHTpa/ibHbix opraHax BnacTM.
2 . n  peacT a  b M ien  bCTBO M m epecoB  pa6oTO A aieneM  b MecTHbix o praH ax BnacTM.
3. HoMMHaAMB npeACTaBMTe/ieM pa6oTOAaTeneM b npaBneHMB cJdohaob O M C .
4. OpraHM3ai4MB m cpMHaHCMpoBaHMe MecTHbix c ipaxo B b ix  m6amamhckmx nporpaM M .
5. CoBMecTHaa aKcnnyaiauMB MecTHbix m BeAOMCTBeHHbix oOteicroB 
3ApaBooxpaHeHMB.
6. OpraHM3aqMB KOMMepnecKOM AeBTenbHOCTM b o6nacTM 3ApaBOOxpaHeHMa m 
MeAMUMHCKOrO CTpaXOBaHMB.
7. Pa3BMTMe Me>KAyHapOAHblX CBB3eM M npOeKTOB.
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Bam non: 1. MywcKofi 2. weHCKMii
Bam BQ3DacT:
1.- f lo 3 0 n e i 
2- o t  31 flo 40 neT
3 o t  41-50 neT
4 51-60 neT
5 CTapine 60 neT
O6pa30BaHne:
1 Bbiciuee TexHUMecKoe
2 BbiCLuee ryMaHmapHoe
3 Bbiciuee ecTecTBeHHO-HayHHoe
4 cpeflHee cneuwanbHoe
CflACMEO 3A COTPYflHMHECTBO!
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